



Photo courtesy of Jack Chiang

RMC cadets on parade at the May 2000 graduation ceremonies.

THE LABOURS OF ATHENA AND THE MUSES: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ASPECTS OF CANADIAN MILITARY EDUCATION

by Dr. Ronald G. Haycock

It matters little whether the Forces have their present manpower strength and financial budget, or half of them, or double them; without a properly educated, effectively trained, professional officer corps, the Forces would in the future be doomed to, at the best mediocrity, at the worst disaster.

*General Jean V. Allard
Chief of the Defence Staff
Forward to the Rowley Report, 1969*

To perform well, officers must be trained and educated to master the art of war. A foundation of military skill is essential, as is the ability to think creatively and to reason critically. Officers must acquire a comprehensive understanding of the political, economic, social, cultural and military issues and trends that may effect the security of Canada....the nation can accept nothing less.

*Lieutenant-General Robert W. Morton
Officers Development Review Board, 1995*

The accepted historical wisdom is that Canadians are an un-military people. Be that as it may, the Armed Forces of this country have participated in much military activity over many decades. They have served in world wars, United Nations actions, and the military activities of their allies. For over a half-century they have believed in collective security and in trying to make a peaceful world. They have done these things with great tenacity, dedication and courage. Their allies know them as competent and brave in the field—as good soldiers, sailors and airmen. These things are not in doubt. Yet in the last thirty years, the Armed Forces have undergone a great deal of what might be called ‘soul and role’ introspection. Much of it has centered on what they learn and what they ought to learn as professionals in Canadian society.

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Thirty-two years ago, in 1969, Major-General Roger Rowley, acting in the new and confusing milieu of unification and integration, concluded that there were serious weaknesses to be overcome in military professional development if the Canadian Forces (CF) were to meet these new challenges. Indeed, he concluded there was not a mature guiding “system”, or appropriate levels of education in the officer corps.¹ In 1995, retired Lieutenant-General Robert Morton found much the same thing.²

We are at RMC to explore the theme of military education at a time when the role of armed forces and what is needed to use them effectively is so full of doubt. And we are also here at an academic gathering convened as part of the 125th anniversary celebrations of this institution of military education. Perhaps ironically, RMC has done this before. In 1976, as part of its 100th birthday, the College decided that a conference entitled “Military Education: Problems and Prospects for the Next 25 Years” was in order. At that time, many

felt that the existing method of educating our soldiers was not up to meeting the demands of the changing world. It was then still in the throes of the Cold War, but it was becoming unsettled by the obvious agony of the US public and armed forces over their painful Vietnam War experience. The keynote speaker was the renowned military historian, Theodore Ropp. After painting a remarkably accurate landscape of what the world would look like at the turn of the millenium, he pointed to the currents in American military education that seemed to be hindering their ability to meet the future. He also labeled a phenomenon, which described the military’s ingrained conservative nature as one resistant to change. The US forces, Ropp said, base their future on what he called the “Last Traumatic Experience”.⁴ This dictates that no changes will be made until a “New Traumatic Experience” occurs.



Early officer education at RMC: technical knowledge of gunnery received heavy emphasis in 1878.

Evidently, between 1969 and 1995 not much was done to rectify these tough findings or to implement the recommended solutions of the investigators. The question is ‘why?’, especially when Canada has been and continues to be so well served by the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces. What then explains the continued problem in Canada’s military education?

The answers are many and complex. And it is not good enough to look at the problems of military education in the nineties or the eighties or even the seventies to come to grips with the issues. The key to understanding is both contemporary and historical. Moreover, the historical review must look outside the narrow confines of how and what military personnel learn.

But, at the risk of violating the historians’ principle that the craft must progress forward in time to be fair and understood, let me first start with a sad series of contemporary events. These are the ones of the last decade that most singularly exposed the plight of military education to a surprised and shocked Canadian public. In looking at these happenings, one can hear the echoes of the Chief of the Defence Staff in 1969 when he wrote the forward to Rowley’s report: “...doomed to mediocrity ...or...disaster.”³

To my mind this helps us understand the Canadian case. And the event that most signaled the emergence of a “New Traumatic Experience” happened in 1993 in far-away Somalia.

In March that year, teenager Shidane Arone was brutally beaten to death by two Canadian Airborne Regiment soldiers then on a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. This tragic event was coupled with allegations of a significant cover up at National Defence Headquarters.⁵ In the next few years, the ‘Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia’ exposed these and other long-term problems in our Armed Services and DND.⁶ Historically, most Canadians have little interest in their military forces, but the Somalia Commission’s revelations riveted the public’s attention.⁷ What they learned was that the problems went far deeper than the events in Somalia, and they involved the fundamental issues of shortcomings in military leadership and ethics, and thereby education.

At the same time as these revelations, the nineties were tumultuous years in Canada and the world. The so-called “evil empire” of the Soviet Union suddenly collapsed; the Cold War abruptly ended. The old enemy was gone and so was the comfort for armies of knowing

what type of conflict they were likely to fight. There was increasing globalization, especially in economics, a proliferation of non-government organizations (NGOs) and an ever-increasing rate of technological change with its so-called “revolution in military affairs”(RMA), all of which ‘drove in’ the confusing and as yet ill-defined “post-modern world”. It all seemed to validate what soothsayers like Francis Fukuyama called the “end of history”; to others it appeared as if the old Westphalian state system had collapsed and the dichotomy of a new uni-polar world and chaos had replaced it.⁸

As for the Canadian public in the nineties, they wanted their peace dividend and they got it, perhaps with a vengeance for the Armed Forces. The budget was slashed as the Liberal government tried to wrestle with the huge public debt. Armed Forces personnel were cut from about 90,000 to less than 60,000. Rust out and shortages of equipment were obvious. Even though our service people did remarkably well in increasingly difficult theatres like the Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo, Rwanda, East Timor and a host of others over the past 10 years, the commitment-capability gap widened; morale declined and numbers dwindled. ‘More with less’ was the catch phrase. There were also the stories about the bad living conditions of many CF members. The defence budget was slashed from over 12 billion dollars at the start of the decade to just over 9 billion at the end of it. Canadians were, to put it in an international perspective, 133rd out of 182 in defence spending as a reflection of the GNP—closer to Luxembourg’s than fitting a G-7 nation bordering on three oceans!⁹

As for the educational and OPD establishments of the Armed Forces, they too were profoundly effected. The National Defence College, the supposed educational body at the strategic and national security level for senior military and civilian personnel, was abruptly terminated. Staff schools were closed. The two sister colleges of RMC — Royal Roads on the West Coast and Collège militaire royal in Quebec — were quickly shut down. RMC Kingston was reduced by about 15 percent before it could receive any of the faculty or students of the other two institutions — and more cuts came later as they did to all of DND.

To those who managed the horror of cutting, it seemed as if they were plucking the heart out of military education. But to them and others — once they recovered their composure — it became an opportunity because all of the decade’s events had clarified the need to change, even if the exact path was not immediately obvious. In all, there is no doubt that the maelstrom of the nineties was the most momentous since the outbreak of the Second World

War. It seemed as if the entire chain of events had provided us with Ropp’s “new traumatic experience”.

In 1997, just before the then-Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Doug Young, announced his controversial decision to shut down the Somalia Commission, he published a wide-ranging report on the state of the Canadian Forces. Four prominent civilian university educators, all of them very knowledgeable about the Canadian military, had substantially assisted his assessment of the problems. They all agreed that military education had to be reformed and that the level had to be raised. To use one of the Minister’s advisors, Jack Granatstein’s blunt words: “The CF has a remarkably ill-educated officer corps, surely one of the worst in the Western world.”¹⁰

The Minister’s general report was very critical in many areas inside the Department of Defence and the Forces. In particular, he ordered reform in leadership and management because of inadequate officer professional development, a failure to adapt to changing conditions, lack of Canadian strategic thinking, disciplinary difficulties, isolation from Canadian society, and problems of values and ethics. But integral to these were matters of education. Specifically, the Minister noted that only slightly more than fifty percent of the Canadian Forces officers held undergraduate university degrees. Moreover, less than eight percent held higher degrees.¹¹

If somewhat disturbing, these facts are relevant. It seems that in comparative terms, Canadian officers as a group, are not as well educated as their contemporaries in other armed forces. Recent US studies, for instance, show a much higher level. Normally, American officers must have a masters degree before they can be promoted beyond the rank of Major.¹² Moreover, in the Canadian military what focus on higher education has existed, is primarily in the technical fields, especially those with immediate, practical applications. There has been little apparent official emphasis on liberal education or in the humanities and



Officer education from another era: RMC cadets learning field sketching, 1913.

social sciences. As David Bercuson, another of Young's advisors, put in his special report to the defence minister:

Canadian officers today are weak in history, theory and the practical application of military strategy. Moreover, there is a dearth of both strategic thinking and forward planning generally. Almost all Canadian military intellectual activity concentrates either on the practicalities of doctrine, on tactical matters or on administration.¹³

behalf they must be articulate and competent.¹⁵ In short, education is not a panacea but it is the *sine qua non* of military effectiveness.

