



**Cover**  
**BEAUFORT DROPPING DEPTH CHARGE**  
 Second World War painting  
 by Donald K. Anderson  
 Canadian War Museum  
 CWM 85065



**PARLIAMENT'S DUTY TO DEFEND CANADA**  
 by Dr. Douglas Bland



**CIMIC OPERATIONS DURING OPERATION KINETIC**  
 by Major Douglas E. Delaney

3	LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
	<b>THE RONALD HAYCOCK LECTURE IN WAR STUDIES</b>
7	TECHNOLOGY, HISTORY AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS <i>Commodore Daniel McNeil</i>
	<b>MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY</b>
19	BYSTANDER NON-INTERVENTION AND THE SOMALIA INCIDENT <i>Lieutenant-Commander George Shorey</i>
	<b>CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION</b>
29	CIMIC OPERATIONS DURING OPERATION "KINETIC" <i>Major Douglas E. Delaney</i>
	<b>DEFENCE POLICY</b>
35	PARLIAMENT'S DUTY TO DEFEND CANADA <i>Dr. Douglas L. Bland</i>
	<b>NATO</b>
45	SYMBOL OR SUBSTANCE? THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATO'S UPDATED STRATEGIC CONCEPT <i>Professor Paul Buteux</i>
51	KEEPING ITS OPTIONS OPEN: NATO'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ENLARGEMENT <i>Dr. Natalie Mychajlyszyn</i>
59	NATO AND ESDP: THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL AGREEMENT <i>Professor Alexander Moens</i>
69	PROLIFERATION, ROGUE STATES AND NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE: ASSESSING CANADIAN AND EUROPEAN CONCERNS AND INTERESTS <i>Dr. Frank P. Harvey</i>
79	LIVING IN A RENOVATED NATO <i>Dr. Allen G. Sens</i>
	<b>COLUMNS</b>
87	BOOK REVIEWS
91	COMMENTARY <i>Martin Shadwick</i>
92	HISTORY AND HERITAGE

*Canadian Military Journal / Revue militaire canadienne* is the official professional journal of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence. It is published quarterly under authority of the Minister of National Defence. Opinions expressed or implied in this publication are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Forces, *Canadian Military Journal*, or any agency of the Government of Canada. Crown copyright is retained. Articles may be reproduced with permission of the Editor, on condition that appropriate credit is given to *Canadian Military Journal*. Each issue of the *Journal* is published simultaneously in print and electronic versions; it is available on the Internet at [www.journal.dnd.ca](http://www.journal.dnd.ca).

ISSN 1492-465X



# CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL

## Editor

John Marteinson

## Assistant Editor

Dr. Guy Monette

## Publication Manager

Monica Bland

## Production

Canadian Forces Training Materiel Production Centre

Production Manager: Sandi Howell

Graphic Design: Michael Bodnar

Text Editors:  
Karine Beaudette  
Jonathan Côté  
Julie Linge  
Jocelyne Sayak

## Editorial Board

Lieutenant-Colonel David Bashow  
Major Claude Bellerose  
Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Bradley  
Captain Andrew Godefroy  
Major John Grodzinski  
Lieutenant-Commander Greg Hannah  
Professor Michael Hennessy  
Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn  
Professor Hamish Ion  
Major David Last  
Professor Brian McKercher  
Lieutenant-Colonel John Moyer  
Chief Warrant Officer J. Perry  
Professor Joel Sokolsky  
Colonel Randall Wakelam  
Lieutenant-Commander Ian Wood  
Commander Deborah Wilson  
Lieutenant-Colonel Don Young

## How to Contact Us

*Canadian Military Journal /  
Revue militaire canadienne*  
Royal Military College of Canada  
PO Box 17000, Station Forces  
Kingston, Ontario K7K 7B4  
Editor: (613) 541-6000 Extn 6148  
Assistant Editor (613) 541-6000 Extn 6496  
Production Manager (613) 541-6000 Extn. 6837  
Fax: (613) 541-6866  
E-mail: mail@journal.dnd.ca

