

by Captain Donald A. Neill



ETHICS AND THE MILITARY CORPORATION

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Who guards the guardians?)

- Juvenal

Without entering into the specifics of individual cases, I doubt the reader will argue that noteworthy ethical failures have occurred throughout Western military forces over the past several decades, and appear likely to continue to do so. Incidences of ethical failure have involved military and public service personnel of all age groups, all elements and without regard to religion, ethnicity, gender or any other criteria. Whether the increasing damage resulting from the exposure of unethical activity is the result of an actual increase in such activity, or an increase in public scrutiny of armed forces, is immaterial; damage has occurred, costing militaries badly-needed defence dollars, public esteem, fragile morale, declining recruiting and even a certain amount of self-respect. Perhaps worst of all has been a minor but measurable decline in national confidence in armed forces in general, a phenomenon observed in the United States in the mid-1970s, and in Canada in the mid-1990s.

Two initial conclusions may be drawn from these facts: first, that it is impossible to calculate in advance the potential impact of ethical failures upon the military forces of a nation; and second, that the potential for ethical failures is a problem independent of service, branch, unit, group, rank or individual. In this context, minor cultural variations aside, the armed forces of

Canada and the United States are representative of typical Western military organizations, in the sense that what has befallen them as a result of increasing interest in ethical conduct threatens all equally. While the engine of ethical scrutiny may differ from nation to nation, what is of concern to this present work is not the engine, but that behaviour that fuels it.

The term 'professional' is often applied to career soldiers throughout the Western world, and the role of the officer has been labeled 'the profession of arms' by analysts as diverse as Gwyn Dyer and General Sir John Hackett. In general terms, a profession boasts five elements distinguishing it from other occupations: a systematic theory (how it works); a system of authority (who reports to whom); community sanction (that it is both legal and acceptable to society); a culture; and an ethical code.¹ What distinguishes the military profession from other professions is the nature of its ethical code, the foundation of which is voluntary subordination of one's own interests to those of the state. This foundation, however, while necessary, is not sufficient to the ethical standard required of the soldier. The aim of this paper is to define military ethical behaviour in the context of liberal democratic societies, examine the sources of ethical failure in the armed forces of Canada

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and the United States, and from that attempt to define the fundamental ethical code of the soldier. Boards of inquiry, courts martial and public censure may in part mitigate the symptoms of ethical failure, but the determination and treatment of the root causes of the alleged 'crisis of ethics' in Western military organizations is a more complex and longer-term exercise, and is unavoidably the task of those organizations themselves.

ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR

Depending upon one's preference for a particular intellectual school, ethical values may be considered to be either relative, absolute or some combination of the two. Psychologists tend to adhere to the former description, religionists to the latter, while philosophers, perhaps not surprisingly, are distributed evenly along the continuum. For the purposes of this paper I have adopted a dualist philosophic approach in the sense that while ethical behaviour is considered relative to the social context in which it is developed, learned, practised and contravened, the ultimate aim of this discourse is to develop a generalizable ethical code applicable to the profession of arms — an absolutist injunction within a relativist context, if you will.

Ethical behaviour may be best defined as performance or conduct that meets the norms established by or for a given group. John R. Saul describes ethics by means of a vivid if somewhat irreverent allegory:

It takes less effort to push a little old lady off the sidewalk into oncoming traffic than it does to go around her....some people do this. Others, afraid of being caught, do not. Both see the law as a means to control mankind's unruly or unethical nature. A third group includes those in positions of power who consider the law and its enforcement to be the principal barrier between order and mayhem. They fear that without the law everyone might begin pushing little old ladies off sidewalks...

A fourth group, which may include as much as 90 percent of the population, perhaps 95 per cent, includes those who, even without witnesses, do not push little old ladies off sidewalks. They don't even consider it. They simply step aside...

The first two groups believe that ethics are a matter of measurement. The third do not believe in ethics and so replace them with a rationally organized antidote to fear. The fourth seems to understand that *ethics are a matter of personal daily practical responsibility*. They seem to know this irrespective of education, religion, whether reason is a conscious fact and whether or not they have access to sidewalks."²

All groups — state, corporate, cultural, scholastic, religious, military, professional, social or otherwise — possess, evolve or otherwise acquire a fundamental behavioural standard, adherence to which is a *sine-qua-non* of group membership. Codes of professional ethics serve three principle functions in society. First, they protect the members of the society against abuse by members of the profession who might choose to exploit their monopoly of expertise; second, they define the professional as a responsible and trustworthy expert in the service of his 'client'; and third, they "delineate the moral authority for actions necessary to the professional function but generally impermissible in moral terms".³ In the case of the military profession, the first aspect is necessary to assure the civilian populace that the army is its servant, not its master; the second, to reassure all and sundry that the army is capable, competent, ready and reliable in time of crisis; and the third, to establish within the army precisely when and under what conditions it may exercise its function — the deliberate and measured exercise of violence in the interest of the state. Thus, for the soldier there are established in time of war certain conditions under which he will be temporarily exempt from his basic, or societal, code of ethical behaviour. The very exercise of his function places him beyond the normal barriers of socially-acceptable ethical behaviour restricting his civilian compatriots. The contradictory nature of military ethics thus lies at the heart of the profession of arms, and will be discussed in depth further along in this paper.

Overlapping and opposing patterns of ethical behaviour invariably result in conflict. As an example, behavioural norms within Canadian society discourage engaging in anti-social activities such as vandalism and individual or group violence — and yet these are prerequisite behavioural patterns characteristic of the majority of urban youth gangs. Surgeons, in conflict with both their oath of ethical conduct and the ethical standards of the average citizen, are often called upon to allow one patient to expire in order to perform, for example, an organ transplant operation on another. And soldiers, in conflict both with society's *mores* and their own physiological needs and psychological fears, voluntarily engage in behaviour which may require them not only to kill, but to unhesitatingly risk their own injury or death in obedience to the orders of their superiors.

The conflict resulting from the superimposition of contradictory ethical standards is usually resolved by weighting, relativism, and social and individual justification; that is to say, in the case of the soldier, social and, in many cases, religious⁴ injunctions against killing are psychologically dealt with first, by the assurances of his commanders that the imperative of his country's need frees him of the moral strictures constraining his

civilian compatriots; second, by his commander's insistence that his country's cause is morally superior to that of the enemy; third, by the argument that his country's cause is 'just' (and therefore, by corollary, that of the enemy 'unjust'); and finally, by reminding him that whatever he fails to do unto the enemy, the enemy will surely do unto him. Given the appropriate circumstantial context (i.e., a trench at Passchendaele, the gun deck of a ship of the line at Trafalgar, or a shell-battered redoubt at Dien Bien Phu), the combination of these arguments is generally sufficient to override social programming and temporarily release the soldier to function in a fashion antithetical to the behavioural standards of his society, but appropriate to an environment which bears little resemblance to his homeland in time of peace.