Arising from this is the second assumption. There is, as Clausewitz identified, a paradoxical trinity — a sacrosanct and symbiotic relationship between armed forces, governments and the people. When the links are broken the trinity falters. As we shall see, the links in Canada have historically been fragile at best.¹⁶

The third assumption in understanding the need for military education is to make a clear distinction between *education* and *training*. By definition, soldiers do a whole lot of the latter, but not necessarily as much of the former. The distinction is also important because in many armies the two concepts are often confused and frequently mutually competitive. Certainly in their 1997 reports, the defence minister and his advisors say that there is little understanding of the role of education among officers. Perhaps this is why when the CF sends the few personnel it does off to do a higher degree it still calls it "postgraduate training".¹⁷

Put simply, *training* is a predictable response to a predictable situation. *Education*, on the other hand, is a "reasoned" response to an unpredictable situation — that is, critical thinking in the face of the unknown. Modern soldiering demands that both education and training reside together and are absolutely necessary. But they are fundamentally different.¹⁸

Indeed, one can argue that in history, without an educated armed force, the superbly trained but uneducated soldier has often been a contributor to the ruination of societies. But a correct combination of high military training and sound education could be their salvation. Two historical examples suffice. Of the former, such was the case with the ancient Spartans. They militarized their society by training *in extremis* to the point at which grooming for war completely blinded them to the societal problems inside their state. These were the real enemy. And in the end, Laconian power was destroyed by those who knew the difference.¹⁹

History is littered with such gruesome examples of military disproportion and consequent ruination. The opposite example occurred 20 centuries later in Western Europe when the liberating influences of the Renaissance and the then information revolution in the form of the Gutenberg printing press again pointed to the need for education among military leaders. And once again, it was the deadly mixture of monumental changes in technology, with a rapid evolution and confusion in society and the state, which forced soldiers to seek higher learning. Again, the usual catalyst was bloody conflict typified by the carnage of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). The new professional soldier, exemplified in the Dutch armies of Prince Maurice of Orange-Nassau, combined martial expertise with specific social and moral values. The key was education. For men like Justus Lipsius of the University of Leiden and Prince Maurice, war was not an act of uncontrolled violence. Rather, it was an orderly application of force or the threat of it by a legitimate government in the interest of



RMC Archives

Learning military engineering skills: RMC cadets building a pontoon bridge, 1923.

All of these revelations of our "Next Traumatic Experience" of the nineties beg the question, "How did we get to this situation?" But before exploring the past, one has to make a few comments on what may be obvious about military education.

If one believes that military education has utility, then one must accept several assumptions. The first is that over time, collections of men-at-arms, have evolved into a profession much like that of doctors or lawyers. In his classic, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington has pointed out that as professionals, soldiers are characterized by an identifiable body of technical knowledge and specific doctrines; they have a higher and particular pattern of education, ceremony, ritual and discipline. These traits give them both an internal group cohesiveness, and therefore an identity that distinguishes them from the rest of society. Importantly, soldiers are also the only permanently armed element in society. This latter point is vital in the traditions of western democracies: that soldiers are armed automatically raises their relationship to society and their appreciation and understanding of it. Further, as Huntington again says "War has its own grammar" that requires that soldiers be allowed to develop their expertise at this "grammar" without undue extraneous interference.¹⁴ Clearly, all of this 'professionalism' underscores the necessity of soldiers to be educated to understand the society from which they spring and for which they serve and on whose

the state. The goal was the resumption of peace as soon as possible. The soldier of the period was professional and educated; he carried on his mandate by being a servant of his community and being thoroughly informed about it. He could command as well as obey; he upheld acceptable social mores; he would not sully his position by common acts of violence; he would be an example to his men and would turn them into effective and disciplined soldiers; nor would he squander life or other national treasures needlessly.²⁰ Finally, in 1648, it was the Treaty of Westphalia that gave a blood-drenched and nearly destroyed Europe some stability to its state system. Education and the profession of arms played no small part.

In the next several centuries, military education became the central theme for an officer's professional development. Military schools were created throughout Europe. The educational demands of technical innovation were the primary cause. But behind this was the guiding force that war had to act in the interest of the state, and therefore needed more than a technical underpinning. The first school was Holland's Seigen in 1619. Quickly, there were others; RMA Woolwich in 1741, RMC Sandhurst 1802, St-Cyr 1803 and 1808, and West Point 1802. All agreed on the common tenet of education. Some of them understood the need for officers to be socially and politically aware as well as technically competent. The goals were to broaden an officer's mind, to avoid elitism, to prepare him for higher positions demanding more than just military knowledge, and to give expression to societies' values and to national development. Much of this was behind the thinking for the founding of the Royal Military College of Canada in 1876.²¹

How is all of this relevant to military education in Canada? It is relevant for two current reasons. As one knows by various recent ministerial and commission reports, Canadian officers are not very well educated as an institutional group, especially in comparison to others in both broader Canadian society and in some other armies. This has led to failings in leadership, and some criminal and foolish acts in the last decade.²² As one is also aware, the 1990s represent a period of extreme complexity and chaos in a still carnivorous world. But having recognized the problem, now is the perfect time to do something about it.²³

Before exploring the 'what to do', we need to explain more of the 'reasons why'. The 'historical baggage' of Canada's soldiers also has played a role in developing attitudes toward and practices of military education. There are many paradoxes endemic to Canada that complicate military development. This country is so large, has such a severe climate and is so rich, but has few immediately useable resources, human or

physical, as to be both unassailable and indefensible.²⁴ Public perceptions of threat were and are rare. Always junior partners in very large alliance systems, such as the French and British colonial régimes, or now the American 'empire', the senior partners never demanded much of our soldiers beyond their field skills. And they defended our land when serious occasions arose. Threats certainly diminished after peace was made with the First Nations people and the Americans. Part-time soldiers serving the localities were all that the government or the people wanted. Canadian soldiers have never needed to be much more than technically and tactically good, and only when called to battle. The militiamen knew what side of the tree from which to fire a musket; he could build bridges, haul supplies, bring a practical savvy to any problem or storm Vimy Ridge. And so Canadians established a high military reputation on these limited functions.²⁵

Over time, Canadians also developed a 'militia myth' that part-time soldiers were the country's best line of defence. But this view also contributed to a further stunted horizon. In the hands of Militia advocates like Sam Hughes, it discriminated against regular soldiers and professional development.²⁶ The effects were poor peacetime preparation in training and education. As for the general public's view of the military, it was seldom concerned or interested. To paraphrase Prime Minister Laurier's advice to the new British commander of the Canadian Militia in 1902, "Don't take the Militia seriously, milord, after all, the Monroe Doctrine protects Canada." He might have added, so did the Royal Navy and time and distance.²⁷

In the two great wars of the 20th century, as a junior ally, Canada contributed magnificently her brave but limited manpower, her natural, industrial and technical resources and her tactical prowess. But significantly, the great allies and not Canadians determined the war direction, strategy and priorities. Indeed, as C.D. Howe



Riding was an essential part of officer education in 1924.

the Minister of Munitions learned in the middle of the Second World War, being in the alliance could even threaten how one wants the industrial strategy and mobilization to go, and it may not be to your benefit.²⁸ While certainly at a higher pitch of activity, the tactical and technical mindset was reconfirmed. Revealingly, Canada was the only self-governing Dominion of the British Empire that did not produce a Field Marshal in either war.²⁹

Until the Second World War, Canada had few military professional development facilities beyond the unit level. What soldiers learned at the higher levels was

three were representative nationally, and with CMR better prepared to give expression to French Canada in the CF, these colleges were limited to producing only 25 percent of the total officer corps.

The other potential exception was the National Defence College. Established in 1948, supposedly it was to be the senior 'Canadian Joint Services Staff College'. As the Chiefs of Staff Committee minutes recorded at the time:

...the scope of the course should not primarily be to train service members in high level gov-

ernment operational planning, but rather to create a supply of personnel, service and civilian, trained to co-ordinate civil and military operations in the national effort demanded by modern war.³³

The directing staff and the students were all to have university degrees, and the students were to be well chosen from military, scientific, diplomatic and executive circles with at least lieutenant-colonel or its equivalent rank. It seemed like a good start — but it was not seen as part of senior officers' education or their career progression.

