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National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa.

## CIVIL CONTROL OF THE CANADIAN FORCES: NATIONAL DIRECTION AND NATIONAL COMMAND

by Dr. Ross Graham

*Command, the legal authority to issue orders and demand obedience, must be sharply defined in law, unambiguously delineated in organization and obvious in execution. If any one of these conditions fail, then accountability and parliamentary control of the military fails also.<sup>1</sup>*

*Douglas Bland*

*...the first step in the approach to a solution seems reasonably obvious: we must first ensure that the measures adopted for the organization of our defences are in harmony with our national requirements and our means.<sup>2</sup>*

*Colonel Maurice Pope*

**A** fundamental requirement of any nation is to ensure that the activities of its armed forces are subordinated to the political purposes of constitutional government; hence, the armed forces must be under civil control.<sup>3</sup> In established democracies like Canada, the principle of political control of the military is well established; however, the relationships between the armed forces and the executive and legislative branches of government are complex.

The members of Cabinet, under the leadership of the Prime Minister, set government policy for defence. The Minister of National Defence is charged with the man-

agement and direction of the Canadian Forces and of all matters related to national defence. The Minister is accountable to Parliament for the use of executive and expenditure authorities authorized by legislation, government policies and regulations.

Broadly speaking, the activities of the Canadian Forces (CF) and the Department of National Defence (DND) can be divided into two distinct types of activities: running the business of national defence, and conducting operations. Running the business of national defence presents similar challenges to those faced by any other government department. Activities carried out under this category include conducting strategic capability planning, force generation, managing the defence services program, conducting business planning, and so on. These activities are carried out by CF and Departmental personnel under the authority of the Minister of National Defence, who is accountable to Parliament for their conduct.

Conducting operations is inherently different from the other activities of DND, due to the potential for the large-scale application of deadly force, plus the 'unlimited liability' that members of the Canadian Forces assume. The potential consequences of error are so enormous that responsibility and accountability must be carefully controlled. The CF carry out operations under the command of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS),

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and the application of deadly force is managed through the military chain of command. The CDS is “responsible to the MND, and hence to parliament, for the effective conduct of military operations.”<sup>4</sup> Whenever required, the CDS also provides military advice directly to the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Both business activities and the conduct of operations must support national objectives and, therefore, must ultimately be under civil control. However, the

clearly impossible to pursue independent policies while Canadian national command is subordinated to foreign officers.

This paper will examine how civil control of the Canadian Forces can be improved, including both national direction and national command. The context for defence in Canada will be established first. It will be argued that the Canadian government accords a relatively low priority to defence, except in times of crisis or war. The next section will outline the problem of civil-military relations in general, and then discuss the situation in Canada. It will be argued that the traditional theory of civil-military relations, with its focus on absolute control of the armed forces by politicians, is largely irrelevant. On the other hand, Douglas Bland’s “shared responsibility theory”<sup>9</sup> is a useful construct for understanding the Canadian context. The next section discusses national direction and national command of the Canadian Forces, and presents the main thesis of the paper: that the smooth functioning of civil control in Canada requires the CF to adapt to Canadian political realities. Improvements in national direction will depend on senior military officers ensuring that their views are in harmony with Canada’s enduring political culture.<sup>10</sup> Improvements in

national command will require the Canadian Forces to anticipate the requirement in times of crisis or war for the Prime Minister and Cabinet to provide “continual political direction and control of military activities and decisions in the interests of state.”<sup>11</sup>

## THE CANADIAN CONTEXT FOR DEFENCE

For the last several years, DND has commissioned Pollara to survey Canadian attitudes on the CF and related military issues.<sup>12</sup> Opinions have been fairly consistent over this period and, in general, indicate solid support for the CF. For example, in the year 2000, 70 percent of Canadians believed that Canada needed the CF “a great deal”, and 81 percent believed that the CF was doing a good job. The Department must consider these results encouraging, particularly when combined with recent public support for increased spending to “replace dilapidated equipment and improve the quality of life for military personnel and their families.”<sup>13</sup> Does this mean that the “... long-established, almost pathological reluctance of Canadians to spend money on defence ...”<sup>14</sup> has disappeared, and that statements such as “By and large, Canadians have not been greatly interested in defence policy issues”<sup>15</sup> no longer apply?