Canadian Forces Photo by Sgt David Svanhall

Military organizations, however, do not exist in a vacuum, and their traditional isolation is rapidly being eroded by increasing public scrutiny facilitated by improvements in communications technology, resulting — as highlighted by Peter C. Newman in *The Canadian Revolution: From Deference to Defiance* — in an accelerating decline in public respect for public institutions. In the five decades since the Western world last mobilized its entire energies for catastrophic war, Western populations have become increasingly less inclined to grant their armed forces privileged status with respect to behaviour and conduct. Military organizations contravening the standards of their society either in peace or war must therefore expect a response in keeping neither with their own in-group perspective nor in the context of the operational environment in which they perform their duties, but rather from the perspective of their parent society.

Evolving social paradigms are at once simpler and more complex than those which military institutions are trained, and expect, to confront. The fundamental ethical question confounding lawmakers in any society is the determination of when, and under what circumstances, it is lawful for that society to undertake actions prohibited the individual. Common examples of this dilemma are taxation, capital punishment, conscription and war, acts which, if performed by an individual citizen, would respectively translate as robbery, murder,

enslavement and criminal assault. Yet with the sanction of 'lawful authority', the term coined by (or at least attributed to) Augustine in his discussion of just war, the state may undertake these activities in its own interests without fear of sanction.⁵ 'Lawful authority', which Augustine equated with God and which to him meant the divinely-appointed sovereign, signifies to modern Western man the powers vested in a democratically-elected government enjoying the support of the majority of the population capable of exercising franchise. This distinction is particularly germane to discussions of *jus ad bellum*, or the right of the state to initiate war, as 'lawful authority' is the first and most fundamental requirement of the profession charged with the

application of violence — and is the obverse of 'moral responsibility', the second such requirement. The key difference between the authorities and responsibilities of the state and those accruing to the soldier who serves it is that while military professionalism presupposes an array of moral obligations developed and refined over millennia, *droit d'état*, as espoused by *inter alia* Machiavelli, Voltaire, Clausewitz and Mao, does not.

It is in the *métier* of the soldier that the ethical standards of society, particularly Western society, and the ethical standards of the professional in-group differ most markedly. The Western social behavioural benchmark is founded in the Judeo-Christian tradition, and espouses tolerance, calm, sobriety, fiscal ambition, political activity, family values and the rational settlement of disputes. Military organizations, on the other hand, have historically tolerated, occasionally insisted upon, and have only recently attempted to restrain aggressive behaviour, intolerance of out-group individuals (who may range from friendly civilians to enemy soldiers), occasional abuse of alcohol, in-group bonding, contempt for financial goals, political abstemiousness and the personal (ofttimes physical) resolution of disputes between soldiers. The gulf between the two behavioural patterns continues to expand with increasing rapidity as concern for human rights continues to percolate across traditionally impermeable barriers. The social context within which military organizations operate is changing rapidly as a result; and the failure by such organizations to recognize and react or adapt to

social change lies at the crux of the problems of excessive scrutiny, suspicion, and distrust that they are facing today.

Resolving the conflict between in-group ethical behaviour and ethical behaviour as defined by society is a complex psychological and operational problem. Professional militaries since the Eighteenth Century have generally accomplished this goal by isolating recruits and subjecting them to a deliberately harsh process of in-group socialization aimed at replacing the restrictive elements of learned cultural behavioural patterns with those more appropriate to the soldier's lot, including but not limited to the willingness to obey legitimate orders without question, to engage in life-threatening activity without succumbing to fear, and to kill efficiently and without hesitation. This early socialization continues to be reinforced after recruit training through a variety of patterned stimuli including the mechanism of barracks life, and is regularly stiffened through the devices of unique appearance (hair-styles and uniforms), speech patterns (proper modes of address for superiors and subordinates, and the use of military jargon), distinctive regalia (medals, insignia, unit flashes and buttons) and pervasive and repetitive modes of behaviour, such as walking in formation, saluting, freedom-of-the-city parades and the like. Basic training serves to set the soldier apart from his civilian compatriots and inculcate in him the fundamental behavioural patterns of his profession, while strictly enforced behavioural norms buttress these patterns throughout his career.

SOURCES OF ETHICAL FAILURE

If we are to attempt to delineate for the profession of arms an ethical code designed to address the problems postulated in the foregoing sections of this paper, it is necessary to first examine the sources of that failure. Where military ethical failures are concerned, these sources are threefold, and can be traced to pre-induction societal conditioning, the socialization process imposed by military forces themselves, and conscious individual action — in short, unconscious behavioural standards imprinted by society, unconscious behavioural standards imprinted by the profession, and conscious behaviour.

Each of these factors can have a negative influence on the ethical conditioning of the soldier, and will be examined in detail in the following sections.

The Society

Critics of the performance of military personnel generally forget one of the most pervasive elements of the recruiting process throughout the Western world: that with very few exceptions, a nation's army is made up of the nation's citizens. It is a fundamental tenet of psychology that basic sociological conditioning takes place during childhood, and that any individual is far less likely to acquire behavioural patterns perfectly after having attained adolescence. Without exception, Western military organizations recruit civilians well after adolescence has been attained, and thus it would appear that, long-service veterans excepted, the majority of military personnel will at any given moment have spent a greater portion of their lives as a civilian citizen than as a soldier.⁶ Since time spent as a civilian is invariably the earlier or primary learning years, it follows that society must bear a significant responsibility for the behavioural patterns which it imparts to the citizen before that citizen chooses to become a soldier.

A variety of trends unique to contemporary Western society contribute greatly to ethical failures once the citizen dons a uniform. Among these is a waning respect for personal rights and privileges, including privacy, individual opinion, and religious convictions, of which the increasing incidence of religious fundamentalism, hate crimes and acts of 'home-grown terrorism' are excellent examples. A diminishing respect for property, evinced by the decay of urban centres largely at the hands of their occupants, may also be postulated, as may a marked lack of respect for cultural differences, whether physical, psychological, or ideological.⁷

Combined with these are negative societal traits resulting from growing ideological extremism and excessively zealous adherence to the ill-defined ideal of 'political correctness'. Increasing media pervasiveness is fostered by the explosion in information technology



and insistence upon absolute transparency in all public institutions, which encourages members of the fourth estate to question institutions previously immune to doubt. Military forces are only the most recent of public organizations to fall under intense scrutiny as citizens demand accountability in return for their tax dollars.