Moreover, when press reports suggested that the new Canadian 'National Defence College' would be similar to the British Imperial Defence College and to the US National War College, Lieutenant-General Foulkes, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) and chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, quickly pointed out that he did not want the new college to obviate the necessity of continuing to send Canadian officers to the other two countries' strategic schools.³⁴ This qualification to remain dependent on allies to get higher strategic development — perhaps a sign of what may be labeled the 'colonial cringe' — hinted at an uncertain future for NDC. It also meant that Canada did not have a high level military forum that potentially could create a unique national strategy or produce general officers able operate in the difficult world of advising politicians.³⁵

Right after the Second War the Canadian government — a bit wary about its militaries' expansive post-war plans — wanted the forces returned to their miniscule pre-bellum levels dependent on a militia. It wasn't to be as events beyond their control, as usual, abruptly changed things with the sudden onset of the Cold War and then the United Nations action in Korea in 1950.

mostly "experiential" in someone else's force.³⁰ Typical was having our officers posted to British service or commissioned in it, such as was RMC's graduate, the brilliant Sir Percy Girouard. Few of the graduates from the College went into the diminutive Canadian Permanent Force.³¹ In the inter-war years, a very small selection of senior officers were chosen to attend the first strategic-level military school in Great Britain, the Imperial Defence College (IDC) — for there was no such thing in Canada. When the IDC opened in 1927, A.G.L. McNaughton was the first Canadian to attend. There he learned all about the strategic thinking of the British Empire, but little about Canada.³²

After the Second World War, the schools of instruction and training expanded considerably as increasing professionalism and size demanded. But, the educational content remained a poor second to an ever increasing and more sophisticated training and technical preparation. There were two potential exceptions. The first was RMC that reopened in 1948 as a tri-service College. In the next decade, it became a university in its own right, with a charter from the province of Ontario. Soon this experience was repeated with the creation of two smaller sister colleges, Royal Roads on the West Coast and Collège militaire royal at St Jean, Quebec. While all



Military engineering class at Royal Military College, 1932.

RMC Archives

The rapid expansion in the next few years created an immediate demand for officers. Newly created Officer Candidate Schools took direct entry candidates right out of high school. It seemed right, for our military proved to be better than most. And there was no evidence that a higher education was necessary to do the things in the field that our allies in NATO and the United Nations asked our Armed Forces to do.³⁶ For a few specialists like doctors, lawyers and dentists, DND created a subsidized civilian university plan to get them. The majority, therefore, remained without higher education. Furthermore, RMC quickly became the place to get the engineering specialists, and the entrance requirements and the curriculum were geared that way. In general, because Canada's Forces had always been oriented to task 'means' and not to goal 'ends', its view of education was similarly 'need- and task-driven' toward technical and tactical considerations rather than having a comprehensive educational concept for all officers. And at the time, why should it not be thus? The CF did very well what its government said and what its allies expected. Besides, the higher education level of the CF was not much different than the rest of Canadian society of the fifties and early sixties...yet.

In these years, all of the old historical paradoxes, but with some in new forms, would continue to influence Canada's military being. The great power, now the United States, made all of the strategic decisions. In Canada, there were precious few civilian defence and military analysts to give informed debate. Canadian universities, then as now, showed little interest in the study of things military unless there was a handsome financial subsidy. Naturally, un-military Canadians, like their governments, rightly had other pressing concerns, such as national development and social programmes to occupy their attention. Yet there were troublesome signs emerging. The ever-widening technological and financial gap of the Cold War made it increasingly harder for our military to participate. With the possibility of mutual assured destruction of a thermonuclear war in an East-West confrontation, some civilians believed that such alliance participation was absurd; others indicated that Canadian soldiers were better off working within conventional war scenarios in NATO and NORAD but at a more limited level; and still others saw the military functioning best in operations like peacekeeping. The military itself preferred the conventional war scenario of the alliances because that is what gave them a comforting professional identity acceptable in other armed forces. As conventional warriors, Canadians were better than many other forces — and so they had something to contribute. In the face of none of their own, they had familiar alliance doctrine to espouse. The accepted enemy was as present and dangerous as ever. It was also a chance to know and use the latest equipment, and to share high quality training and to practice operations in formations higher than brigades. As long as Canadian governments couldn't decide to leave the European alliance and clearly define a different defence policy, then the soldiers as professionals had every right to place their faith in this modernized version of conventional 'tactical-technical' thinking. Besides, it seemed that if Canada really wanted to embark on any new direction it would be by choice through the Department

of External Affairs (now Foreign Affairs and International Trade) and not the military.³⁷

Beginning in the early sixties and steadily gaining momentum in subsequent decades, was government unwillingness to support in policy or funds an expensive defence policy aimed at the European alliance. Unification, integration and civilianization became by the early seventies another one of Theodore Ropp's "Newest Traumatic Experiences".³⁸ Indeed, some have argued that in the 18 months after Paul Hellyer's unification reforms in the late sixties, over 26,000 service personnel departed the CF with 13,142 quitting prematurely. If it was due to low morale, likely some of the brightest and the best left.³⁹

Yet, there were those in the CF who realized what the officer needed. Between 1969 and 1995, the Canadian Forces had no less than six major reports on the need to reform professional development. Beginning in 1969 with Major-General Roger Rowley's comprehensive three-volume report, all pointed to the "absence of an underpinning philosophy and conceptual framework for OPD beyond the issues of military tactics."⁴⁰ Some of them were even dedicated solely to showing that there was no real military education for officers beyond the rank of lieutenant-colonel. But as to their fate, in William McAndrew's words, the reports were "cherry-picked to oblivion rather than implemented".⁴¹

One of the reasons for the lack of reform in these years was the simultaneous emergence of another of the CF's paradoxes: bureaucratic management processes that ultimately eclipsed traditional ideals of leadership. Or put another way, if there was a realization that higher education was necessary, now the 'coveted' MBA and



The library at RMC, 1936.

MPA became the new icon and panacea for future military educational needs — and it added its influence to the technological preference already there.⁴²

Still, many in the Canadian Forces saw little need for higher education, especially in the Army. Consequently, for a hard pressed commanding officer of the combat arms, sending his officers to a graduate school meant that they were not available for long periods in the regiment.⁴³ So it was not encouraged. Only

the technical support services who had some semblance of future planning posted their officers to “PG training”. Canadian personnel continued to attend many technical and command and staff schools in the United Kingdom, Europe and increasingly in the United States. Mostly, it was ideas about Alliance doctrine, and their equipment and strategies that they came home with. Perhaps the military would have been better off asking why they wanted to do so, and what were the implications of not developing ideas of their own.⁴⁴

Indeed, as early as 1971, former Canadian officer and RMC professor Adrian Preston predicted that once Canada started to move away as she did in the 1970s from the robust alliances developed in the fifties, senior Canadian officers would suffer from lack of a command intellect that would be difficult to shake.⁴⁵ Twenty-five years later, by the time the Somalia Commission inves-

higher education was not conceived of as a way to develop the minds of officers; rather it was a task-oriented function to acquire a skill for which there was an obvious and immediate need for a few, mostly in technical areas.⁵⁰ Frustrated, many well-educated officers simply left the service, and they continue to do so.⁵¹ As one commentator said of this brain drain, that while in industry when a specialist leaves one firm he is not lost to the industry — when an expert leaves the Armed Forces he is lost forever.⁵²

Contributing to the situation was, and perhaps still is, the nature of Canadian Forces career management. The Armed Forces have had a cadre of military career managers for years. But for at least two decades they have had a most difficult task. Overworked and undermanned and having to juggle competing demands of diminishing human and financial resources with



Photo courtesy of Jack Chiang

Aerial view of Royal Military College.

tigations occurred, Douglas Bland confirmed the same point and said that the problem had infected all of NDHQ, turning it into centre for support of allies and individual service agendas rather than command and leadership.⁴⁶ If this is so, then education policy development did not have much of a chance.

To some degree, the Canadian ‘regimental system’, military culture and inter-service rivalries bear some of the responsibility for the limitations of military education. Former senior officers Charles ‘Sandy’ Cotton and Doug Bland have likened the military culture to tribes, all in cutthroat competition with each other.⁴⁷ As senior regimental officers reach NDHQ, perhaps this is why there has been no unified education policy coming out of NDHQ over the years.⁴⁸ For officers who managed to get a chance for such higher education, or more likely for those who earned it on their own without any official support, not being in the regiment to train in the combat skills and other professional development areas often meant not advancing on the merit list. For them, promotion was difficult.⁴⁹

Seeking higher education became career punitive. And consequently many did not seek it at all. In short, as Lieutenant-General R.J. Evraire was to write in 1988,

increasing operational tasking like peacekeeping, these managers are often forced simply to fill positional holes.⁵³ And so choices are not necessarily well made. Neither an educational philosophy nor long term systematic planning is there to guide them. Consequently, education is undervalued in career development. Sometimes, recent postgraduates are not posted into after-degree employment which take advantage of their hard earned education; other times where they do get in the correct slots, their seniors do not know how to use this brain trust — some say it frightens them. In all, this is paramount to an institutional anti-intellectualism, especially in the combat arms.⁵⁴

In looking back on the 30 years before the Defence Minister’s reform fiat of 1997, one can not avoid the question, “What sort of internal signs, especially within the existing OPD agencies ‘demonstrated the problems in military education?’” Generally, there was no overarching departmental policy to guide and integrate military education into the Armed Forces. Efficiency and utility investigations were legion and there always seemed to be the disquieting rumour that one or more of the colleges or the schools would be closed for financial reasons. Everyone tried to heal something. Fixes, when they appeared, came as a sort of spontaneous curricular

acupuncture. Such *ad hoc* treatment caused the educational and training limbs to twitch in different directions, often independently. Similarly, there was no consensus in the actual Forces that higher education was necessary for an officer. And lastly, within the education debate there was the argument whether military personnel should be educated solely at civilian universities or in the military ones.