## Editorial Advisory Board

### Chairman

Brigadier-General J. J. R. Gagnon

### Members

Dr. J.A. Barrett, Dean of Continuing Studies, RMC  
Dr. John Barrett, representing ADM (Pol)  
Dr. Serge Bernier, Director History and Heritage  
Dr. Douglas Bland, Queen's University  
Colonel F.M. Boomer, representing DCDS  
Dr. John Cowan, Principal, RMC  
Colonel Deborah Davis, CFC  
Colonel R.M. Gervais, representing DG Log  
Dr. Ronald Haycock, Dean of Arts, RMC  
Dr. Michael Hennessy, RMC  
Professor A.J. Hyatt, Univ. of Western Ontario  
Colonel D. Langton, representing VCDS  
Professor Albert Legault, Université Laval  
Brigadier-General M. Lessard, representing CLS  
Commodore I.D. Mack, representing CMS  
Dr. B. McKercher, Chairman War Studies RMC  
Brigadier-General (ret'd) D. Macnamara, CFC  
Professor Danford Middlemiss, Dalhousie University  
Dr. Ingar Moen, representing CRAD  
Dr. Dean Oliver, Canadian War Museum  
Robert Quinn, representing DGPA  
Captain(N) W.A. Reed, representing JAG  
Dr. Joel Sokolsky, Acting Dean of Arts, RMC  
Colonel R.M. Williams, representing CAS

## EDITOR'S NOTE

With this issue, *Canadian Military Journal* marks the completion of our first year of publication. It has been an exciting and challenging year for the staff, working to create a new journal that effectively serves the needs of the Canadian Forces and the broader defence community in Canada. Our mandate is very broad: to provide a forum for the serious discussion of ideas and issues relevant to the profession of arms in Canada. We sincerely hope that our readers will have found the articles and commentary in the first issues to have been professionally interesting, and the views of our authors to have been thought-provoking. Regrettably, we have not yet succeeded in generating much of a debate about important issues where differing views and opinions ought to be discussed.

Are we doing what you expect of your professional journal? Quite frankly, we don't know whether or not the *Journal* is meeting your needs. We would like to have far more 'feedback' from you, our readers, than we have been getting. Are there issues and ideas you think should be discussed? Do you agree with the views and opinions expressed in our articles? If not, do you have something pertinent to say? What can we do better than we are doing? Please take a minute or two to let us know your views. Our e-mail address is shown above, and the Editor can also be reached on the DWAN.

We are pleased to inform our readers that *Canadian Military Journal* will in future be indexed in the prestigious Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals, which is available on the Internet.

# LETTERS to the EDITOR

## TASK FORCE KOSOVO

The articles in the first edition [Vol.1, No.1] covering the conflict in the Balkans were very interesting, especially the article entitled “Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment” by Colonel Michael Ward and his colleagues. In it, the authors re-examine Operation “Kinetic”, from its initial planning right up to deployment, pointing out logistical difficulties relating to the deployment of equipment and supplies. They summarize the problem in terms of the slow allocation of needed funds, a national support capability that was stretched to the limit, a lack of supply ‘visibility’ and the unavailability of some essential commodities. The authors then propose as a solution both increased funding availability and the use of domestic contractors.

An advance of funds, however, would only have partially alleviated the lack of operational capacity of KFOR in the initial stages of operations in the theatre. Even if we had the best logistics systems in the world, one must still expect the kinds of difficulties seen when support services are set up at the very moment the bulk of troops are being deployed. I believe the low level of stocked provisions in the Canadian Forces Supply and Distribution System contributed to this problem. Those in charge of equipment programs have lacked the necessary funds to stock to capacity. Moreover, the decentralized allocation of thousands of pieces of equipment to bases means they are not stockpiled since they are commercially available; this situation also impacted on operational capacity. As a result of this, we would do well to verify whether Canada’s industrial infrastructure is capable of rapidly supplying the Canadian Forces. For instance, very low inventory levels on the part of suppliers will delay deliveries considerably. This is an important factor which ought not to be neglected. Should we keep large stocks at our disposal which would not be used except when they are urgently needed? Lastly, one must not underestimate the importance of financial constraints faced when Public Works and Government Services procures goods and services, as the Ministry must contend with procedural regulations set down in the General Agreement on

Customs and Excise and NAFTA. A favourable interpretation of these procedures, which nevertheless respects these financial limitations, allowed 3 Canadian Support Group (3 CSG) and Public Works and Government Services to significantly increase the efficiency of the acquisitions processes, and thus to remain within its limited financial means.