In short, military organizations in democratic societies are perforce required to induct citizens that have already been subjected, on average, to nearly two decades of exposure to rapidly changing societal attitudes which in many cases reflect values different from, and in some cases antithetical to, the core values required by military organizations in order to be effective. The citizens then moulded into soldiers may possess underlying ethical standards which differ radically from those which must be imparted during military socialization, risking ethical conflicts and all that these imply. Society must therefore bear a good portion of the burden of blame for ethical failures amongst members of the military, as each citizen will unavoidably reflect both the good and the bad characteristics of the society which forms him. As Peter C. Newman notes:

...all navies, armies and air forces mirror the character of the societies they are sworn to defend. If the ultimate purpose of our military is hard to pin down, it's because we as a people lack a definable creed or even a set of common beliefs.⁸

The Individual

A discouraging side-effect of the spreading and otherwise praiseworthy progress of social democracy throughout Western societies has been the lamentable tendency to shift responsibility for the failures or crimes of the individual to the broader and therefore more diffuse shoulders of society as a whole. This tendency towards abdication of personal responsibility for one's actions, albeit less prevalent before the all-embracing liberalizing trends of the nineteen fifties, sixties and seventies, if taken to extremes echoes the arguments of those individuals charged with having committed crimes against humanity during the Second World War, and is enshrined in the spurious legal defence of *respondeat superior* — more popularly expressed as 'I was only following orders'. International law and the law of armed conflict have since put paid to that defence by defining the moral and legal obligation of the soldier to refuse an order that is manifestly unlawful (e.g., to murder prisoners, to rape, otherwise abuse or kill civilians, or to engage in the wilful and purposeless destruction of civilian property). Societal indifference notwithstanding, therefore, the responsibility for one's own actions remains with the individual soldier, be he Private or General — as does the concomitant injunction to exer-

cise individual judgement in responding to orders. The argument posed by the character John Bates during his twilight debate with his disguised monarch in Shakespeare's *Henry V* — "We know enough if we know we are the King's subjects. If his cause be wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us" — is no longer a valid defence. Henry's response to Bates' charge clearly establishes individual responsibility even in the context of medieval Christian morality: "Every subject's duty is the King's; but every subject's soul's his own."⁹ Individual responsibility is likewise established *a priori* in courts of law, both national and international, and yet for some reason contemporary Western society has made significant inroads towards abolishing it as a vital social convention.

Notions of personal responsibility are further enshrined in the commissioning scroll through which the officer is charged by the sovereign both with the direction and discipline of the soldiers placed under his command and obedience to the orders of those designated his superiors. Obedience to the will of the sovereign, however, has the potential to come into conflict with one's ethical duty in the peculiar circumstances engendered by war, and it is here that the individual judgement and moral character of the soldier once again come into play. An obvious example is the plight of the Free French during the Second World War, who were faced with a choice between obedience to the orders of the duly constituted head of state and ceasing resistance to a brutal invader and an odious regime, or in effect choosing treason by attempting to combat the invader. History has not only exonerated De Gaulle, the Free French and the Resistance, but has raised them to folkloric (and in De Gaulle's case, deific) status, while simultaneously demonizing the Pétain regime. Disobedience to his superiors and his nominal head of state was, in this instance and in the opinion not only of De Gaulle and the thousands of his countrymen who flocked to his banner, but posterity as well, a moral obligation. A soldier lacking solid ethical priorities and incapable of making such a choice could not have come to the decision made by De Gaulle and his followers.

The second and perhaps weightiest factor determining the reactions of the individual in a situation requiring a moral choice are those elements of his character that have been determined by his environment; to wit personal experience and psychological trauma. Balanced against or working in conjunction with these elements are the motivators of ego and personal ambition. The same society that shields or even lionizes individuals who refuse to accept personal responsibility for their actions is simultaneously encouraging a self-indulgent standard of amorality in business, professional and social affairs worthy of a Borgia. Such attitudes are

antithetical to the profession of arms; individual acceptance of responsibility for one's actions and accountability for those of one's subordinates is and must remain one of the pillars of military service.

The Military

Deeds for which they would atone with their lives if committed in peace, we praise them for having done under arms. (Seneca)¹⁰

Finally, we must focus our attention on the role played by the military institution itself in engendering, fostering and perpetuating socially questionable standards of behaviour among their personnel. In a recent book, astronomer Carl Sagan examined the increasing effectiveness of operant conditioning in producing soldiers willing to fire their weapons in combat, which has resulted in a decrease in instances of combat inaction from approximately 85-90 percent during the First World War to less than 40 percent during the Vietnam War. He also cited a corresponding and well-documented rise in the incidence of battlefield stress casualties and post-repatriation traumatic stress disorders among returned soldiers. It would appear that while military training techniques are becoming increasingly effective at producing



aggressive soldiers, they remain less efficient at anticipating, averting, ameliorating or treating the psychological side-effects of their own success.

Problems with training methodology are as old as military organizations themselves. When Churchill characterized the traditions of the Royal Navy as consisting of little more than 'rum, sodomy, and the lash', his intent was to ridicule the stultifying effects of tradition — and he spoke, in effect, for all services. The military man,

according to Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, is a most conservative creature, who will not adopt an idea until it is obsolete, and will not abandon it until it has nearly destroyed him. This innate conservatism is in large part the result of the role of the military as guardian of the social order, and is itself a not unnatural response to anything which might unduly threaten that order — such as sudden and drastic social change, whether evolutionary or revolutionary in nature.

While such conservatism is not an entirely negative trait in moderation, when carried to extremes it may prove the undoing of the profession of arms. The practice of safeguarding legitimate tradition invariably spills over into the retention of outmoded operational procedures, the ultimate cost of which usually only becomes apparent when exorbitant casualty statistics are enumerated. The oft-quoted example of the light cavalry charge at Balaclava points up the futility of deploying chasseurs against infantry supported by cannon, a lesson that one might suppose ought to have been painfully evident to the army that had employed the regimental square to such devastating effect at Waterloo. Nonetheless, the dash and gallantry of the cavalry charge, however out of place on a battlefield where rifled musketry and breech-loading artillery were fast becoming the rule, remained to plague armies well into the Second World War — a triumph of dogged conservatism over common sense.