In the case of National Defence College, in due course, its graduates were too few, its curriculum lacked academic rigour (and therefore credibility); its candidates were not always well selected as the very best; less than fifty percent of the graduates were ever promoted and its short 10 months term was too busy. In 1976, one critic summed it up thusly: “no papers, no heavy reading; just one visiting expert after another and occasional group reports on problems looked into between junkets to the Far North, East and South and a whopper to Europe and the Middle East...”⁵⁵ By 1992 the criticism was very strident: “the old adage that the NDC is not a college, or national, and has nothing to do with defence is not far off the mark.”⁵⁶ For good or bad, it was closed in 1994. Perhaps had it been, right from the start, part of a rigorous higher education policy for the CF’s senior officers rather than its 1948 purpose of training a few select senior officers and civilians on the internal and external aspects of inter-service problems, it might have survived.

As for the three colleges of the Canadian Military College system, over the years they maintained a high level of university education for those who attended. But being allowed to produce no more than about twenty-five percent of the total officer requirement, their foot print was not large enough to set the standard for education in the CF. And there were some internal problems long in the solving.

Besides funding issues, all three colleges were mutually competitive in programmes. Sometimes it led to duplication, which starved some courses and prevented the creation of newer ones. In time, the two junior colleges expanded their mandate to give their own degrees. This greatly intensified the inter-college competition.⁵⁷ Rather than education conceived as a holistic entity, it was driven by ‘task-need’ demands of military occupations. RMC for instance, produced a far larger number of engineering graduates than in the

sciences or arts. This reflects the historical bias favoring the technical and tactical focus within the CF. It caused tensions in faculty divisions who seemed to be competing more and more for what they deemed their share of the ever diminishing resource pot.

There were also antagonism with the military outside of the colleges in their often differing view of what a soldier should be taught.⁵⁸ Certainly the military colleges were not helped by the fact that there remained, as a former college Director of Cadets described it, a “severe gap between the RMC faculty and many senior officers at NDHQ who lacked an appreciation of education.”⁵⁹ There was also the endless debate over whether the civilian universities should do all the educating and the military college system should only train cadets. A chronic criticism was that education costs in the college system were very much higher than in civilian circles. This unsettling assessment turned out to be a greatly over-simplified charge, but it was made often.⁶⁰ There was also a smoldering dissatisfaction from the operational branches that they were not getting CMC graduates soon enough and that they knew too few military things for having spent four years at a military institution. The Colleges, they said, had to put the “M” back in RMC. Sometimes the cadets were accused of being arrogant ‘ring-knockers’ who did not fit into the appropriate military culture.⁶¹

Moreover, in the early 1970s, RMC seemed to be “dragging its feet” at getting involved in a much needed CF continuing education scheme.⁶² Just as was then happening in Canadian civil circles, there were plenty



Academic facilities at RMC: the Girouard building and the Massey library.

Photo courtesy of Jack Chiang



Aerial view of the Canadian Forces College in Toronto.

of service personnel and their dependents who wanted the education and were pushing from the bottom up to have access to it. The result was that in 1973, the University of Manitoba came up with a solid plan to provide university level courses for all in the CF. They were also prepared to give university accreditation to some of the more sophisticated military training programmes. It was an innovative concept that RMC had been reluctant to explore. Manitoba got the contract and then dominated CF extension education for the next 30 years. It might have been helped a bit, as RMC's historian, Dick Preston has suggested, that the University of Manitoba was in the Defence Minister's home riding.

In these same years, the Canadian Forces College at Toronto turned out competent, solid Command and Staff graduates quite capable of taking their place in the heady but conventional military worlds of NDHQ or the Alliance in Europe or the United States. However, it was not exempt from criticism that it was not meeting the changing military conditions and the demands for a better OPD. The Command and Staff Course only reached a limited proportion of the Majors, in part because there was no mechanism of distributed education. Often the College wanted their graduates to be given university credit for completing the CSC. But while being dedicated and serious in doing their job, many instructors had little academic qualification either to teach or to be masters of portions of the content; there seemed to be no attempt to make sure that they did, save that they were chosen for their service experience more than any other thing. The curriculum stuck pretty well to the conven-

tional Alliance doctrine and allowed little room for exploring anything uniquely Canadian. A student's time was jammed with visiting speakers, and there was little mind stretching, in-depth reading and writing. Examinations were restricted. Syndicate discussions demanded little academic preparation, and one wondered if anyone ever failed.⁶³

Such were the educational conditions of the past thirty years or more. But in the last decade our "traumatic experiences" accumulated very quickly. That series of events started happily enough with the end of the Cold War. Then as the military went through the budget cuts and the closure of colleges, schools and bases and the shame and pain of the Somalia tragedy, it seemed that the CF as an institution was incapable of changing itself fast enough from the top down. And so, in 1997 an impatient Minister of National Defence — the spokesman for the civilian-political sector, ordered it to be done. Moreover, to make sure it was, he appointed an independent civilian overseer in the form of the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.⁶⁴

As we know, several of the Minister's recommendations were directed squarely at military education. Now all officers were to have a university degree upon commissioning, and those serving members who did not have one were given a limited time to get it. Other important directives varied from a complete curriculum and governance review at RMC to the establishment of

an ethics and leadership centre there and the creation of new courses at CFC in Toronto directed at the professional development of senior and general officers.⁶⁵

One of the most fundamental questions in the 1997 imposed reform movement was, “What should an officer candidate learn?” Its concomitant was ‘how to avoid the limitations that were brought about by the long technical and tactical bias and the isolation from the Canadian community’. The answer was a liberal education — as the defence minister said — that must ensure for each graduate “a broad-based education, well grounded in the sciences and the humanities, with special emphasis being placed on the development of values, ethics and leadership skills that needed to prepare officers for responsibilities and service to country.”⁶⁶

Even before the 1997 ministerial directions, some of the elements within the CF were already doing important things on their own. For instance, for a long time, RMC had been sensitive to the growing desire for higher education. For years the engineering division has had a first class graduate school with sponsored officers earning a variety of degrees. The number of billets for these people was generated by a particular unit or technical agency requesting a specific expertise. Nuclear submarines, for example, would have produced a specific demand for nuclear engineers. But this was not the case for the arts, especially in subjects relating to the study of the profession of arms and society. Nor was it the case for having billets identified for the sake of increasing the general educational level of the CF. NDHQ sent few. However, if telephone calls and letters from individuals were any indication, the demand was there. And so the College decided to take education to where the clients were: their work place. In 1992, RMC began to teach post-graduate courses from their War Studies Masters programme in Toronto at the Canadian Forces College. It had the willing co-operation of the people there, and it used a few of their Command and Staff students as the first experimental lot. Teaching was usually done late in the day or in the evenings so that there was as little disruption as possible to the principal task. Four years later, by the time the Defence Minister’s report came out, RMC had its first graduate and there were over 300 officers — both Regular and Reserve

Force, and more than a few other ranks — working on a Master of Arts in War Studies in several major centres across the country. Its success only confirmed again that military personnel wanted higher education, were will-

ing to do it on their own and were driving the demand from the bottom up in the absence of a top-down policy. Moreover, the subject was what many dedicated soldiers wanted: it related directly to the study of the profession of arms.

The War Studies success helped RMC embark upon an undergraduate continuing education programme in early 1996. The new initiative was a natural extension of General Robert Morton’s Officers Development Review Board report of the year before, again before the minister issued his orders. The Morton Report emphasized four pillars in an officer’s professional lifetime: education, training, experience and lifetime self-development.⁶⁷ At RMC, under the enthusiastic guidance of a newly created Dean of Continuing Studies, a nationwide extension project was again an immediate success. For a while, expansion to meet the flood of enrolments simply out-ran funding and organization. Frequently, the Dean had to go cajoling and begging for money and personnel to get the project going on an uncomfortable *ad hoc* basis. He also spent a great deal of time trying to get individual CF elements to ‘buy into the idea’. Many of them did. And so the structure was built brick by brick. Currently, the College has over 2000 undergraduates taking courses part-time coast to coast and overseas from Bosnia to the Far East. As well as having conventional programmes, Continuing Studies created a new undergraduate degree pattern aimed at the profession of arms similar to the graduate War Studies — a Bachelor of Military Arts and Science (BMASc). They also credited certain CF training courses. The outreach project is highly sensitive to the posting demands of



Officer cadets on summer training at CFB Gagetown.

service personnel, something that civilian universities did not do as easily if at all. It uses whatever means is effective to deliver this education to the work place, be it correspondence, traditional lectures or electronic.⁶⁸

Again, there was never any doubt that military personnel wanted to have education, even though at the early stages of this project, NDHQ could never quite make up its mind whether it was worth funding or not.⁶⁹

While all of this was well in train, the Minister's reforms produced a close scrutiny of RMC's undergraduate curriculum during 1997-1998. The "Report of the RMC Board of Governors Study Group," chaired by retired Gen. Ramsey Withers, a former CDS, was inspired by the idea that RMC "must constitute the 'heart and soul' of the officer corps"; to do so, the Withers' Report said:

Officer trainees need a fairly comprehensive introduction to the profession of arms and its component parts. In post industrial, liberal democracies this introduction includes extensive studies of the humanities and solid grounding in the sciences. In addition, the study of military theory and military history is mandatory.⁷⁰

While commending the quality of the academic education (but less the quality of the military component), the report pointed to the need for a "core" programme common to all cadets. In short, it was a reaf-

well represented. The traditional degrees would continue in Engineering, Science and the Arts, but the core courses would constitute 30 percent of the courses taken in any degree pattern by all cadets. Most of the stipulated core courses had been offered for years, but only the arts graduates were getting most of it. This was not equally so among the sciences and engineering cadets. Since the engineering degree programme held significantly more courses than needed to maintain a solid engineering professional accreditation, the report directed that its curriculum be cut down to find room for the core subjects. And the artsmen were going to take more science and math—and from now on they were going to take it seriously!