Nevertheless, I cannot agree with the following statement: “National support capability was stretched to the limit during the deployment surge, and could not meet the demands of a short-notice mission when all



Canadian Forces Photo by: Cpl Ken Allan

other overseas commitments were also competing for support .... For example, sea containers were packed without itemized lists of contents, which created havoc and delay in-theatre that was overcome only by tremendous additional effort ....”

In fact, 3 CSG has developed considerable expertise in providing logistical support for the mounting and completion of missions. On extremely short notice, 3 CSG can supplement its personnel with experienced and qualified individuals. In this instance we were certainly weary, but at no time did we feel taxed to the limit of our capacity, despite also continuing to support Operations “Palladium” and “Echo”. Far be it from me to suggest that 3 CSG has no room to improve, but in this case there was no question of having suffered the ‘over-stretching’ noted by the authors.

One solution that might resolve the problem of recording the location of supplies would be to utilize a

simple software package using bar codes. It is unfortunate that the Supply and Distribution System is still so far behind available technology; ordinary corner stores have made use of such information systems for the past ten years. Even as I write, the Supply and Distribution System's Project "Update" has no official plans to introduce this technology. Our logistics requirements are far more complex than those of private industry, where the bar-code system can show the exact location of all stocks. In fact, 3 CSG has developed just such an application in recent years, which allows us to order, distribute and receive supplies by means of a simple electronic transaction rather than manually entering, bit by bit, all the necessary data. For example, it is theoretically possible, through a single transaction, to request 15,000 different supplies.

In actual practice, we coordinate this inventory management system with 25 Canadian Forces Supply Depot (25 CFSD), our principal partner, which is able to deliver to us within 24 hours. The purchasing unit within 3 CSG deals only with 'local' stocks. This arrangement is based on a 'just-in-time' short order system whose target date is the ship's departure date. The application features a system that allows us to determine the exact location of every item, regardless of the number of sea containers. An electronic copy and a hard copy of the inventory are sent to the National Support Group (NSG) and, finally, a list of contents is placed inside the door of each container. This is exactly the procedure followed by 3 CSG for (second line) provisions as prescribed by the orders for Operation "Kinetic".

Even today, 3 CSG is uncertain as to what flaw caused the problem of 'supply visibility'. Whatever the case, as soon as we got instructions from J4 Logistics, three representatives of 3 CSG were sent overseas to solve the problem. Contrary to what the authors describe, the early difficulties with logistics sustainment were not caused by a lack of civilian contractors, but rather by inadequate military organization and lack of equipment on the ground. In the future, a representative of 3 CSG will be on-site for the arrival of all sea containers; a control registry will be included with the containers, a fork-lift will accompany subsistence stocks, and a computer bar-code system will be provided to the deploying organization in order to ensure the immediate location of first line supplies. Finally, the National Military Support Capability Project should significantly improve the deployment capacity of the Canadian Forces.

LCol Alain Côté  
Commanding Officer 3 CSG

## BLOOD ON THE HILLS

In giving Brereton Greenhous yet another opportunity to malign my book *Blood on the Hills* in his reply to my rebuttal of his review, you have given him an opportunity to malign my scholarship. I answer him point by point:



1. He says I chose to take issue with only one of the points he made in his review, implying that I do not take issue with the rest. Wrong. The editor imposed a strict limit on the length of my letter. I have much more to say about the inaccuracy and unfairness of his points.
2. He says that I did not list Clark or Ridgway in my bibliography. As to Clark, I used him in my letter to support the argument I made in my book. I did not claim to use him in my book. As to Ridgway, I *did* use him and I cite him at footnotes 28, 30, and 35 of Chapter 5. Clearly Greenhous did not bother to check.
3. Greenhous accuses Clark and Ridgway of "not being particularly bright" and having "axes to grind." I leave it to your readers to decide if Greenhous is grinding his own axe since he is currently engaged in writing an official history of the Canadian Army in Korea for the Directorate of History and Heritage. Your readers might take note that in my book I am highly critical of the several existing official histories of the Canadian Army in the Korean War.
4. Greenhous claims to have checked what I said Rees wrote in his copy of Rees. He says he could find nothing to back up my claim that Rees supports my argument. I invite your readers to read Rees, pp. 444-449 and judge for themselves. Perhaps those pages are missing from Greenhous' copy of Rees.
5. Greenhous refers to Michael Hickey's *The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism, 1950-1953* as "an excellent new book". Curious that Greenhous forgets to note that Hickey barely men-

tions the Canadian contribution to the Korean War, and then only to disparage it. Hickey did not spend one minute in Canada doing research in primary sources. Is that excellent?