A major culprit within Western military organizations is the bureaucratization of the military profession. This phenomenon is now some four decades old, originating in a series of policy decisions made by liberal bureaucrats and business-trained defence officials during the early- to mid-1960s, in Canada and the United States alike. As Secretary of Defence under Kennedy and one of the latter's "whiz kids", Robert McNamara introduced to the military a new theory of management derived from his experience in the automobile industry. Business management principles became *de rigueur*, and business management techniques were to be applied by all and sundry to the day-to-day operations of government, the intricacies of international politics, and the operations of warfare alike. Business administration gradually made its way into think-tanks, universities and the Pentagon, and resulted in a generation of senior bureaucrats, politicians and generals who believed in, and attempted to apply to their duties, the rationalist doctrine of universal quantifiability. Business management techniques began to trickle down into the lower ranks of the military, and terms and concepts such as 'man-management' began to replace leadership at unit level and below. This proved to be a fundamental and crucial error, as management is not a substitute for leadership, but only a small and subordinate element of it.¹¹

The gradual encroachment of the business management fad within Canada's Department of National Defence has been admirably chronicled by Douglas Bland. When in 1947 then-Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton was examining possible candidates for the position of Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, his leading criteria were that the senior officer in question "must be good at paperwork, a genius at coordination, and a man in whom the government has complete confidence". Bland goes on to state that:

Brooke Claxton was looking for a new type of officer, not merely a war hero....He needed an officer who could easily and confidently function in both national and international political-military circumstances and *who would act not as an advocate for the military's point of view* but as a link between the military and the government. Such an officer had to have sharp skills honed...in the corridors of Ottawa's bureaucracy...a chairman who "[was] more a diplomat than a soldier." [italics added]¹²

What Claxton sought was an accomplished bureaucrat with the political savvy to navigate the murky waters of the Ottawa establishment, and a bemedalled uniform to command the respect of the military, but without either too distinguished a military record, a hardened military viewpoint or an excess of dedication to the military establishment itself. In short, he sought the quintessential corporate drone; an entity replete with 'form', but devoid of substance.

When MacNamara undertook to establish business management principles throughout the armed forces of the United States, he had a willing acolyte in then-Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer,¹³ whom Bland describes as follows:

Hellyer's "first love" was macro-economics and he had earned his way in business, a point he liked to emphasize when confronting government managers. Hellyer, the politician, however, was defined by...a zealous need for administrative order, and a critical, almost suspicious attitude, toward public servants and military officers and their advice.¹⁴

Hellyer applied his energy, political ambition and not inconsiderable administrative skills to bring about the unification of the Canadian Forces and the integration of headquarters,¹⁵ a process which, although it will not be discussed here, has been described as less of a military operational necessity, than "an act of mayhem committed in the name of administrative tidiness".¹⁶ What was significant was not the fact of unification itself, but the underlying reasons for bringing it about, none of which had anything to do with increasing the wartime effectiveness of the Canadian military establishment.

The process of bureaucratization continued with the appointment in 1970 of Donald MacDonald as Minister of National Defence. MacDonald established the Management Review Group (MRG), the mandate of which was "ostensibly to bring modern management techniques and organizational ideas into the CF and DND,"¹⁷ but the goal of which, according to Bland, was to accomplish a transfer of decision-making power from the hands of military personnel — in particular, the Chief of Defence Staff — into those of senior civilian bureaucrats within the Department. Bland's summary of the Group's recommendations notes that:

The MRG's preferred organizational solution was to separate the CDS from his traditional and legal responsibility to 'control and administer' the CF and to assign parts of this function to civilian members of DND. The leader of this new organization would be the Deputy Minister [a civil service bureaucrat] acting out of 'the office of the Minister' *where all departmental and military decisions would be taken...*

Other acts to limit the power of the CDS followed. The headquarters, amalgamated under the Deputy Minister, would include several civilian deputies to administer logistics and other functions, duties that would require them to give orders directly to the military commands in the field. The strategic planning process...would be directed by a 'politically sensitive civilian' acting for the deputy. The CDS in the end was expected to perform a coordinating role, although the MRG members...saw no need for an operational command function as such.¹⁸

In these recommendations, the members of the MRG went well beyond McNamara's or even Hellyer's wildest imaginings by advocating a transfer of the responsibility for the command and operational control of the Canadian Forces to a mixed coterie of serving officers and appointed civilian bureaucrats — in the case of the latter, a disturbing conferral of *de facto* authority over troops without assigning concomitant responsibility, as civilians are by definition neither subject to the chain of command nor bound by the same ethical code as members of the profession of arms. While these recommendations were poorly received by the Canadian Forces and government alike, they nevertheless serve as an excellent indicator of the way the management winds were blowing. The end result of this process was and remains a bifurcated senior command structure¹⁹ in which the Deputy Minister and the CDS function in essence as a single individual, and in which fully half of the 'group principal' or Lieutenant-General-equivalent positions are occupied by civilian bureaucrats possessing the *de facto* but not the *de jure* authority to issue orders to uniformed personnel.

Paul Manson — who later served as Chief of the Defence Staff — raised the troubling issue of the civilianization of headquarters in his 1973 article, posing questions such as “Where exactly does the civilian fit in when it comes to giving direction to the Canadian Forces? Precisely what authority may the civilian hold over his military counterpart?”²⁰ questions which were astute for his day, and which in our own have yet to be answered satisfactorily. The civilianisation of the senior command level of the CF remains a matter of serious concern, not least because appointed civil servants are not bound by the same oath of service, chain of command, or, through the device of the commissioning scroll, the same ‘royal injunction’ as their military counterparts. They follow differing career paths, are subject to a different remunerative philosophy, are not required to adhere to the same work ethic as soldiers, may join unions, are not obliged to serve in hazardous circumstances, and — perhaps most significantly — are prohibited from exercising operational command of military personnel. In short, their circumstances are sufficiently different from those of the soldier that it would be unreasonable to expect them to adhere to the same ethical code — and yet they are, at the national command level at least, required to perform the same functions as their military co-workers. These problems notwithstanding, as of 1 October 1972, the makers of military policy in Canada were “not only not selected by military officers at large, they [were] drawn in large measure from the civil service.”²¹

In Canada, the impact of the management fad appears to have engendered a significant degree of inconsistency of thinking at the highest levels of the national defence organization, not through failing to effect change, but through effecting change aimed elsewhere than at increasing the operational effectiveness of the Canadian military organization in its primary function — supporting government policy by force of arms. This is in large part the result of the inevitable blurring of the distinction between senior soldiers and senior bureaucrats that came about with the restructure efforts of the early 1970s. As one writer put it, “To give civilians positions of authority in the military hierarchy is to create civilian generals, a contradiction of terms and a combination of incompatible concepts”.²² Organization theory focuses not on the moral responsibility of a particular individual, but on the decision-making authority he or she wields. By this measure, executive-level civilian ‘generals’ eventually came to outnumber their military counterparts at headquarters as successive governments sought to create equivalencies between disparate branches of the public service.