The Withers' committee had high praise for the quality of the undergraduate courses and especially the outreach programmes in Continuing Studies and graduate offerings. But pointedly it commented on "the lack of a mutual appreciation of needs" between the Canadian Forces and RMC. Here once again was the old dichotomy between education and training. The committee members recognized that the ability to reconcile these two were fundamental in its reforms. It put forward a variety of suggestions to bring the two together inside RMC, including strengthening the personnel



RMC cadets at convocation, May 2000.

firmation of the College's traditional liberal education philosophy more clearly defined in the terms of the profession of arms. The core was to include courses in civics, military law, Canadian military history, military theory and strategy, international relations, leadership and ethics, information technology and emerging technologies. Mathematics and science subjects were to be

quality of the military wing, a delayed selection of military classifications for cadets, and more college responsibility in recruiting them and in their basic officers' training. It even advocated the increased use of military examples and mentors for the classroom. Most importantly, RMC had to integrate both the academic and military wing's efforts toward the common

goal of producing exceptional officers for the CF. A prime way of closing the education-training gap was to increase the number of professors in uniform to at least 30 percent of the entire teaching faculty. But it also made it clear that they had to be university qualified. NDHQ would have to make sure that the appropriate postgraduate educational opportunities would be given the new military teachers.⁷¹ This would take careful career planning, time and resources; that meant policy from the centre.

In their investigations outside of the College, the committee members found that “a significant portion of the problems identified at RMC derive from the greater CF community.” Perhaps with a note of sadness, they concluded that “we wish only that the Canadian Forces would, even more significantly, appreciate the magnificent educational, training and research tool which is theirs at RMC and clasp it firmly to the bosom of their operations.”⁷²

When the other two military colleges closed in 1995, the task of military university education fell primarily on RMC. Indeed, as both the Withers report and the oversight *Minister of Defence’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the DND and the Canadian Forces* have made clear, RMC should be the hub of education for the Canadian Forces.

But RMC cannot and does not want to be the sole provider of higher education for the military. However, Withers’ committee clearly saw RMC graduates as the standard bearers of officership. In order to affect the officer corps, the College must educate 40 percent of the total CF officer needs. This number still leaves the majority to be obtained from the civilian institutions. By having the dual civil-military officer production system there will be strong and healthy links between the military and societal imperatives necessary for a well rounded, well educated Armed Force in a democratic society.⁷³

Contact with civilian universities remains very important. In pursuit of this, RMC sees itself well positioned to act as advisor, even a broker, in helping Canadian Forces members get to a civilian university or to Kingston. At the moment, our Continuing Studies programme has several cooperative agreements with universities across the country. RMC recognizes other institutions’ credit towards our degrees and they the College’s. For instance, Queen’s and RMC have given reciprocal access for students to each others’ programmes for over twenty years.⁷⁴ With a university charter granted by the Province of Ontario and subject to its Ministry of Education’s audit standards like all other Ontario higher educational institutions, RMC is an integral part of the university community, even if *McLean’s Magazine* will not give the College a place in its annual review of Canadian universities.

One of the vital things for education and professional development no matter what the profession is to have a scholarly forum such as a journal for ideas emanating from research and debate. It is part of the educational process. And it can forge links with the commu-

nity. During the interwar years the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* rendered this service. Unfortunately, after the Second World War, it was not renewed. The other existing journals were individual service-oriented publications and not aimed necessarily at higher levels of debate or scholarship. Fortunately, unification saw a renaissance of a new version of *CDQ* privately published but with DND subvention. But slowly, as money got tighter and, one could argue, as the military became less and less interested in debate or scholarship, CF participation waned and the subsidy ended. There was not a forum for new ideas. And NDHQ did not seem to be interested enough to spend its money in this direction. Fortunately, in 1997 the Minister ordered that a new scholarly professional journal for the Armed Forces be created at RMC. The College eagerly put up a model; but then things seemed to grind to a stop at NDHQ over editorial policies such as non-attribution and the omnipresent ‘who was going to pay’. Frustrated with the delays, the Minister’s Monitoring Committee gave military authorities a nudge in their 1999 *Interim Report*. “As the capstone doctrinal policy forum of the CF, the journal” the report said, “must be considered a litmus test of the CFs stated intent to embrace education and intellectual debate.... Any further delays ...could be viewed by critics as a failure to pass that test.” The CF now has the *Canadian Military Journal*, already in its sixth issue. And there is no doubt that it is a ready forum of ideas and debate.⁷⁵

Of course, military education does not end at RMC. After the closures in 1994, the only other major professional development school left was the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. And like RMC, it had recognized before the Minister’s pronouncements the new conditions demanding a better amalgam of education and training. General Morton’s ODRB findings in 1995 and the Defence Minister’s directives two years later simply gave CFC a mandate and a more finite focus to do so.⁷⁶ CFC is responsible for what Morton called Development Periods 3 and 4 — that is, for the professional development of majors through to general/flag rank officers.

In the past, CFC linkages and co-operation with outside educational institutions were not well developed. As Morton said, “the CFCSC sees RMC as an institution limited to undergraduate education and regards its own programme as the central point in the command and control structure of the system.”⁷⁷ But with both schools wanting to change, one of the first and most useful things done was to establish in late 1995 an informal “inter-college committee.” As a channel of communication and co-operation, it discussed issues of mutual interest such as OPD, education, curriculum and accreditation. Over the next six years, it quickly became formalized and continues to operate usefully and well in bringing together educational and training philosophies and resources.

Other improvements at CFC followed quickly. For instance, some of the instructors at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel or higher now have a requirement to hold a Masters degree. The Command and Staff courses have been revamped and include higher levels of strategic and national security studies. OPD integration of

education and training with RMC has now reached the point that credit is given towards a Bachelor of Arts or Master of Arts in various degree patterns for officers passing the several courses there. Soon it is hoped that a professional (not an academic) degree will be awarded to any command and staff course student who meets the university admission requirement of RMC and then succeeds in the command and staff course.⁷⁸

Indeed, for over the past two years with the active participation of RMC and experts from civilian universities, the Canadian Forces College is delivering a three-month and a six-month course aimed at the senior officer niche supposedly held in the past by the now defunct National Defence College. There the similarity ends because the new programmes at CFC are much more rigorous. Their creation was the result of the both the Morton report and the ministerial direction to cure the chronic absence of high level professional education for officers of General and Flag rank. The Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) and the National Security Studies Course (NSSC) are geared to a graduate level university performance. Their goal is to fill the long neglected OPD areas of both 'war fighting' and strategic leadership and management, the absence of which Rowley had identified as long ago as 1969. The other goal was to get general officers to think critically at the strategic government and international level and, to use General Romeo Dallaire's phrase, "to think out of the box". In their third iteration now, for the first time these mandatory programmes will ensure that Canada's generals will have the formal professional military education vital to their position and responsibilities.⁷⁹

The Canadian Forces College has also added to their faculty civilian academics with doctorates in military history and politics to help augment the expertise of the military instructors. And there will be more. The College's library resources have improved tremendously, especially the electronic 'Information Resource Centre', described by professional librarians as world class. The message coming out of National Defence Headquarters is that if all officers are to have degrees, then all senior officers will soon likely have to have at least a Masters degree to achieve General or Flag Officer rank. And it will be possible, because with RMC's recent accreditation of portions of the Command and Staff courses and the AMSC and the NSSC, an officer can earn a RMC post graduate degree simultaneous with progress through the various levels of the Canadian Forces College without 'leaving the work place' or attending Kingston.⁸⁰ Now all that CFC has to do is reciprocate with some accreditation toward the Command and Staff course for officers who cannot attend Toronto, but who hold appropriate RMC graduate degrees. Other military forces do it, and it would provide more officers with the "pcsc" post-nominal.