A survey conducted before the 1997 election of priorities for the next federal government is revealing.<sup>16</sup> Health care and the economy dominated the priorities, and defence was not included in the top ten issues of



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type of control required is fundamentally different. In this paper, government formulation of defence policy, together with civil control of national defence business, will be called ‘national direction’ of the Canadian Forces, while civil control of CF operations will be termed ‘national command’.

For a sovereign nation, it is perhaps surprising how little public and political attention has been devoted to defence. The noted political scientists, Dan Middlemiss and Joel Sokolsky, attribute cabinet inattentiveness to defence policy to Canada’s small stature on the international stage, and the resulting rarity of major policy decisions.<sup>5</sup> Inattentiveness to national command is largely due to our history as a contributor of forces in support of allied causes. Canadian national command was largely subordinated to Britain during the two world wars, in spite of substantial contributions of troops and materiel. During the Cold War, collective defence was seen as the only affordable option, and Canada’s main strategic decisions were to join NATO and NORAD. Subordination of Canadian national command was an easy habit to continue, even though NATO did not require it.<sup>6</sup>

With the end of the Cold War, there has been a growing appreciation that “Canadian defence policy is not set in Washington or Brussels but in Ottawa,”<sup>7</sup> and Desmond Morton has observed that present circumstances offer an historic opportunity to pursue strategic policies that serve our own interests.<sup>8</sup> However, it is

concern. This survey illustrated a consistent theme: Canadians are not un-military, and *in principle* support forces capable of ensuring security at home and participating in peace support or combat operations abroad. However, Canadians usually assign defence a lower priority than domestic issues such as health care, education and the economy.

If these are the attitudes of the Canadian public to defence, what are the attitudes of their government representatives? Dr. Douglas Bland conducted a survey of parliamentarians in 1998-99,<sup>17</sup> which included both Senators and Members of Parliament. Twenty percent of those contacted responded to the survey, resulting in a total sample size of 65. When asked about their primary parliamentary interests, defence policy was fourth, at 9 percent, much lower than social policy (38 percent) and economic policy (36 percent), and significantly less than national unity (16 percent). Foreign policy was given as a primary interest by 5 percent of respondents. Given that 80 percent of those contacted did not respond to the survey at all, it seems safe to conclude that defence policy is not a primary interest for most parliamentarians.

The domestic focus of most parliamentarians is consistent with the priorities of the Canadian public. A secure geopolitical situation has allowed politicians and the public the luxury of ignoring security matters. "Since Defence policy is seldom, if ever, a central or even significant issue during elections, politicians in general, and ministers in particular, stand to win or lose very few votes by taking firm positions on such issues."<sup>18</sup> In the absence of a requirement to take firm positions, there is also little motivation to stay informed, and the observation that: "Politicians as a whole have little background in, or concern for, military matters"<sup>19</sup> seems justified.

On a more positive note, support for the CF and DND among those parliamentarians who did respond appears strong. For example, 66 percent felt that the 1998 defence budget was too small, 85 percent agreed or strongly agreed that the CF gain "influence" for Canada in the UN, and 79 percent said the same thing for NATO. A 59 percent majority believed that "Canada should seek ways to strengthen its defence ties to the United States," and 56 percent agreed or strongly agreed that "Canada has used the CF to win favour with the US in the past ten years."

Engagement with the UN and NATO reflects the well-established Canadian policy of multilateralism, and provides a 'counterweight' to excessively close ties

to the US. Concern for our defence relationship with the US reflects a desire to maintain some level of influence with our most important ally, but also addresses the "defence against help"<sup>20</sup> role of the CF. This role responds to the concern that inadequacies in Canadian security posture may result in an offer of "help" from our American neighbours that Canada "may not want but cannot reject."

In order to exert international influence, Canada must maintain professional armed forces capable of international deployment, but how much capability is really required? As noted by Middlemiss and Sokolsky, "...it is almost impossible to correlate specific levels of contributions to collective defence with the actual degree of Canadian influence."<sup>21</sup> Their analysis of the capability question in 1989 still rings true today: "Since 1968, Canada has answered the question "How



The House of Commons.