Misperception of the role of the soldier in modern society lies at the root not only of the ethical drift cur-

rently afflicting the military, but of the military’s poor public image. It is also a critical problem within the ranks of the military itself, because the ethical standards of the soldier and those of the businessman that soldiers have been and are being encouraged to emulate are not only not mutually reinforcing, but in point of fact mutually exclusive. To paraphrase Saul, the ethic of the businessman is self-interest, while that of the soldier is self-sacrifice. Blurring the distinction between the two leads not only to a misidentification of goals, but a misinterpretation as to how those goals should be achieved. The business ethic espouses not only different ends, but different means. It is entirely insufficient to publish a ‘statement of military ethics’ or similar beast, and expect soldiers to understand and adhere to it when they are on a day-to-day basis expected to emulate business managers; and a fool’s errand at best to try to develop an ‘ethos’ designed to serve, guide, and extract the best efforts from soldiers and civilians alike when the two professions bear so little in common.

The suggestion that Western military forces have allowed themselves to become overly fascinated with the ideals of business methodology is neither a new nor a frivolous one. Richard Gabriel in his 1985 study of the armed forces of the United States observed that:

...in the 1950s the Army Command and General Staff College devoted 665 hours to tactical and operational skills. By the late 1970s, only 173 hours were spent on these skills. The rest of the time was taken up...with courses and instruction in management, finances and general politics.²³

While this type of classroom instruction had yet to permeate more junior staff colleges, it soon became the rule rather than the exception at the senior levels. The National Defence University in Washington DC, for example, boasted in the early 1980s a curriculum which offered courses on how to testify before a Congressional committee; Gabriel notes wryly that “apparently, the simple injunction to tell the truth to one’s political superiors no longer suffice[d]”.²⁴ He goes on to make the following observation:

It is a frightening fact that a staff psychologist at the National Defence University who has been doing personality testing on the university’s classes since 1979 can find no differences between the military men at the university and the executives of business corporations whom he also tests. If the officers and executives all wore similar clothes, he notes, it would be impossible to tell them apart.²⁵ As one of the principal themes of this paper is the argument that soldiers should be held responsible for their own actions and accountable for the actions

of their subordinates, it would be inappropriate not to bring to light the difficulties experienced by military leaders at all levels in setting and enforcing universal codes of behaviour. Whether set out in a 'code of conduct', an 'honour code', a 'statement of ethics and values' or some other morally binding admonition, behavioural standards for any sub-societal group aspiring to the status of a profession must be clear, unambiguous, universally understood and universally adhered to, or they are by definition not standards at all. They must carry enforceable professional penalties for non-compliance if they are to be considered credible. Most important, however, they must be designed to be relevant to the profession in question.

The obligation borne by military leaders to develop and present such standards is twofold; they must enforce the standard in their personnel, but must also demonstrate it through their own actions. The traditional characteristics of courage, loyalty and mercy are perhaps the most obvious indicators in this light, as no professional soldier, regardless of the implied punishment, will follow into action a leader who is manifestly disloyal, brutal or pusillanimous. A final indicator is integrity, a concept which the Oxford Concise Dictionary describes variously as 'uprightness' and 'honesty', but which is perhaps better expressed as the willingness to forego a potentially beneficial act simply because it is forbidden by one's ethical code (or "wrong"); or to carry on with a potentially harmful one simply because it is demanded by one's ethical code (or "right").

Which of course begs the definitions of 'right' and 'wrong'. This distinction recalls the conundrum of the amoral individual that contemporary Western society seems bent on creating, and which Western military organizations are perforce required to mould into soldiers. Whereas a moral individual is assumed to be capable of distinguishing right from wrong, and usually chooses to do right, and an immoral individual, capable of making the same decision, usually chooses to do wrong, the amoral person is intellectually incapable of distinguishing between the ethical poles.

One of the goals of basic military training is to alter the conventional morality ingrained in an individual since childhood by replacing militarily problematic segments with a selective amorality in which otherwise immoral behaviour is under certain circumstances not only permitted but required — or, as Seneca has noted, even laudable. For a definition of amorality, we must again turn to Saul who, tongue firmly in cheek, defines it as:

A quality admired and rewarded in modern organizations, where it is referred to through metaphors

such as professionalism and efficiency...one of the terms which highlights *the confusion in society between what is taught as a value and what is actually rewarded by the structure*. Immorality is doing wrong of our own volition. Amorality is doing it because an organization or structure expects us to do it. Amorality is thus worse than immorality because it involves denying our responsibility and therefore our existence as anything more than an animal.²⁶

The problem is that humans, as complex and fairly intelligent animals, are capable of learning in a great many ways beyond the simple conditioning of basic soldier training. Observation is the commonest form of learning, dominating the formative stages of childhood and remaining active throughout adult life. Leadership by example therefore becomes less a rhetorical injunction and more a paramount responsibility of the leader-as-teacher. It is 'only human', for example, in the



A.T.J. Bailein, Over the Top, Canadian War Museum, CWM 8058

absence of instruction to the contrary, to assume that an action permissible to one's superior is permissible to oneself. While in the grossest sense it is unlikely that, for example, a manifestly disloyal officer will encourage the display of manifest disloyalty by his subordinates, imitative behaviour is the hallmark of all primates, and learning by observation is rarely gross or even conscious in scale and nature. It is far more likely that fleeting or morally nebulous instances of immoral behaviour by a senior will encourage individuals in whom amorality has been encouraged by society and the corporate system alike to adopt immoral behavioural standards. The military tendency to wink at supposedly minor offences with phrases such as 'boys will be boys' or 'he'll straighten out in the field' exacerbates this structural weakness and has a costly impact on soldier effectiveness as well as on the public image of the

military in general. The Nelsonian admonition to 'never pass a fault' is gaining adherents as the cost of laxity continues to climb.

Not surprisingly, one of the problems with creating and sustaining an attitude of professionalism throughout the officer ranks of a bureaucratized military is evaluating and rewarding ethical behaviour. Linn notes that:

...in a 1977 Army War College study on professionalism, one-third of US Army officers surveyed stated that they believed that unethical behaviour was rewarded by 'the system', while two-thirds believed that ethical behaviour went unrewarded.²⁷

Establishing a system of rewards for ethical behaviour is, however, a two-edged sword; on the one hand, doing so implies that ethical behaviour represents superior rather than standard performance, and rewarding it would therefore be akin to rewarding a private soldier for having laced his boots properly. On the other hand, the lack of a system of 'carrots' to offset the 'stick' of sanctions may render it difficult to re-establish ethical behaviour as the norm in the first place. As an aside, it is interesting to note how the complaints of American officers of two decades past echo those recently expressed to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

The idea of 'the system' as a random, headless bureaucratic juggernaut bent on overwhelming the honest while remaining open to exploitation by the crafty is hardly a new one; what is novel is the fact that distrust of 'the system' has become so widespread. Gabriel sums up his analysis of the American military 'system' of the early 1980s in the following rather hyperbolic but heartfelt terms:

The officer who succeeds within the military bureaucracy is more often not a trained combat leader who has studied and practised the arts of war but more likely an experienced bureaucratic infighter who has studied the art of management and knows how to survive in a bureaucratic system that rewards non-inventiveness, compliance, a willingness to follow rules without question, an ability to protect bureaucratic turf and, above all, not to rock the boat. These are not the qualities of successful combat leaders or the qualities of successful military planners.²⁸

Saul in *Voltaire's Bastards* agrees, and suggests that the decline of Western military organizations into paragons of the bureaucratic ideal is attributable to Western bureaucracies taking rational political philosophy to the uttermost extremes of absurdity; to the point at which self-interest supersedes self-sacrifice as the

principal engine of human activity, the place where the business ethic overpowers and erases the social ethic. The risk in adapting business methodology to the profession of arms risks encouraging soldiers to adopt a "similar outlook to...other government departments. As a consequence, the need for military discipline is no longer obvious, [and] management and business administration supersede leadership...".²⁹ While this process may make pragmatic good sense for profit-oriented corporations, it is the death knell of armies.