One other point to be made when talking about RMC and CFC is the concept of a Canadian Defence University. It is an idea long overdue and encouraged by many previous investigators. The core of the university would be RMC. This vision sees not only an enhancement of military research and scholarship, role

models and standards, but also the creation of an academy of leadership. Its partner would be that major officer professional development agency: the Canadian Forces College. As an over-arching institution, the defence university would be the best way to blend all stages of an officer's career from commissioning to general rank under the four pillars of education, training, experience and continuous self-development. As this is written the idea of a Canadian Defence University grows closer to reality.⁸¹

On other Canadian Forces bases, many commanding officers are encouraging their personnel of all ranks to take advantage of either civilian universities or RMC's part-time studies programme. DND will give cost rebates for those who successfully complete university and other post secondary courses. Significantly, providing higher education is beginning to be seen as a 'quality of life' issue aimed at improving conditions on military bases for soldiers and spouses alike.

One other aspect of education that has recently started the overhaul process is the Officers Professional Development Program. Affectionately or not, they are known as the 'opydopies' and they were created in 1974 by the Defence Management Committee. They were intended to broaden and deepen a junior officer's knowledge and understanding of the military profession beyond classification training, and to prepare him or her for later professional development. The correspondence study packages covered reading and written exams in service knowledge, administration, military law, service support, national and international relations and war and the military profession. Theoretically, all officers were to write them if they were to be promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, and they were supposed to be done before getting to the Command and Staff College at CFC. Over the years, the programme did not meet expectations for a variety of reasons. Some of them stemmed out of the forces' attitude to education and to senior leadership disinterest. As a result, the quality of these self-study courses declined as the OPDP units' resources dwindled and its chain of command became more convoluted. Various OPD reports over the years, including the Morton Report, wanted them maintained as their idea was sound. But again the 'fixes' were more of the 'acupuncture treatment' where everything twitched but without a cure. Finally, a 1998 study recommended that the entire programme be fundamentally redrawn toward the wider and deeper study of the profession of arms and opened to anyone in the CF as part of professional development. It was to be placed in RMC's care to ensure its academic quality (and hence credibility) and where it could be integrated into the current changes in OPD at the appropriate DP levels. Recently, the old unit in Ottawa was closed, with its resources transferred to RMC's Continuing Studies Division where the process of rebuilding is going on. This should give new life to an originally sound idea.⁸²

In all, in the last two years, there has been a perceptible change in the CF's attitude to education. Now it has more value in the profession than it ever has had before. The traditional high level Canadian Forces

training is being modified and coordinated to meet certain education requirements; it is therefore double-hatted and cost effective for soldiers who have only a relatively short career time to be both well educated and well trained.

But vigilance is necessary. The Ministers Monitoring Committee on Change and some other agencies inside NDHQ say that there are still serious problems.⁸³ A much clearer definition and effective implementation of educational policy is necessary from the centre. As advances have happened so far, it is in the typical Canadian way: one brick at a time from the ground up. For any policy to be efficient it must have several operating layers. Among them are precise definition, promulgation, and central coordination and execution of educational policy. Statements by a minister do not necessarily a policy make — nor does it make it happen easily or quickly.

All too often the various components of DND and the Canadian Forces do not co-operate on this issue. Nor is it a matter of Defence Headquarters taking the Minister's directives, staffing them to death for a report and then being able to check off the box as a job done. And some Force elements responded to requirements to have degrees by charging off to a local civilian university with their own expensive solutions, setting up abbreviated educational packages for a few of their senior officers without baccalaureates. If the Minister says all officers must have degrees, then the effort must be coordinated to guarantee common basic education standards and to avoid "certificatism" or simple ticket punching. This demands good long-term career management of education. It also demands proper and recognized access to, and appreciation of education for its own sake beyond military training.⁸⁴ True professional development has a place, indeed a necessity for both *education* and *training*. RMC should play a central but not the only role in bringing the two solitudes together. An educational management model must be created that will ensure that academically talented soldiers are guided and encouraged toward education, particularly in the arts and social sciences directed to the study of the profession of arms. These personnel should be identified early, be well-chosen, then tracked, protected — culled if necessary — and guided toward education, higher command and service to Canadian and international

society. Hopefully, with the new defence statement on what an officer should be in the CF of the year 2020, this model may yet materialize.⁸⁵

Better educated soldiers will allow our military to act on an equal footing with those of our allies because Canada's soldiers will have the same educational tools. The days when all we had to do was contribute our tactical and technical savvy are gone. We are not ever likely to have to mobilize in world wars again as we did twice this past century. War has changed. Indeed, we do not have the resources or will to do so now. So if we can not bring our numbers or our brawn to the international table, then we must bring our brains.

One could also argue that the labours of Athena and the muses in military education represent stages in the maturation of the Canadian Forces. The nation seems more secure in its identity than its military. Some might say the Forces suffered too long from a colonial cringe, in part brought on by the historical baggage and resource reality. It kept the Forces tactical and technical and dependent on others for the view 'out of the box'. It can be seen in the various limitations in professional development.⁸⁶ As military education is finally undergoing substantial renaissance and re-valuation, it may signal the final phase of the CF in throwing off these vestiges and developing institutional independent judgement and identity. In doing so, perhaps it is finally finding its place in Canadian society, much of which has already cleared similar hurdles.⁸⁷

All of the old paradoxes will remain: domestic-alliance, civil-military, training-education, war-peace, unassailable-indefensible, peacekeeping-conventional conflict, tasks-goals, leadership-management, rising commitments-decreasing resources. These are all the things officers must live with and understand. Only in this way can we be sure that when Canada uses its small military force for whatever reason, the nation will be getting from its soldiers a reasoned response to the unpredictable situations of a dangerous and uncertain world.



NOTES

1. Foreword by General Jean V. Allard, Major-General Roger Rowley, Chairman, Report of the Officer Development Board, Department of National Defence, March, 1969, Vol. 1, p iii. Hereafter cited as Rowley Report.

2. Lieutenant-General Robert W. Morton, Chairman, Report of the Officer Development Review Board for the Chief of Military Personnel, NDHQ, August, 1995. Hereafter cited as Morton Report.

3. Rowley Report, p. iv.

4. Theodore Ropp, "The Military Officer and his Education in the Next Quarter of a Century" in *Signum*, special issue on military education, Vol. iii, No. 283, Aug. 1976, pp. 1-16. The con-

ference took place 14-17 June that year. The author was present.

5. For the most recent and the best analysis of the scandal surrounding the Canadian Airborne, its history, and the Somalia cover-up, see LCol Bernd Horn, "Bastard Sons": An Examination of Canada's Airborne Forces, 1942-1999", doctoral dissertation, War Studies, RMC, 2000. Also refer to David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1996.

6. Minister of Public Works and Government Services of Canada, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces

to Somalia, Ottawa, 30 June 1997. The most convenient way for the researcher to get at all aspects of the Somalia report is the CD-ROM, "Information Legacy: a Compendium of Source Material from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia" produced by the above department.