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much is enough?" by spending *just* enough — just enough to keep its armed forces together and to allow the military to operate alongside allied units undertaking similar roles."<sup>22</sup>

Douglas Bland has identified a number of enduring ideas on defence that are held by Canadians and their governments,<sup>23</sup> and which are supported by the above discussion.

- Although Canada's defence is ultimately Canada's responsibility, "no direct threat exists or has existed to Canadian territory ... such that there is an obvious need to maintain large standing forces to meet it."
- "The defence of Canada is so vital to American interests that any threat or attack on Canada would undoubtedly bring an American response."
- In its national interest, Canada "should maintain sufficient defence capabilities that Canada cannot become a safe haven for others intent on threatening the United States."

- Through organizations such as NATO and the UN, Canada should pursue a policy of multilateralism, as a “counter-balance to the overpowering influence of the United States in Canadian affairs.”

The preceding discussion establishes the *peacetime* context for Canadian defence. The context will be different in times of crisis. The “... evidence indicates that although politicians are not routinely occupied by national defence, they become interested and involved during a crisis or emergency.”<sup>24</sup> Examples of crises that resulted in intense political interest include the Cuban missile crisis, the October crisis in 1970, and the Oka crisis in 1990. In a crisis involving significant Canadian casualties, political interest would be even more intense. As noted by Henry Eccles:

The more grave a crisis becomes, the greater will be the emphasis on the two paramount factors, combat effectiveness and political control. The factor of monetary economy diminishes in importance as the danger grows.<sup>25</sup>

In the final analysis, there are two contexts for defence in Canada:

- Peacetime periods characterized by “political indifference to the detailed implementation of policy”<sup>26</sup> and a strong desire to minimize expenditures; and
- Periods of crisis or war, during which the government expects to exercise continual political direction and control. Cost considerations will be of lesser importance during these periods.

## CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

According to Eccles, “... the primary purpose of providing for civilian control of the military is to insure that the actions of the military forces of a nation

are subordinated to the political purposes of constitutional government.”<sup>27</sup> Much of the traditional theory on civil-military relations focuses on the problem of preventing a military coup d’état, and therefore on ensuring absolute control of the armed forces by politicians. In established democracies like Canada, the principle of political control of the military is deeply embedded in the culture, and a military coup is almost inconceivable.<sup>28</sup> Hence, the focus of traditional theory on absolute control of the armed forces is largely irrelevant.

Absolute control of the armed forces by politicians would require a degree of political involvement in the details of defence policy that is clearly absent in Canada. Unfulfilled expectations in this regard have been an ongoing source of resentment on the part of the Canadian Forces. As General Gerard Thériault, former Chief of the Defence Staff, stated after his retirement:

Clearly, effective political control of the military requires a great deal more than the kind of weak, inconsistent, reactive and insufficiently informed leadership that inevitably results from the structural shortcomings of the political control machinery we have in Canada.<sup>29</sup>

This suggests that the traditional theory of civil-military relations is not particularly useful in the Canadian context, and may actually be counterproductive.

Bland has recently introduced a new theory for civil-military relations based on shared responsibility.<sup>30</sup> In this model, “the civil authority is responsible for and accountable for some aspects of national defence policy and control of the armed forces, while military leaders are responsible for others.” Control is effected through “[s]hared responsibility and consensus building between the civil authority and the military within a dynamic national regime ... ”<sup>31</sup> Although control is shared, responsibilities and accountabilities must be specified. “The civil authority must *at least* control policies dealing with national goals, the allocation of defence resources, and the use of force.”<sup>32</sup> For those responsibilities assigned to the military, it is important to have appropriate accountability mechanisms in place so that civil authorities can hold military officers to account for their performance against agreed standards of behaviour and performance.

Dr. Bland identified four problems in civil military relations:<sup>33</sup> curbing the political power of the military establishment, maintaining good order and discipline in the ranks, protecting the armed forces from political partisanship and guarding the ability of the



The Canadian naval operations in the North Arabian Sea. HMCS *Charlottetown* conducting vertical replenishment, November 2001.

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minister to set defence policy. This last problem, which was described by Samuel Huntington as “the relationship of the expert to the minister,”<sup>34</sup> refers to the difficulty of establishing defence policy when dependent on the advice of experts who may be in a conflict of interest position when they offer such advice.