Lacking a reliable system for rewarding ethical behaviour, and still uncertain whether such a system, if one could be developed, would be beneficial or detrimental in a military context, excellence in the contemporary bureaucratized military must perforce be judged against another scale. As previously noted, the hallmark of bureaucracies is the principle of quantifiability; but ethics, other than in failure, do not easily lend themselves to measurement. Linn notes that in a bureaucracy lacking a quantifiable ethical standard:

The value of self-interest leads to promotion being the standard of success rather than service and contribution, and it also leads to ethical disasters. When service to country and corps is forsaken for matters of self-interest, the sense of purpose is lost, commitment to men and mission wanes, and military competence degenerates...

What is not being understood is that military service means you are morally obligated to competently serve the general interests of society even if it means risk to your promotion as well as risk to your life.³⁰

The lack of willingness of a leader at any level to risk status either by committing himself wholly and unreservedly to an endeavour or by forthrightly acknowledging responsibility for a catastrophe is damaging not only to morale within the services but to the survival of the profession of arms itself. War, if not the oldest human occupation, is without a doubt the most practised and studied, and soldiers undoubtedly learn best from the mistakes of their forebears, and this to a degree paralleled by few other professions. One of the pillars of the profession of arms is therefore the willingness of commanders at all levels to be held responsible for their own actions and accountable for those of their troops both in success and, perhaps more importantly, in failure. Failure is an excellent teacher, and if an army must endure it, then also must that army learn from it. However, failure is precisely the sort of status-damaging event for which bureaucratic organizations avoid recognition at all costs. Dixon in *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* puts the case against avoidance of responsibility thus:

It is a sad feature of authoritarian organizations that their nature inevitably militates against the possibility of learning from experience through the apportioning of blame. The reason is not hard to find. Since authoritarianism is itself the product of psychological defences, authoritarian organizations are past masters at deflecting blame. They do so by denial, by rationalization, by making scapegoats, or by some mixture of the three. However it is achieved, the *net result is that no real admission of failure or incompetence is ever made by those who are really responsible; hence nothing can be done about preventing a recurrence.*³¹

Avoidance of blame remains a prime motivator in bureaucratic thinking and is a natural result of a culture of career protectionism, which is itself an entirely predictable outcome of the bureaucratization of any profession, military or otherwise. Unwillingness to accept blame and denial of accountability are grave and fundamental threats to the profession of arms precisely because they prevent the profession from learning from its mistakes.

Conventional wisdom, which is the foundation of Gabriel's work, suggests that the American armed forces were driven to deal decisively with the management-military interface as a result of the reverses suffered by the United States in Vietnam. It is interesting to note in retrospect that the failings identified and decried by Gabriel in his mid-1980s study represented the problems of the 1970s which resulted from the missteps of the 1960s, and that by the time his book went to press, many of them were well on their way to being resolved. A military force rendered dysfunctional by the slavish application of business management principles would have not have been capable of mounting Operation "Desert Storm".

THE MILITARY CORPORATION

The swollen officer corps of the West have progressed from the myth of modern organization to the myth of the modern manager. All the syndromes of bureaucratic life are to be found in their headquarters. A nine-to-five attitude. Group decisions to protect each individual. An inability to respond to information that the system is doing the wrong thing. Leadership rarely rewarded. Business management systems consciously applied to running armies. It is not an exaggeration to say that officers now know more about systems management than about fighting wars.³²

Despite a penchant for hyperbole exacerbated by a lack of direct personal experience in uniform (not to mention an excessive reliance upon the occasionally irrelevant accusations made by Gabriel), the foregoing

citation from Saul's *Voltaire's Bastards* strikes a number of uncomfortable chords. If one subscribes to Saul, military staff colleges, which proliferated like fruit flies during the nineteenth century, were the forerunners of the modern business school. Staff colleges based their instructional techniques on the application of the rational philosophic approach to staff methodology, and the synergy produced by this approach when combined with the mass production techniques of the Industrial Revolution and the mobility afforded by the steam locomotive eventually revolutionized warfare. Professionalization of the officer corps, however, served to dilute the outdated sense of class obligation, replacing it instead with fiscal loyalty bolstered by jingoistic patriotism — uncertain sentiments at best.

Liberalization of military organizations continues to this day to profess to eliminate 'class distinctions' whether these exist or not, and in doing so have succeeded in almost entirely erasing the moral obligation of national service as a profession, vocation or *métier*, transforming it instead into a 'job', where service is rendered solely for pay. This should be the point at which military service and other forms of employment diverge; apart from a desire to do the best work of which he is capable, it is doubtful whether one would consider inquiring of, for example, a plumber or a house painter the nature of his ethical code. This is because no one has ever given plumbers a license to practice wholesale violence in the interest of the state, and because no painter is expected to be willing to expend his life and the lives of his countrymen in the performance of his duties.

Given, then, that the soldier and the officer who leads him are obliged by virtue of their choice of profession to set the interests of their country, their duty and their subordinates before their own, and that in the case of the officer, this obligation is expressed as a moral responsibility by virtue of his acceptance of the burden and risks of the defence of the state, it is puzzling that for the past quarter-century Western military forces have deliberately chosen to pattern their institutions of higher military education and the leadership structures of their respective military forces after the most demonstrably amoral breed of profession yet to arise — that of the civilian businessman, who is himself, ironically, the product of an institution modeled on the rationalist military staff schools of the nineteenth century. We have in effect come full circle; business schools are now teaching soldiers what soldiers once taught them. The danger lies in the fact that the business schools, in adopting the rationalist approach of their staff college forebears, substituted profit for public service as the fundamental motivator in developing their methodology. The goals, methods and ethical standards of business, business administration and business management are wholly and with-

out exception opposed diametrically to those of the profession whose *raison d'être* is the defence of the state. As Gabriel notes in *Military Incompetence*:

A duly sworn officer carries moral responsibilities beyond anything the civilian business executive can imagine. An officer is given the moral authority and obligation by his superiors to *expend the lives of his fellow citizens* in pursuit of legitimate military objectives. No civilian enterprise confers such a terrible burden and responsibility.³³

A profession demanding self-sacrifice before self-interest by definition can never adopt a profit motive, for there is no material profit in self-sacrifice. The two goals are mutually exclusive.