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 11. DND, "Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces" by The Honourable M. Douglas Young, P.C., M.P., Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs, 25 March 1997.
 12. "Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress", a Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dick Cheney, Chairman, Washington D.C., March, 1997. pp. 15-16. Dick Cheney, now Vice President of the United States and former Secretary of Defense in the George Bush administration, notes that 90% and 96% of all US LCol and Col hold advanced degrees. In Canada in 1997 only about 7% held advanced degrees for all the CF. Hereafter cited as the Cheney Report.
 13. "A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence by D.J. Bercuson, PhD, FRSC, University of Calgary," 25 March, 1997, p. 16. Hereafter cited as Bercuson Report.
 14. Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Practise of Civil Military Relations*, New York: Vintage Books, 1957, p. 57 and Ch. 1 and Ch. 2. Also see L.D. Laswell, *The Analysis of Political Behavior*, New York: 1947, p. 152. For a good analysis of the development of the professional Canadian Force, see Stephen Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Professional Army, 1860-1939*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988.
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 18. Morton Report, Vol.1, p. xvi.
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 27. Carmen Miller, "Sir Frederick William Borden and Military Reform, 1896-1911" in the *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. L, No. 3 (Sept. 1969), pp. 265-284, and Desmond Morton, *Canada and War: A Military and Political History*. Toronto: Butterworths, 1981, p. 44.
 28. Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, *C.D. Howe, a Biography*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980, Ch. 9, 10 and 11.
 29. Desmond Morton recounts that when he entered Collège militaire royal in 1954, his family joked that he was destined to be Canada's first field marshal. As he says, his life changed direction. But there were many others in the military who retained the belief that in every kit bag there was a field marshal's baton - and who could blame them. However, it takes more than training, as Morton points out. See Desmond Morton, "The Political Skills of a Canadian General Officer Corps," in Horn and Harris, eds., *Generalship and the Arts of the Admiral*, pp. 361-372.
 30. For an early assessment of military education in Canada, see F.J. Dixon, "Military Education in Canada," in J.C. Hopkins, ed., *Canada: an Encyclopedia of the Country*, Vol. iv, Toronto, 1898, p. 444. It was a short entry. Also see G.F.G. Stanley's chapter on military education in Hector Massey, ed., *The Canadian Military: a Profile, 1867-1970*. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972.
 31. R.A. Preston, *Canada's RMC*, pp.119-120. There were too few officer billets in the Canadian Permanent Force, and, according to Preston's research, early Canadian governments did not want to antagonize the Militia whose political lobby was, and would remain substantial. On Girouard, see *ibid*, pp. 110-111 and 110n.
 32. John Swettenham, *McNaughton*, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968, Vol. 1, pp. 229-236. While at IDC, McNaughton was concerned about Canadian sovereignty, but it seems not about developing strategic thinking outside of the imperial realm.
 33. DND, Directorate of History and Heritage, "Chiefs of Staff Committee", Minutes, 394th meeting, 26 June 1947. Min. 7, D. Hist File 73/1223/1302.
 34. *ibid*, 400th meeting 4 Sept 1947, Min. 30 and *ibid*, 408th meeting, 9 Dec 1947, Min. 4.
 35. Writing in 1971 L. Motiuk in "The Officer Corps, the Armed Forces and the Future", in Papers from Contributors to the Study of Professionalism in the Canadian Forces, commissioned by RAdm R.W. Murdoch, CDEE, Sept 1971, noted in Append 'K' that the officer corps "still bears ..the stamp of its colonial heritage" and is "disposed to obtain its strategic and military doctrine secondhand from mother countries, large neighbours or dominant allies." (*ibid*, p. 25).
 36. Douglas Bland, "Military Command in Canada", in Horn and Harris, eds., *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, pp.124-133. From 1950 to 1959 the CF grew from 30,000 to over 120,000 regulars.
 37. For a tour de force on Canadian defence history, see the several volumes of James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, various dates, especially Vol. iii, "Peacemaking and Deterrence", 1972 and Vol. iv: "Growing Up Allied", 1980.
 38. W. Harriet Critchley, "Civilianization and the Canadian Military", in B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock, eds., *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century*, Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993, pp. 226-241, and Douglas Bland, "Controlling the Defence Policy Process in Canada: White Papers on Defence and Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of National Defence", in *ibid*, pp. 211-225.
 39. Desmond Morton, *Canada and War*, p.186.
 40. Morton Report, Vol.1 p. 16. After the 1969 Rowley Report note the following: DND documents Report of the Study on Professionalism in the Canadian Forces, Ottawa: CDEE, P-5000-47, 1972; the Leonard Report Mar 1977 cited in fn. 51 below; MGen C.G. Kitchen, Outservice Training for Officers, ADM(PER), Mar 1985; Col David Lightburn, Senior Officer Professional Development, CPD, Apr 1986; and LGen R.J. Evraire, General and Senior Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces, Oct 1988. There are others!
 41. William McAndrew, "Canadian Officership: an Overview", in Horn and Harris, eds., *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, fn. 60, p. 66.
 42. Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, pp. 103-104. McAndrew and many others concur in the deleterious effect of an overwhelming emphasis on business management rather than leadership.

He says one should "reject the common assumption that officers are merely business executives in uniform, and the more senior of them CEOs. The two professions may share common characteristics, but ends and purposes are not among them. One has a bottom line and limited liability; the other has unlimited liability with a profit and loss statement reckoned in soldiers lives. The difference is fundamental." In Horn and Harris, eds., *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, p. 54.

43. Col Howie Marsh, "Command Challenges in the 21st Century", in Horn and Harris, eds., *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, pp. 189-210.

44. Douglas Bland, "Military Command in Canada", in Horn and Harris, eds., *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, pp. 121-136. A good sign is the recent interview with the new Chief of the Land Staff, LGen Mike Jeffery. He feels that the CF has been a tactical force far too long; it should be able to apply military force "more strategically". He thinks that Canada should play "not a follower, but indeed in some cases even a lead role". See Sharon Hobson, "Interview: Lt Gen. Mike Jeffery, Canadian Chief of Land Staff", in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 34, No. 16, 18 Oct 2000, p. 48.

45. Adrian Preston, "The Profession of Arms in Post War Canada, 1945-1970", *World Politics*, xxiii, Jan 1971, pp. 189-214.

46. Public Works and Government Services. Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision: a Study for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, by Douglas L. Bland, Ottawa, 1997, Ch.1 and Ch. 6, especially pp. 52-60. Bland cites Stephen Harris' internal DND study 1990 that confirmed that "Canadian officers provide, but they do not lead"; that there is as a result no centre for "strategic decision or command". *ibid*, p. 54. It is the 'colonial cringe' again.

47. Charles Cotton, "Military Values and Attitudes of the Army in Canada," Report 79-5, Toronto: CFPARU, 1979 and a conversation between Douglas Bland and the author, June 1999. Also see Bland, "NDHQ: Centre for Decision, Somalia Commission", Ch. 6.

48. Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, p. 126 for his analysis of the 'regimental system' in Canada, see *ibid*, pp. 116-129.

49. BGen Ken C. Hague, "Strategic Thinking General/Flag Officers: the Role of Education," in Horn and Harris, eds., *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, pp. 517.

50. LGen R.J. Evraire, General and Senior Officers Professional Development in the Canadian Forces. October 1988, p 75. See his discussion on pp. 36-48. Hereafter cited as the Evraire Report.

51. Granatstein, Report, p. 20 and Ropp in *Signum*, p. 4. Ropp worried in 1976 that if higher education was not earned by an officer at the cadet level that the training and technological demands of their later career would turn off their "critical lamps" and that war colleges – as they stood then with their syndicates of "rap sessions", parades of speakers and often unqualified staff – had little hope of rekindling anything. *ibid*, p. 6.

52. Motiuk in "Papers from Contributor to the Study of Professionalism in the Canadian Forces", p. 27.

53. Evraire Report, pp. 79-88. Note Gen Evraire's discussion on the "experiential" fascination that the CF has in trying to make person-

nel 'for all seasons' through short postings and 'on the job' training instead of developing areas of expertise beyond the operational ones. Specifically, he notes a lack of education in "defence policy" areas, and the difficulty of career advancement (promotion) for an officer who opts for these studies.

54. Morton Report, p. 16.

55. Cited in Ropp, *Signum*, p. 6. That was 1976; seven years earlier Rowley had pointed to the flaws and offered a solution, part of which was to hook it directly to senior officers' development and have a national Canadian military university. See Rowley Report, Vol. 1 pp. 84-85. By 1989, there was substantial debate about its educational usefulness in OPD. See LCol David Harries, "The National Defence College of Canada" in *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1989, pp. 40-42 and LCol J.A. English, "Whatever Happened to the National Defence College?", unpublished mss. By early 1993, English's criticism had reached the national level in *MacLean's Magazine*. Also see S.M. Davis, "Development and National Characteristics of National Defence Colleges – As a World Wide Phenomenon," doctoral dissertation, Queen's University, 1979.

56. J.A. English, *Lament for an Army: the Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism*, Toronto: Irwin, 1998, p. 104. Dr. English notes that the NDC toured 41 days in Canada and 89 outside the country. The entire course was 44 weeks. *ibid*, pp. 79-105.

57. Minister of National Defence, Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Canadian Military Colleges, pp. 33-34. In addition to OPD studies beginning with General Rowley's in 1969, there have been at least another eight which studied the college system between 1976 and this ministerial committee in 1993. Little action was taken on any of them at the policy level, likely because – as this report says – there was no government policy on military colleges and what they should do for the CF, *ibid*, pp. 3 and 7. This committee also wanted to keep all three colleges open, increase the percentage of officers educated in them, and, like Rowley a quarter century earlier, incorporate all three under a single university banner with an over-all governance and policy from the cabinet level.

58. For instance, NDHQ, ADM(PER), Academic Development Task Force, Report on the Academic Development at the Canadian Military Colleges, 29 Mar 1977, recommended doing away with the 8 honours and general specialized Arts degrees in French, English, History and the like, and replacing them with a single one in military and strategic studies. Only Chemical Engineering was to be stopped in that division (p. 5). The Task Force went on to propose that there should not be 'a dual entry scheme' instituted – that is, there should be no separate Arts entry at RMC to the existing Engineering entry for all applicants; that would "do so at the expense of the CMC production of engineers". (p. 5) They wanted 52% of all university directed recruits to the CF to be enrolled in Engineering, 25% in Sciences and 23% in Arts. No wonder the chairmen of the task force, A.C. Leonard, Dean of Engineering at RMC, cautioned his members "not to reveal anticipated decisions that might create undue concern among the faculty". (p. 2) It did that! Generally speaking, much of Leonard's recommendations were vigorously objected to by RMC faculty and rejected or diluted by the Advisory Board. See Preston below. Hereafter cited as Leonard Report.

59. Richard A. Preston, *To Serve Canada*, p. 134.

60. Peter Dunnett, RMC Academic Costs and Civilian University Costs: a Production Function Approach, Kingston: RMC, 1997. They are comparable when one looks at the provincial subsidies and the estimated cost charged by a civilian institution if they had to pay for the RMC four pillar approach that DND considers necessary. Then there is the matter of military culture.

