



JSPA Combat Camera Photo ISD01-6569 by Sgt. Dennis Mah

A Griffon helicopter from 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron carrying the 3 RCR Quick Reaction Force during an exercise near Velika Kladusa, Bosnia, June 2001.

BOSNIA REVISITED: A RECENT NATIONAL COMMANDER'S PERSPECTIVE

By Colonel Chris Corrigan

What type of leadership is appropriate for a national commander on operations? This article examines the question from the perspective of one who has recently returned from operations as a national commander.

Over 33,000 Canadians have served in the Balkans in the past decade and, sadly, some have paid the ultimate sacrifice. Many others have been injured physically and mentally by their experience. In some respects Canada and its military have become Bosnia-weary, especially when considered in the context of 11 September 2001 and Operation "Apollo" in Afghanistan — such is the pace of our operations that a recently returned Operation "Palladium" rotation can become contemporary history so soon. Although our Operation "Palladium" commitment to SFOR in Bosnia has moved to the edge of the radar screen, it remains a key component of Canada's role in NATO, the military being an extension of diplomacy.

What follows is a commander's perspective, one honoured to serve with 1656 Canadian servicemen and women — Army, Navy and Air Force, Regular Force and Reserve — along with the Canadian civilian members of the Contractor Support Programme (CSP) and the Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency (CFPSA) who executed Rotation 8 of Operation "Palladium" between April and October 2001. Command is a

very personal experience, and no one person has a monopoly on the phenomenon of leadership; therefore, this article is offered in the spirit and in the hope that the sharing of my experience, and the planning and approach to leadership that I applied, may prove worthwhile to those fortunate to have a similar command opportunity.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF LEADERSHIP TO COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP THEORY

Given the limitation of length, the perspective of this article is one of applied leadership in a command appointment. It is helpful to understand how the theoretical and analytical differences between command and leadership relate to the practical application of leadership as part of command, and to briefly discuss leadership theory.

Retired Lieutenant-General R.R. Crabbe has distilled, from many definitions, the nature of military command. He describes command in the following terms:

- To direct and do so with authority.
- To think and make sound judgments and decisions, often without all the facts.

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- In war, to be responsible for taking lives and saving lives.
- In peace and war, to establish moral standards, and to direct and enforce how military members relate to each other and to society.
- To think, decide, act, establish standards, and exert influence.
- To be able to bring military forces to bear on the enemy on behalf of the state.¹

Furthermore, he elaborates that commanders must be fighters, leaders, tacticians, thinkers and disciplinarians, as well as examples of fine moral character possessing the indispensable values of honesty, loyalty and integrity. Leadership is inherent in command.² In a military construct, command and the leadership skill-set can be described as a sub-set of what is termed 'best military judgment' — the intuitive ability to make decisions based on years of training, experience and professional and personal self-development, including recognition of past patterns and circumstances that determined past decisions and were gained throughout one's career.³ I had the privileged and rare opportunity to apply leadership with the authority of command. Many others, including staff officers, do not have this opportunity.

Leadership has been studied extensively through the use of concepts and models. It has been analysed in terms of a set of principles or characteristics of behaviour — the work of sociologists, psychologists and practitioners — that have been

others.⁴ It is a complex phenomenon that involves cognitive ability and behavioural traits. Leadership has been examined in the context of what it is — "a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal," how it differs from power — "the capacity or potential to influence," further defined as "position power...the power a person derives from a particular office or rank in a formal organization system" or "personal power...the power a leader derives from followers," how it differs from coercion — "the use of force to affect change...manipulating penalties and rewards...threats and punishment," and how it differs from management — "the activities of planning, organizing, staffing and controlling...concerned with creating order and stability."⁵ Executive leadership combines inspirational leadership and its obligation to the profession with strategic decision-making and its obligation to the organization or institution.⁶ Leadership has also been described in the context of the relationship between trait versus process-based leadership. Trait-based leadership is founded on such traits as personality, appearance and experiential skill-sets, thereby suggesting that this style narrows to what some call 'born leaders'. Process-based leadership is founded on the interaction between the leader and followers in the context of the environment, and suggests that leadership can be learned.⁷ Leadership has been further defined in the theories of laissez-faire, transactional, and the most current and dominant theory, that of transformational leadership.⁸ "Evidence has accumulated that transformational leadership can move followers to exceed expected performance. It is seen as a particularly powerful source of effective leadership in Army, Navy, and Air Force settings."⁹