The inevitable outcome of developing officers who think and act like corporate managers is to transform the military organization into a non-profit corporate entity, displaying all of the characteristics, both positive and negative, of any other large business. The positive characteristics of businesses are that they provide employment, generate tax revenue, and produce some form of tangible good or service. Military organizations, however, are *not* businesses; they consume tax revenue, provide employment only at the expense of the state, gen-

erations more suited to the advancement of individuals capable of performing — and capitalizing on — tasks not directly related to the primary purpose of the military.

The end result of the corporate transformation is a military offering all of the disadvantages of a private corporation without providing any of the benefits. This approach risks building, fostering and furthering the advancement not of military leaders, but of uniformed corporate managers, the defining characteristic of whom, according to Saul, is that their loyalty to the corporate entity exceeds, and eventually supersedes, their loyalty to society at large — an ethical orientation diametrically opposed to that demanded of the soldier in a liberal democracy.³⁴

RECALLING THE MILITARY ETHIC

If there is one defining element of the vocation of the soldier that sets him apart from civilian professionals within a democracy, it is, as Gabriel suggests, that he alone within his parent society is charged by an elected government with the judicious expenditure of the lives of his fellow citizens. As the foregoing demonstrates, there are a number of fundamental ethical principles peculiar to the profession of arms which, if not entirely mutually exclusive, are at least occasionally mutually contradictory. In addition to the somewhat intangible ideals of loyalty, courage, and mercy, the preceding sections of this paper point to four essential ethical imperatives driving the soldier. These are the national interest of the state, the lawful orders of one's superiors, the welfare of one's subordinates, and the obligation to carry out one's duties with honour and restraint.

Meeting these criteria demands a process of prioritization. First, it is accepted that in a liberal democratic society, the military is the tool — in point of fact, has no legal *raison d'être* beyond the scope — of national policy. The service of the interests of the state must therefore precede all other considerations. Second, in order to function, any armed force requires a chain of command designed to absorb the orders originating with political authority and translate these into military directives. Without such a structure, the force would be incapable of functioning. Obedience to one's superiors in the hierarchical pyramid is therefore the second most important link in the chain of the military ethic.

Third, in order to be able to execute the orders issued by one's superiors, one requires an armed body consisting of soldiers, subject by law to one's orders. If leadership is indeed the art of influencing human beings in order to accomplish a mission in the manner desired by the leader, it is axiomatic that the leader must maintain his subordinates in such a condition that they are capable of



erate no profit and apart from assisting in riot, flood or fire control, produce in peacetime only the intangible service of 'national defence' — successful deterrence, the value of which can be measured only in failure. Even worse, in peacetime the side-benefits of the military 'service industry', such as search and rescue, peacekeeping, disaster assistance and aid of the civil power, take on an importance all out of proportion to the true purpose and value of a military force. These ancillary and secondary capabilities thus come to be emphasized at the expense of the primary capability, which is waging war, thereby creating a greater market for, and expectation of, sub-maximal performance, and an envi-

responding to his orders in as efficient a manner as possible. The welfare of one's subordinates, including the moral as well as professional responsibility not to spend their lives needlessly, must therefore be the third most important motivating factor within the military mind.

Fourth and finally, the military leader is required, both morally and by international law, to carry out his duties with 'honour and restraint'. War is the most violent and destructive of human activities, involving death and devastation on a vast scale.³⁵ It is expensive in terms of the lives, weapons and physical chattels expended or lost. Professionalism demands accomplishing one's mission without the profligate expenditure of resources, and moral and legal obligations demand minimizing the impact of hostilities upon those not involved, the noncombatant population. This ethical criterion has no priority relative the other three, for its strictures permeate, circumscribe and define them. The injunction to carry out one's duties with honour and restraint should therefore form the over-riding moral context within which the soldier adheres to the other three criteria, providing the framework for otherwise nebulous and hard-to-quantify values such as mercy, courage and integrity.

Having thus established a prioritization of the fundamental ethical criteria of the profession of arms, we can derive therefrom the outline of an ethical code for the military forces of a liberal democracy. First, the soldier serves the interests of his country. Second, the soldier executes the lawful orders of his superiors, except where these would conflict with the interests of his country; third, the soldier safeguards the welfare of his subordinates, except where it is necessary to hazard their interests in executing the orders of his superiors or in serving the interests of his country. Finally, the soldier practices the profession of arms cognizant of the legal and moral obligation to do so honourably and with restraint, a condition which circumscribes all of his actions and which proscribes his acting in an illegal or morally repugnant fashion regardless of what is at stake. This final injunction is not dissimilar to the Hippocratic Oath of the medical profession, and serves as the ethical dividing line separating soldiers from murderers. There can be no justification for breaching the fundamental principles of honour and restraint.

This hierarchy of obligation provides a brief but all-encompassing yard-stick against which any prospective action by a soldier, regardless of rank, may be measured. Further, it embraces the requirement for the soldier to meet legal, professional and moral obligations in the fulfillment of his duties without necessarily establishing an ethical hierarchy among the first three.

CONCLUSION

It is intrinsically fundamental to our system that when you place an individual in command, be that of a regiment or a brigade or an area...he [or she] is fully responsible in every respect for the well-being, training, discipline and administration of the troops under his or her command, and accountable for his or her actions.³⁶

There is good reason to believe that the ethical hierarchy described above is already understood and applied by many, if not most, of the members of the profession of arms in Canada. One of the officers questioned by the Commission of Inquiry into the so-called 'Somalia Affair', when asked whether his loyalty to his superior might influence his testimony, stated by way of reply that such loyalty, however great, would nevertheless remain subordinate to his "duty to the laws of the land and ethical conduct as an officer."³⁷ In spite of the wide range of historically unprecedented pressures to which the men and women of the Canadian Forces are daily subjected, the relative rarity of incidences of ethical failure may in itself be sufficient reason to believe that this sentiment represents the rule rather than the exception across the military ethical landscape.

Throughout this paper I have attempted to avoid discussion of specifics and focus instead on the generalities of ethical conduct in a military environment. A number of possible sources of ethical failure have been identified, including the individual, society at large, traditional military culture and the contemporary corporatist structure into whose mould military organizations, to their vast detriment, have at the behest of governmental and societal pressures been forcing themselves for the past several decades. It remains to be seen whether any of these sources of failure can be addressed by modern military organizations. Individuals are responsible for their own behavioural modification; and short of anti-democratic activity (hardly the hallmark of Western armies), the military cannot change society. Volunteer armies are entirely at the mercy of what society provides by way of recruits; and individuals are themselves responsible for the ethical choices they make.