As noted by Bland, problems in civil-military relations “cannot be finally and absolutely resolved,”<sup>35</sup> but must be managed on an ongoing basis. Like many policy problems, they are ‘difficulties’ that must be managed and not ‘puzzles’ that can be permanently solved.<sup>36</sup> In the shared responsibility model, problems are managed in a spirit of cooperation and consensus building, with the principle of subordination of the military to the political aims of the country well understood by all.

General Thériault identified the two main challenges in Canadian civil-military relations as “the quality of political control on the one hand, and the responsiveness, adaptability and cost-effectiveness of armed forces in conditions of political, strategic and economic change, on the other.”<sup>37</sup> In view of the Canadian context for defence described above, the “quality of political control” desired by Thériault is probably unachievable. The real challenge in Canadian civil-military relations is to cope with the widely varying requirements for political control in conditions of peace, crisis and war.

### NATIONAL DIRECTION AND NATIONAL COMMAND IN CANADA

According to Bland, the chief characteristics of civil-military relations in Canada are “political inattention, a significant degree of independence and discretion on the part of senior officers and officials, and disharmony followed by surprise.”<sup>38</sup> In principle, this situation could be improved either by increasing the degree and quality of political oversight, or by the military leadership adapting to Canadian political realities. In practice, the priority and attention that politicians accord to defence is in line with the priority that Canadians assign to defence. Mainstream political ideas on defence are defined by the Canadian defence context and the “enduring attitudes on defence”<sup>39</sup> discussed above, and are unlikely to change soon. There can be little doubt that future improvements in civil-military relations in Canada will require the military leadership to adapt.

Civil control in peacetime will be exercised through national direction of the CF. Responsibilities and accountabilities will be shared between military and civil leaders; however, political indifference to defence during peacetime will ensure that many responsibilities will be assigned to the military, by default if not by design. Senior officers must ensure that their expectations of the peacetime behaviour of politicians are realistic. Although Cabinet will set high-level defence policy, the detailed implementation of that policy will almost certainly be left to the military. Senior officers must ensure that defence policy is implemented in

response to the real interests of the state, and not institutional interests.<sup>40</sup>

This system of national direction will work smoothly only if the views of senior military officers on the conditions and requirements of national defence are in harmony with Canada’s enduring political culture, which persists regardless of the party in power.<sup>41</sup> Future senior officers will therefore require a good understanding of the role of the military in a national security environment that also includes diplomatic, economic and informational components. This understanding must be combined with a working knowledge of the theory and practice of government, including an appreciation of political realities in the Canadian context. Bland has identified a number of steps that could be taken to strengthen the relationship between Parliament and the Canadian Forces, which would also improve CF officers’ understanding of Canada’s political culture.<sup>42</sup>

Traditional military operational and generalship skills remain critical; however, they must be augmented by those of executive management and diplomacy. Senior officers must be able to operate effectively in both military and executive management roles, and to be comfortable in either situation. Many of the required skills can be acquired most easily through education and experience outside the CF, and future career management should take this into account. Finally, the military leadership will need to reflect the increasing diversity of Canadian society.<sup>43</sup> As noted by Morton, “History has an implacable lesson: successful military forces are part of their society, not at odds with it.”<sup>44</sup>

Political indifference will ensure that the Canadian Forces will be left with the vitally important responsibility of developing a national command system, without political supervision. The system designed in peacetime will be the only one available in crisis, and therefore it must be “so designed that it will, without change, operate as efficiently in the emergencies of war as in peacetime.”<sup>45</sup> In times of crisis or war, the government will insist on providing continual political direction and control of military activities and decisions in the interests of state. Depending on the severity of the crisis, the Canadian Forces must be prepared for the Prime Minister, as leader of the executive, to assume the role of de facto commander-in-chief. Moreover, as observed by strategist Bernard Brodie, “[g]ood military planning should take into account the orders that the [prime minister] is likely to give the military during a crisis, as distinct from those he may have promised in some general fashion to give.”<sup>46</sup> Hence, the national command system should be designed to meet government needs first, and not the requirements of military doctrine.