The plethora of leadership concepts and theories could give one cause to believe that the practical application of leadership is complicated. Certain concepts or theories of leadership are environment specific, while styles of leadership are trait specific. This examination explores the application of leadership in an operational context. It could be said that certain styles of leadership are appropriate when applied to different strata or groups of personnel in hierarchies. Transactional leadership is based on the needs of the leader rather than that of the followers or their development. It involves extrinsic motivators, is directive and prescriptive, and is appropriate when applied to followers at the lower levels of an organization. "Transformational leadership is an expansion of transactional

leadership. Transformational leaders motivate others to do more than they originally intended and often more than they thought possible. They set more challenging expectations and typically achieve higher performances."¹⁰ Transformational leadership is based upon a process whereby an individual engages others to create a connection. It involves intrinsic motivators, individual consideration, and intellectual and charisma stimulation. It is descriptive and more appropriate



Soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment participating in a platoon live-fire exercise while serving with SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

applied to virtually every discipline. Some 65 classification systems have been derived over the past 55 years in the process of examining the definition and dynamics of leadership. These classifications include concepts of leadership being part of a group dynamic or process whereby the leader, as an agent of change, personifies the will of the group. Another classification views leadership as being based or centered on the personality traits of the leader and his or her ability to influence

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when applied to managers, supervisors and leaders.¹¹ Bernard Bass elaborates four components of transformational leadership:

- Leadership is charismatic, such that the follower seeks to identify with the leaders and emulate them.
- Leadership inspires the follower with challenge and persuasion, providing meaning and understanding.
- Leadership is intellectually stimulating, expanding the follower's use of his or her abilities.
- Finally, leadership is individually considerate, providing the follower with support, mentoring and coaching.¹²

The *Charismatic Leadership Component* is characterized by a leader who is unhesitant to take risks, has high moral and ethical standards, and consistently does the 'right thing'. Leaders who are optimistic and enthusiastic, who communicate a shared vision and expectations, and who inspire team spirit characterize the *Inspirational Motivation Component*. These leaders also demonstrate the *Intellectual Stimulation Component* since they are able to articulate their vision, are receptive to change and supportive of new ideas and approaches, and can delegate tasks while instilling trust in their subordinates. The fourth component is *Individualized Consideration*, whereby a transformational leader genuinely demonstrates interest in each member of the organization, and in so doing validates the importance and self-worth of each member. This leadership technique requires good listening skills and is typified by 'management by walking around'.¹³ In practical terms, these four components are not in any order of priority or of equal weighting, but vary according to one's personality. One can be an effective transformational leader without being overly charismatic. Arguably, General George Patton was more 'charismatic' and 'inspirational' than his boss, the less 'charismatic' yet 'intellectual' General Omar Bradley.

It can be said that the transactional leadership style applied at lower levels shifts more to transformational leadership as one occupies higher positions of authority, rank and responsibility. For those in the early stage of their military career, such as junior non-commissioned officers and junior officers, who do not yet share or who have not yet internalized the same order or values of the institution and are still undergoing initial military socialization — learning the 'do's and don'ts' — issues can appear 'black and white'. As a result, transactional leadership is more appropriate. For those with greater length of service and increased authority, responsibility and rank, such as senior non-commissioned officers and field officers who have internalized the shared order and values of the institution, issues become less 'black and white' and increasingly 'grey'. In this particular case, transformational leadership is more appropriate. *Put another way, the transactional leadership appropriate at the platoon, company, unit 'tactical' level gives way to transformational leadership when dealing with senior officers at the formation level or senior staff and DND civilians at the 'operational' and 'strategic' level.* The four components of transformational leadership can be applied to varying degrees to all strata of an hierarchical organization. In a military application, a commander is more

likely to relate intellectually to the officers and charismatically to the other ranks.

GETTING INTO THE RIGHT FRAME OF MIND – THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE

As Chief of Staff Land Force Central Area (LFCA), the force-generating Area for Rotation Two of Operation "Palladium," and later while visiting Kosovo as the Area Commander for the LFCA-generated contingent to Operation "Kinetic One," I was not a stranger to the Balkan situation. That said, one can never fully prepare one's self intellectually for the Balkans.¹⁴ "Anyone who claims to be an expert on the Balkans clearly has never lived there, and once they have, they will realize that they will never understand the Balkans."¹⁵

In advance of this command opportunity, I revisited my 'kit bag' of command experiences and personal leadership 'first principles'. The dearth of historical study and analysis of the ten years of Canadian experience in the Balkans made this more difficult. Yes, unit and contingent/task force war diaries



A 3 RCR patrol in Bosnia, summer 2001.

and the latest editions of unit histories are replete with the 'Keeganesque, *Face of Battle*'¹⁶ anecdotal feel for what took place at the tactical level, but what of the higher Canadian national-strategic and UN/NATO military-strategic environment and decision-making that provides the context for Canada's commitment to the Balkans?