What military organizations can and should accomplish, however, is twofold. First, the Canadian Forces must take a long, hard look at traditional military culture with a view to winnowing out its harmful aspects while retaining those which are beneficial. And second, the profession of arms as a whole, and its 'senior partners' in particular, must continue to resist any further attempts to force the military to adopt corporatist managerial, operational, organizational and above all, ethical models. These are anathema to the qualities that enable armed forces to fulfill their societal role. The

first step in this process, as with any addiction, is recognizing and accepting that there is a problem, and this may be the most difficult and challenging part of the process for a military that is nearly four decades down the corporatist road. In the words of an ancient Chinese sage, “Fish aren’t aware of water”.

Finally, all members of military organizations must adopt and demonstrate, from the highest echelons downwards, the standard of ethical conduct demanded by the profession of arms; for as surely as no soldier should be expected to go ‘over the top’ without his superior leading the way, no soldier should be held to an ethical standard not openly and forthrightly adhered to by his seniors.

It is not the intent of this paper to advocate, as have so many others, the division of National Defence Headquarters into separate military and civilian components. The synergies and efficiencies achieved by civil-military integration at the level of senior leadership and management are too valuable to lose, and the interlinkages too closely woven to permit easy bisection. Instead, I hope

to encourage the recognition of, resistance to, and — where possible — reversal of the creeping process of civilianization that has played so large a part in the gradual but inexorable decline of the profession of arms in Canada.

The four-part ethical imperative outlined above may appear so simplistic as to seem facile and therefore difficult to apply. At the risk of being accused of reductionism, first principles are rarely complex, and I invite the reader to make what use of these he will. Integrity, valour, loyalty, veracity, duty, honour and so forth have been the touchstone of military service since the medieval evolution of the chivalric ideal, universally aspired to if not always attained. It is imperative that Western military organizations recognize and come to terms with the corporatist mould that has for the past three decades been perverting the purpose and structure of the ethic of service. Failure to do so will only encourage continued ethical drift at a time when the profession of arms, throughout the Western world, is desperately seeking an anchor.



NOTES

1. Anthony E. Hartle, *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989), p. 19.
2. John R. Saul, *The Doubter's Companion* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1994), pp. 122-23. Italics added.
3. Hartle, p. 26.
4. Ramsey notes that “...for many centuries after participation in war was said to be justified for Christian conscience, it still was never allowed that, when one’s own life or goods were at stake, the evil intention of a clearly guilty assailant gave the Christian any right to resist or wound or kill him...”. Paul Ramsey, *The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1968), p. 159.
5. “The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like; and it is generally to punish these things, when force is required to inflict the punishment, that, in obedience to God or some lawful authority, good men undertake wars.” Augustine, *Contra Faustum*.
6. November 1996 personnel data compiled by the Canadian Forces indicate that 58.5% of Regular Force members were under 35 years of age, indicating that at least this many had fewer years in uniform than out of it.
7. Saul in *Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West* lays the blame for the decay of social conscience partially at the doorstep of contemporary higher education, where “what is encouraged is the growth of an undisciplined form of self-interest, in which winning is what counts...” In other words, for the first time in Western history, our most respected institutions are preaching social anarchy. (pp. 121-122).
8. Peter C. Newman, “Can Young Tame the Demons at Defence”, *Maclean's*, 10 February 1997, p. 39.
9. Both this quotation and the one preceding it are from William Shakespeare, *The Life of King Henry the Fifth*, Act IV, Scene 1.
10. Seneca, quoted in Robert L. Holmes, *On War and Morality*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 114.
11. Lieutenant-General (Retired) Charles Belzile, former Commander Land Force Command, Canadian Forces. From a speech delivered to the Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, Ontario, on 17 January 1997. It is not necessary to defend this statement; the sweeping changes undertaken by the American armed forces in the wake of the Vietnam debacle are sufficient testimony to the fundamental inapplicability of McNamarian management to military operations. This is the same rationalist business approach that brought us the nuclear arms race, biological weapons programmes and the cognitively dissonant (some would say maniacal) doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction.
12. Both quotations from Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence* (Toronto: Brown Book Company Ltd, 1995), p. 48.
13. David Detomasi, “Re-engineering the Canadian Department of National Defence: Management and Command in the 1990s”, *Defence Analysis*, Vol 12, No. 3, 1996, p. 338.
14. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, p. 68.
15. John Gellner in a review of Vernon J. Kronenberg’s *All Together Now*, published in the Summer 1974 issue of *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, emphasizes Mr. Hellyer’s drive and ambition.
16. Douglas L. Bland in a speech to the Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, Ontario, 17 January 1997.
17. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, p. 96.
18. *ibid*, p. 97, italics added.
19. Paul D. Manson, “The Restructuring of National Defence Headquarters – 1972-73”, *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Winter 1973-74, p. 11.
20. *ibid*, p. 12.
21. J.E. Neelin and L.M. Pedersen, “On the Effect of the Restructuring of National Defence Headquarters on the Profession of Arms in Canada”, *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Summer 1974, p. 54.
22. *ibid* 7, p. 54.
23. Richard Gabriel, *Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win*, (New York: Noontday Press, 1985), p. 195.
24. *ibid*, p. 196.
25. *ibid*, p. 196.
26. John R. Saul, *The Doubter's Companion*, pp. 22-23. Emphasis mine.
27. Thomas C. Linn, “Ethics vs. Self-Interest in How We Fight” in *Moral Obligation and the Military* (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 1988), p. 221.
28. Gabriel, *Military Incompetence*, p. 14.
29. Neelin and Pedersen, “Effect of Restructuring”, p. 54.
30. Linn, “Ethics vs. Self-Interest”, p. 222.
31. Norman F. Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* (London: Future Publications, 1976), pp. 43-44. Italics mine.
32. Saul, *Voltaire's Bastards*, p. 225.
33. Gabriel, p. 191. Italics mine.
34. Saul, *The Doubter's Companion*, pp. 74-79.
35. With the possible exception of Communist economic planning, which in the 20th Century has proven more devastating than war. Demographic statistics suggest that Stalin’s forced resettlement programme of the 1930s, 40s and 50s, as well as Mao’s Great Leap Forward, each resulted in more deaths than all of the century’s wars combined.
36. Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Gordon M. Reay, former Commander of Land Force Command. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, Commission of Inquiry into the deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 14 February 1996, Volume 46, 9143.
37. Testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel Steve Moffat, quoted in Jeff Sallot, “Colonel cites stress faced in Somalia”, *The Globe and Mail* (n.d., n.p.).