Providing for continual political direction and control of the military during crisis requires clear lines of authority and accountability that run from Parliament all the way down to individual soldiers. Close political direction may be especially important during the early stages of a crisis, when it may still be possible to avoid



Raising the Canadian flag at Kandahar airport, Afghanistan, 11 February 2002.

a major incident. As noted by Eccles: “The interlocking of the political decision and the military decision has become more critical and more evident. Cold War and various forms of guerrilla warfare require a special finesse, a special political feel to deal with contradictory and equivocal situations.<sup>47</sup>” In the Canadian context, the Oka crisis is an example of a potentially explosive situation that required special finesse, and which was effectively defused.

In Canada, the CDS provides the link between Parliament and the Canadian Forces. Hence, clear lines of authority and accountability from Parliament down to individual soldiers can only be in place if there is an unbroken military chain of command linking the CDS with operational units in the field. Any break in the chain of command destroys civil-control of the military below that link.

The military principles of command and control, learned at great cost in past military engagements, are well known and enshrined in CF doctrine. Surprisingly, Canada’s history of subordinating com-

mand to our allies has led to past violation of these principles at the strategic level, essentially nullifying national command. In future, national direction of the CF will not be sufficient to allow Canada to pursue strategic policies in its own interests. The Canadian Forces must also be under national command.

## CONCLUSION

As a matter of principle, the activities of the Canadian Forces must be subordinated to the political purposes of constitutional government, but different types of activities require different types of control. National direction consists of government formulation of defence policy, together with civil control of the ‘business’ of national defence. National command refers to civil control of CF operations.

There are not one, but two contexts for defence in Canada: a peacetime context characterized by cost consciousness and political indifference to the detailed implementation of policy; and a crisis context characterized by intense political interest and the expectation of providing continual political direction and control. Civil-military relations in Canada are best understood as a shared responsibility in which “the civil authority is responsible for and accountable for some aspects of national defence policy and control of the armed forces, while military leaders are responsible for others.”<sup>48</sup> The main thesis of this paper is that improvements in civil-military relations in Canada will require the Canadian Forces to adapt to Canadian political realities.

Improvements in national direction will depend on senior military officers ensuring their views are in harmony with Canada’s enduring political culture. Future senior officers will therefore require a good understanding of the role of the military in the Canadian national security environment, along with a working knowledge of the theory and practice of government. The military leadership will need to reflect the increasing diversity of Canadian society. Executive leadership skills will also be essential, to permit senior officers to operate effectively in both military and executive management roles.

Peacetime development of a national command system will be the responsibility of the Canadian Forces, but it is critical that the system be designed to meet the government’s need to provide political direction and control during crises. The military principles of command and control are well known and enshrined in CF doctrine; however, Canada has violated them in the past at the strategic level by subordinating command to our allies. Civil control of the armed forces of a sovereign nation requires more than national direction. The Canadian Forces must also be under national command.

1. Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997), p. 177.
2. Maurice Pope, "Memorandum on a Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence," March 1937, in Douglas L. Bland, ed. *Canada's National Defence: Volume II Defence Organization* (Kingston: Queen's University of Policy Studies, 1998), p. 8.
3. Throughout this paper, "civil control" refers to control of the military by parliament, and not to the integrated National Defence Headquarters in which civilians participate in the management of defence.
4. Douglas L. Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947 to 1985* (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Co., 1987), p. 98.
5. D.W. Middlemiss and J.J. Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), p. 69.
6. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, pp. 177-179.
7. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 227.
8. Desmond Morton, "What to tell the Minister," (Report to the Prime Minister: A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence, March 1997), p. 13.
9. Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations", *Armed Forces and Society* (Vol. 26, No. 1, Fall 1999), p. 9.
10. Military officers are forbidden from engaging in partisan political activities. The suggestion here is that senior officers should ensure that their expectations are not divorced from the enduring political realities that persist regardless of the party in power, and which can therefore be considered to be non-partisan.
11. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, p. 198.
12. Department of National Defence, *Canadians' Opinions on the Canadian Forces (CF) and Related Military Issues* (Pollara, 2000).
13. Mike Blanchfield, "Spend More on Military, Poll Says," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 28 December 1998.
14. Martin Shadwick, "Defence and Public Opinion in Canada," in David E. Cole and Ian Cameron, eds. *Defence and Public Opinion* (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 1994), p. 11.
15. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 113.
16. CBC/Radio-Canada/Environics/CROP poll, conducted April 1997, as quoted in Donna Dasko, "The 1997 Election: Issues and Public Priorities," *Opinion* (Council for Canadian Unity, Vol. 5, No. 5, June 1997), www.ccu-cuc.ca/en/op/v5n5/art1.
17. Douglas L. Bland, *Parliament, Defence Policy and the Canadian Armed Forces* (Kingston: The Claxton Papers No. 1, Queen's University, 1999).
18. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 69.
19. *Ibid*, p. 114.
20. Nils Orvik, "Canadian Security and Defence against Help," *International Perspectives* (May/June 1983), p. 3, as quoted in Douglas L. Bland, "Who Decides What? Civil-Military Relations in Canada and the United States," *Canadian-American Public Policy* (No. 41, Feb 2000), Note 57.
21. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 217.
22. *Ibid*, p. 220 (emphasis in the original). Or, as noted by Denis Stairs: "Canadians, as a political community, care. But they care only a little, and the government knows this very well." Denis Stairs, "Canadian Foreign Policy and Interventions Abroad," *Challenges to Governance: Military Interventions Abroad and Consensus at Home*, (Conference held in Montreal, Nov 2000), p. 16.
23. Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada*, p. 188 and Bland "Who Decides What? Civil-Military Relations in Canada and the United States," *Canadian-American Foreign Policy*, No. 41, Feb 2000, p. 23-24.
24. Bland, *Parliament, Defence Policy and the Canadian Armed Forces*.
25. Henry E. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press), p. 191.
26. Bland "Who Decides What?", p. 50.
27. Eccles, p. 175.
28. According to General (ret'd) Gerard Thériault: "For Canadians, the question is not whether civilian control exists; it does, and respect for the principle of political supremacy is deeply embedded in Canadian military culture. The real question is whether political authority is capable of strong and competent leadership and whether departmental staffs and the Forces are best structured for the needs of national defence and the kind of motivation and genuine professionalism that are called for." Gerard Thériault, "Democratic Civil-Military Relations: A Canadian View," in *The Military in Modern Democratic Society* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, November 1996), p. 11.
29. *Ibid*, p. 10.
30. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," p. 9.
31. Bland "Who Decides What?", p. 8.
32. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," p. 19, emphasis in the original.
33. Bland "Who Decides What?", p. 10. See also Douglas L. Bland, *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), p. 63.
34. Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, p. 231.
35. Bland "Who Decides What?", p. 12.
36. Eccles, p. 124.
37. Thériault, p. 4.
38. Bland "Who Decides What?," p. 38.
39. Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada*, p. 188 and Bland "Who Decides What?," pp. 23-24.
40. Thériault, p. 10.
41. Douglas L. Bland, "Canada's Officer Corps: New Times, New Ideas," *The Profession of Arms in Canada: Past, Present, and Future* (CDA Institute XVth Annual Seminar, 1999), p. 12.
42. Douglas L. Bland, "Parliament's Duty to Defend Canada," *Canadian Military Journal* (Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001), pp. 40-42. The focus of Bland's work is on improving the quality of parliamentary oversight of national defence.
43. An extensive discussion of the requirements for future officer development is contained in: Canada, Department of National Defence, "Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020): Strategic Guidance for the Canadian Forces Officer Corps and the Officer Professional Development System," February 2001. [http://www.dnd.ca/pd/engraph/opd2020\\_e.asp](http://www.dnd.ca/pd/engraph/opd2020_e.asp)
44. Desmond Morton, "What to tell the Minister", (Report to the Prime Minister: A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence, March 1997) p. 7.
45. F.S. McGill, "Project #16 Presentation to the Commissioners," (Public Archives Canada, RG 33-46, Vol. 60 (McGill's Interim Report), p. 6, as quoted in Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada*, p. 27.
46. Bernard S. Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 260, emphasis in the original.
47. Eccles, p. 141.
48. Bland "Who Decides What?", p. 8.



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**A Canadian soldier attaches a Canadian pin  
on the shirt of a local boy from the village of  
Molla Abdulla Kariz, Afghanistan.**