With respect to what type of leader and commander one wants to be, General (ret'd) Fred Franks provides the following answer:

Commanders have different command styles. If you spend any significant amount of time around Army people, you're going to encounter no little commentary about these differences. There is no right way to command, no template out of which commanders are stamped. Some commanders — to point out the more visible differences — are loud, physically dominant extroverts; others are quieter, more soft-spoken, more given to indirection. Such opposites can be equally effective as commanders.¹⁷

What is one's command persona or leadership 'game face'? None of this is mysterious; all who have experienced this pre-command dynamic will be able to relate. Command is such an intensely personal experience. For me it was a conscious revisiting of prior command experiences, while also reflecting upon the many role models, good and bad, that I have experienced. This experiential or pattern recognition

mulated my guidance and intent to commanding officers early, and repeatedly communicated it. I visited my subordinate chain of command during pre-deployment training. Coming from LFCA and being a former Chief of Staff and Commander, I knew many of them well. On 16 February 2001, in the cavernous field house in Petawawa, Colonel Mark Skidmore, Commander of 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, in a short and dignified ceremony, introduced me to the 1300 soldiers that he was to loan me for six months. This very early leadership appearance was my first opportunity to communicate with what was to be a large portion of my future team.²⁰

THE PREPARATION CHALLENGE

For Rotation 8, the units were identified almost a year in advance, with teams forming and building cohesion nine months prior to deployment. I had to apply a 'light touch' as the troops were not yet under my command, would not come under my command until deployed, and remained the training responsibility of the force generating area, LFCA. I, with my headquarters staff principals, conducted the strategic reconnaissance in October 2000, and the units conducted their tactical reconnaissance in November. Upon my return from the strategic reconnaissance, I shared, in a manner more transactional than transformational, my observations and guidance with all the leadership in the battle group, down to company level, prior to their tactical reconnaissance. Each rotation has its own style and approach. I conditioned my future command team to conduct their own estimate and not simply conduct a relief in place with the outgoing teams. I impressed upon

them that this was a good intellectual exercise and that they owed it to themselves and their soldiers.

Training for the battle group commenced in October 2000, for the National Support Element or Direct Support Combat Service Support Battalion earlier in mid-September 2000, and for the National Command Element, my Task Force Headquarters, 15 January 2001. One can easily see that 'training creep' can lead to a six-month deployment being preceded by six months of training. As 'training creep' has a severe impact on quality of life, all in the chain of command must keep a grip on their subordinates to ensure that overtraining does not take place. It is important that training be done to meet the most likely scenario, rather than the worst-case scenario.

The practice of forming ad hoc organizations from individuals rather than assigning tasks to formed cohesive units is



Troopers from 'A' Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons sighting a radar at a surveillance site, Bosnia, June 2001.

allows one to better determine the best leadership course of action. Negative role models are of value as they teach you tolerance, as well as how not to be.¹⁸

As a leader, you must be true to yourself and 'comfortable in your own skin'. However, there is one luxury a commander is not permitted...that of being shy or aloof. John Masters writes in *The Road Past Mandalay*, "Command doth make actors of us all."¹⁹ All members of a military team have an expectation of being well led. To be a good leader, a person must relate to soldiers (some would say, 'love soldiers'), love soldiering, demonstrate passion for the mission and, through words and deeds, clearly demonstrate that one cares for one's soldiers and their well-being.

Leadership is about communicating, defining reality, providing hope and inspiration, and communicating who you are and what your expectations are. For my part, I for-

a concern. Although the Task Force Headquarters was formed ad hoc from personnel assigned from across the Canadian Forces, the long-lead time and preliminary training resulted in the requisite team cohesion. This situation, combined with a mature and relatively benign mission, reduced the operational risk associated with ad hoc organizations. Future task force headquarters, formed at short notice for more robust missions, may not be afforded the same pre-deployment cohesion-forming process. It is ill-advised for strategic reconnaissance parties and headquarters staffs to meet for the first time in Trenton just prior to deployment, or, even worse, on the tarmac on arrival in the theatre.