61. Richard Preston cites an interesting example of this. See note below, pp. 128-129.

62. Richard A. Preston, *To Serve Canada*, pp. 123-141. Preston details the travails of RMC during the 70s and 80s in the constant rationalization of the CMCs by NDHQ. He also points out that the Branch Advisors knew little about education and only thought about it in terms of immediate task-driven practical application: "they had only a smattering of knowledge derived from RMC calendar descriptions. They did not think of courses in terms of potential for intellectual development." *ibid*, p. 133. This author remembers well the attitude of a few of his colleagues toward continuing education in the 70s: it wasn't real education for a proper university and it only meant more work and no more resources. The University of Manitoba showed more initiative than the CMCs and therefore got the CF continuing education contract in 1973. *ibid*, pp. 151-154. Consequently, RMC only did local "radius" extension education until the War Studies MA programme began to offer its PG courses at other centres across the country in 1992.

63. Rowley Report, Vol. 1, pp. 81-84. In 1969 only 32% of the combined staff of CFC and CLFCS had a baccalaureate. Granatstein Report. "For Efficient and Effective Military Forces," 25 March, 1997, p. 21. Also see BGen W. Donald Macnamara, "Intellectuals in the General Officer Corps", in Horn and Harris, eds., *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, p. 503. He makes the point that at CFC: Toronto, the fact that "failure to meet the undergraduate and graduate degree goals over the last thirty years also failed to provide sufficient senior staff qualified to teach at a graduate level, and now stands to complicate the accreditation of the [CFC] courses, notwithstanding their quality." Also note Col Howie Marsh's assessment of the syndicate system. He claims that many of the instructors and the students are "IST" on the Myers Briggs personality chart. They are, by type, described as "Introverted, Sensor, Thinker and Judge". In his opinion, this is so because they are the natural products of the regimental system – from whence most of these staff college personnel come. They operate on "gut feeling" and past experience; they are not naturally innovative, resist change and prefer the status quo. Such personalities, he believes, should always be taught or teach in a pedagogical environment that forces them into "external exploration". See Marsh, "Command Challenges in the 21st Century", in Horn and Harris, eds., *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, pp. 196-197.

64. DND, "Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces," Interim Report, 1998, Hon John Fraser, chairman, p. iii. The body was set up in October 1997. Hereafter cited as Minister's Monitoring Committee, Report.

65. Young Report 1997, p. 17.

66. *ibid*, p. 42. For a very interesting discussion see Major, Dr. D. M. Last, "Educating Officers: Post Modern Professionals to Control and Prevent Violence," draft of a working paper submitted to the Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff, Oct. 1999. A version of this is

published in Horn, ed., *Contemporary Issues in Officership: a Canadian Perspective*, Ch. 1.

67. DND, CFRETS, The Officers' Professional Handbook, "The OPD System", A-PD-007-000/JS-HO1, 17 Mar 1997 and Morton Report, Vol. 1, pp. 1-9. Morton structured OPD into four phases: DP1 recruit-commissioning; DP2-Capt; DP3-Maj-LCol; DP4-Col-Gen. Morton noted in his assessment of the past OPD that far too much emphasis had been put on "experiential development and not enough on self-development – meaning education." He added, "Lack of planned development meant ineffective use of resources. Too often the wrong people were educated to do the wrong things, often at high cost." He advocated life-long learning. *ibid*, p. 5.

68. For a thorough explanation of the rationale for Continuing Studies and BMASc, see A.J. Barrett and B.J. Plant, "A Model for Undergraduate University Education for Trained and Experienced Professional Students," an unpublished paper, Kingston: RMC, 1996. Also see DND, CFRETS, The Officer Professional Development Review Board-Working Group, Final Report, 31 Jul 1996, pp. 12-13. This was the 'ways and means' committee for Morton's ODRB. It had no civilians on it. Like Morton, it did not agree that all officers must have a baccalaureate upon commissioning – but only when one became a "Colonel/Captain(N)". *ibid*, p.12. RMC's Dean of Science (later to be the first Dean of the CS) and the Dean of Arts had insisted that they attended the ODRB-WG meetings when matters of education were discussed. They were the only ones, save one other officer who thought that degrees were necessary at commissioning.

69. See the RMC Continuing Studies web page at <http://www.rmc.ca/academic/cs> for the details of its current programme.

70. "Balanced Excellence: Leading Canada's Armed Forces into the New Millennium", Report of the Board of Governors Study Group: Review of the Undergraduate Program at RMC, 30 April 1998. Gen Ramsey Withers, chairman, pp.1 and 14. Hereafter cited as Withers Report.

71. *ibid*, pp. 35-40 and rec. 29. The Arts Division needed seven officers with doctorates to meet the 30%. It is doubtful if there are that many now in the CF, let alone available.

72. *ibid*, pp. i, ii and 24.

73. Minister's Monitoring Committee, Second Interim Report, 1999, pp. 40-44. Fraser wrote "RMC must be congratulated and supported in its role as the academic standard bearer of the CF." (p. 44) He also noted that "despite the push for increased liberal arts military education...the Canadian military are still acting under the

assumption that such subjects as geomatics engineering are true military education fare but history or anthropology are not." (p. 43) Withers Report, pp. 29-30 and H-2.

74. The outreach programme for RMC was arrived at by both conviction and necessity. The College simply does not have the resources to do it all. Furthermore, academic credibility and forging a place in the consciences of the civilian academic community are ways of finding a place a nation not normally inclined to think of the CF in such societal terms. See Minister's Monitoring Committee, Second Report, pp. 40-44 and Withers Report, pp. 1, I and 25-6.

75. Minister's Report to the Prime Minister, rec. 63 and Minister's Monitoring Committee, Second Interim Report, p. 8.

76. Morton Report, pp. 50-53 and Minister's Report to the Prime Minister, pp. 16&17, recmdn. 18,19 and 20.

77. Morton Report, p. 52. He made a similar point about RMC's lack of linkages with other "military institutions" (p. 43).

78. W.D Macnamara, Report on the Command and Staff Course as a Professional Graduate Program, May 2000. This assessment was commissioned by RMC's Dean of Continuing Studies as part of the on-going accreditation effort of OPD with CFC. The new degree is a 'professional' one as opposed to academic, and is not intended to qualify a recipient for doctoral admission: it is to recognize higher level professional accomplishment.

79. Macnamara, "Intellectualism in the General Officer Corps," in Horn and Harris, eds., *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, p. 503. For detailed descriptions of the various CFC courses, see their web page at: www.cfc.dnd.ca.

80. For a very good analytical synopsis of the philosophy and creation of the AMSC and NSSC programmes at CFC: Toronto, see LCol Randy Wakelam, "Senior Profession Military Education for the Twenty-First Century," in *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Autumn 1997, pp. 14-18.

81. Desmond Morton, Report, "What to Tell the Minister" p. 24; Withers Report, pp. 29-30 and the Rowley Report, Vol. 1, pp. 99-102

82. BGen Ernest Beno and Dr. Doug Bland, "New Directions: an Analytical Review of the Canadian Forces Officer Professional Development Program," Blanix Consulting Inc., May 1998. The real problem, one could argue, was that because many COs resented the time it imposed on their subalterns and captains, that they did not take it seriously and granted all sorts of exemptions – and so the students did not take it seriously either. See p. 4 for a summary of OPDP's problems. Also see Morton Report, pp. 44-46.

83. Claude Beauregard, "Military Culture as a Factor in Explaining the Problems of the Canadian Forces," a paper presented to the Canadian Military History Conference, University of Ottawa, 8 May 2000. Dr. Beauregard is an analyst in NDHQ's Project Management Office – Quality of Life organization that is responsible for seeing that 89 reform recommendations of the SCNDVA are carried out. He says that investigations have revealed that there is a military culture "based on a cult of silence, exclusive membership...and doubt concerning the values of civil society". (p. 10) Moreover, this culture fosters a separation between power and knowledge in which the former is "suppressing the latter". (p. 11) Until these are completely eradicated from the Forces, lasting reform will be difficult. Also note his comments on box-ticking (p. 10). Also see the Minister's Monitoring Committee's, Second Interim Report, pp. 2-4 and 41-42.

84. *ibid*.

85. Canada. DND. "Canadian Officership in the 21st Century: OPD 2020 Statement of Operational Requirement", January 2000. Draft. Military education and lifetime learning are absolutely central in this image of what a Canadian officer should be. Even if the assessment is perhaps too idealistic, nevertheless, it is a vision to which one can aspire.

86. Richard A. Preston, "Two Centuries in the Shadow of a Behemoth: the Effect on the Canadian Psyche", in *International Journal*, XXXI, No. 3, Summer 1976, pp. 414-433. He says that Canada has a troubled psyche – "unsure that it really has a distinctive identity." (p. 433)

87. As two young Reserve Naval officers put it in the mid-nineties: "the military services in Canada have become a separate culture replete with their own language, customs, dress, hierarchy, morality, and style of living; a sort of 'closed society' wherein ordinary Canadians feel ill at ease and unwelcome." See, Lt(N) H. A. Culliton and Lt(N) David Hill, "Canada's Naval Service: In Search of a New Relevance in the Twenty-First Century," in the *Maritime Warfare Bulletin: Historical Edition*, No. 1, 1994, p. 132. Both these committed officers were civilian university graduates, both have now served in the Naval Reserve for a decade and both graduated with MAs in War Studies from RMC on their own initiative. This is testimonial to the strength of the bottom layers.