I originally called Greenhous' review of my book flippant. His letter of rebuttal to my rebuttal doesn't even reach the level of flippancy.

D. J. Bercuson  
University of Calgary

*Editor's Note: Dr. Bercuson has been given the last word. No further letters about Blood on the Hills will be published.*

## NAVAL FIRE SUPPORT

LCdr Hansen, in the Autumn 2000 issue (Vol.1, No. 3), has written an important description of the decline and ultimate disappearance of Naval Fire Support (NFS) in the Canadian Navy, a sequence of events that is at once regrettable but not surprising. It was not always so. As the Weapons Officer of HMCS *Yukon* from 1966-69, regular practices as part of operational readiness requirements on ranges in the United States and abroad kept our doctrine and operational proficiency alive and well. The limitations of the existing weapons systems were understood but the high rate of fire compensated for limited hitting power and would have been effective in fixing the enemy in support of allied land manoeuvre.

What was clear was that, despite unification, there was no non-naval interest in NFS capability. While the Navy could communicate with allied forward observers, we could not do so with our own Army except by jury-rigging borrowed radios, and their observers had no common call-for-fire doctrine or familiarity with NFS capabilities. During the year I spent as the token naval officer on the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College Course, my offers to brief on NFS capabilities and limitations were ignored and the concept played no part in the curriculum. Similarly, there was no interest in NFS in the Environmental or Joint Phases of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff Course during my time as a member of the Directing Staff from 1977-81.

The question needs further discussion, notwithstanding the long lead-time for acquiring new equipment, especially in the current budgetary climate. Specifically:

- In the practice of littoral warfare, what does the Army need and want from the Navy?



FIS Halifax

- Does the Army understand the capabilities and limitations of naval forces in supporting troops ashore?
- Is the Navy able to comply with Army requirements?
- Perhaps most important, how and by whom is the question of risk analysis in littoral operations addressed? The brief comment leads one to think that the current climate of risk aversion would have precluded the "Chinnampo" operation and the 'train-busting' in the Korean War, as well as other heroic episodes in Canadian naval history.

These questions need to be aired in the light of the growing emphasis on joint operations. The resulting decisions then must be reflected in joint doctrine.

Robert H. Thomas  
Captain RCN (ret'd)

## WOMEN IN THE CANADIAN FORCES

I am writing to ask for help from readers of *Canadian Military Journal* in gathering information and personal stories for a book I plan to write on women in the Canadian Forces. An article I wrote – "A Salute to Servicewomen", about the history of Canada's military women – appeared in the Spring 2000 edition of *Air Force Magazine*. Included with the article was a note explaining that I am collecting stories from women who have served in Canada's military since the Second World War. While several people have contacted me with words of support and encouragement, only one woman who served in Canada's military since the war submitted a personal story.

The response to my earlier request has thus far been very disappointing. Perhaps servicewomen did not see it. Perhaps women do not think that their stories are part of history. Perhaps they do not think that their stories are important. Perhaps they do not care. Perhaps they simply do not know how to begin.

Whatever the reasons, I maintain that the only way to capture our legacy, as military women who have served this great country with distinction, is for all of us to come forward and to share our stories. Only then can we record our significant achievement. Only then can we pass on our pioneering history to future generations.

To the women readers of *Canadian Military Journal*: please consider sharing your part of our history. If we do not tell our stories, no one else will do it for us. Do we want *McLean's* magazine features to

be the legacy which Canada's military women leave behind? We have been silent for far too long. Please add your voice to the chorus. I cannot succeed alone.

Send tapes, videos, notes, letters, diaries, stories, ideas, etc. to me at the following address:

LCol Susan Beharriell  
9229 Amble Court  
Colorado Springs, CO  
USA 80925

I can also be contacted by: Fax: (719) 554-8585,  
Phone: (w) (719) 554-8697, (h) (719) 390-2880 or  
E-mail at [sbeharriell@cs.com](mailto:sbeharriell@cs.com) or [susan.beharriell@peterson.af.mil](mailto:susan.beharriell@peterson.af.mil)

Susan Beharriell, LCol