There is another aspect that is worthy of mention. For commanding officers fortunate enough to get an operational tour during their appointment, this is the one time that they will have the resources to conduct such intense and high-level training. As a result, some have a propensity to push the training to as high a level as possible. This is fine for the young officers serving only a two- to three-year tour of regimental duty and this being their first or second operational tour. However, it is not a morale enhancer for the soldiers of a unit that have always served at unit duty and are facing their third, fourth or fifth tour. *A transformational leader realizes that not all in his command possess the same level of experience or motivation, and that he must control or moderate the environment appropriately.* In this respect, ‘training creep’ needs to be disciplined to ensure the right balance between pre-deployment training and the mission’s requirements.

The front end of the build-up training is in war fighting up to company/combat team level live-fire manoeuvre in a battle group context. After this necessary war-fighting training comes the important mission-specific training that gets everyone into the right frame of mind for peace support operations. This training is very well supported by the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, and includes law of armed conflict, rules of engagement, media training, first aid, foreign weapons handling, mine awareness and combat stress conditioning. All of this training is concluded with a brigade-controlled field training exercise that serves to confirm the operational fitness of the units, and is followed by operational declarations made by each commander up to the next higher level in the chain of command. Embarkation leave then takes place, followed by deployment.

I assumed command from my long-time friend Colonel Tim Grant in Velika Kladusa on 3 April 2001, and handed over to Colonel Denis Brazeau on 3 October 2002. At the beginning and end are the change of command boards of inquiry, and prior to and upon redeployment are the mission commander reports, briefs and debriefs to the CDS and DCDS. I presented my End Tour Brief to the Joint (J) Staff, the DCDS and the CDS at a post-Daily Executive Meeting (DEM)²¹ on 14 November 2002.

Worthy of note is the pre-deployment office calls all national commanders have with each of the CDS, DCDS and force-generating environmental Chief — in my case, the Chief of the Land Staff. Each stressed their full support and unconditional confidence in the Task Force’s ability to meet the mission’s challenges. This application of transformational leadership did much for my morale, and confirmed to me that even commanders need morale boosts from time to time. It also

impressed upon me that to be a transformational leader one must be willing to be transformed as well.

COMMANDING AND LEADING – THE APPLICATION

During the mission, I made a point of being away from the headquarters three to four days every week to visit the Canadians in the five camps and in each of the multinational divisional (MND) headquarters in Banja Luka (MND(South-West)), Mostar (MND(South-East)) and Tuzla (MND(North)), as well as at Headquarters SFOR in Sarajevo. I also called on our ambassadors in Zagreb and Sarajevo. I had at my disposal a Griffon helicopter, which reduced a one-way ground trip from the northern to southern end of the area of responsibility from ten hours to three. My staff had my utmost trust, and they did not need me present all the time. Before each trip I would be briefed on the issues and, even more importantly, on whom I was to meet. I made a point of knowing the name of every officer and senior NCO, and recognizing the contribution that he or she was making. I impressed upon my chain of command that these visits were not intrusive or command performances, but in the spirit of genuine interest of who they were, what they were doing, and how I as Task Force Commander could make their lives better. On each visit I would spend a night with the troops to better get a feel for the atmosphere. I took with me my human intelligence team to quietly measure the situation; my RSM, of course, to get the real unfettered information from the resident senior NCOs, my staff officer to get a feel for the views of the junior officers, and my Master Corporal driver who unobtrusively captured the mood of the NCOs. For each visit I also impressed upon the COs that whoever was available to host me was sufficient, no matter what the rank. *It almost goes without saying that all leaders must know their troops, but a transformational leader, in addition to knowing his troops well, must make a connection with them and demonstrate that he genuinely cares and has their best interests at heart.*

“Transformational leaders motivate others to do more than they originally intended and often more than they thought possible.”

Answerable to the DCDS for each of the 1656 positions, I had to substantiate the real mission need and value of the contribution, especially at each of the divisional and SFOR headquarters. NATO has an insatiable appetite for Canadian staff officers because of our ‘can do’ attitude, and NATO will continue to ask for more. This is very important, because for every person out on a tour, at home four to five others and their families are affected.

On two occasions, in addition to my routine weekly visits to each camp, I insisted that all personnel, civilian and military, be available for a Commander’s Hour. These occurred at the end of the first month in the theatre and at the tour’s halfway mark — the time when complacency and boredom occur and, as a result, accidents become more likely. A month into the tour was right, as all had settled into their jobs and their environment, and the chain of command had had ample time to impose their influence. I spoke to everyone about my

role, their role, my expectations of them and what they could expect from me. It was especially important to foster a unity of team effort out of a disparate group of Canadians — military from formed units, individual augmentees, both Regular Force and Reserve, civilians from the CSP and the CFPSA — all having varying degrees of expectations and experience.

The Canadian Armed Forces continues to make a difference in Bosnia — a difference of which all Canadians can be justifiably proud.

Since they were subject to the same standards of discipline and quality of life, they all had to be treated equally. The differing standards, military cultures and norms of other contingents was a challenge, as was maintaining Canadian standards in the large multinational

camp, such as for the fifty Canadians at SFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo and the eighty at MND(SW) Headquarters in Banja Luka. I therefore spoke to all personnel, military and civilian alike. I spoke to such issues as negligent discharges, fraternization, drugs and alcohol, security of weapons and ammunition, speeding and vehicle safety, applying the 'buddy system' especially on R & R, and rumour management. I appealed to them not to 'let themselves down', and in so doing, let down their section, platoon, company, unit, the Task Force, and Canada. Guilt can be a compelling tool! *True transformational leadership is contagious — when you demonstrate a genuine caring for them, they will place a higher value on themselves and care for each other.* At the end of each session I demanded questions. The mental gymnastics were great fun and the highlight of each visit.

Key to the process of communicating is the means, and I used every means possible. Arguably, the most important operations order annex in any domestic operation or peace support operation is the Communications or Public Affairs (PAFF) annex. In peace support operations it equals, if not exceeds, the importance of the Fire Support annex. Therefore, I paid close attention to my media plan, and in concert with my very capable PAFFO planned our media training and the scope of media visits from Canada. After the closure of Eritrea in June, we were the object of the media's affection and had two very successful and well-covered media visits. We used every visit as a means to communicate, whether the visitors were Honorary Colonels, VIPs, Assistant Deputy Ministers or our own Minister. Visitors did not get a free ride: we gave them a message to take home. So important was this communication that I would personally brief visitors on arrival, then let them loose into the AOR with the units. Prior to departure I would personally out-brief them to ensure that they were taking home the correct information and facts rather than perception or rumours — rumours that could have the potential to cause us to 'chase our tails' later responding to Ministerial Inquiries. *Transformational leaders manifest the persona or the conscience of the group and share with the group what the outside world is thinking about them.* As such, I promoted amongst the visitors the expectation that the troops would appreciate very much an expression of the value of their six months of dedication to the mission and the sacrifices made by their families.

Well in advance of deployment I determined what I wanted to achieve in the six months of command on operations. As

operations has primacy, mission accomplishment was clearly number one. Following closely was furthering the evolution and support to the mission of the CSP and the CFPSA. In addition to getting to know as many people in uniform as possible, I enjoyed interacting with the highly committed and dedicated Canadian civilians belonging to 28 CFPSA and 177 CSP. Both of these initiatives were commenced in Rotation 7 — CFPSA to improve the morale and welfare support to the Task Force, and CSP to have Canadian civilian support personnel from ATCO-Frontec assume the basic static camp support functions from those in uniform. CSP allowed all those in uniform to focus on the mission outside the camps, and also provided some relief to the so-called 'endangered species' trades, such as cooks, firemen and construction engineers who, due to their small numbers, high demand and resultant repeated deployments, have been withering recently. It can be said with confidence that Rotation 8 advanced these two projects considerably.

An unspoken objective of mine, but one that I disclosed nearer to tour end, was my wish to bring everyone home alive. Of course, long before we arrived in Bosnia, I spoke to the issues of training and operational safety. Death is always an element of what we do. I did not want to create unduly a risk-averse environment for the chain of command, but merely to highlight the exercise of common sense so as not to put anyone in harm's way needlessly. Few things done in Bosnia are worth the life of a Canadian.

The limitation of length precludes an examination of my dealings with the other national commanders — the brigadiers commanding the British and Netherlands contingents, the colonel commanding the Czech Republic contingent, superior NATO commanders and the national chain of command. However, a few words on my approach to commanding officers are warranted.

A transformational leader cultivates opportunities for growth and development for his troops and ensures growth through mentoring or tutoring. With respect to my immediate subordinates, I was very conscious that none had experience as a commanding officer on an operation, even though many had been sub-unit commanders at the company, platoon or troop level, and most had been on operations in those positions previously in the Balkans. Consequently, each had to be mentored appropriately. For a six-month tour, one must get to know one's commanding officers quickly and determine which of them thrive under mission or descriptive command, and which of them are more productive with prescriptive or directive command. I balanced oversight with their freedom of action. As a strong believer that a healthy command climate needs to be pushed down from above, and that soldiering should be fun, I wanted them to enjoy their operational command as much as possible. That said, I did conduct morale checks on them, as although one is never lonely in command, one is alone in command. Their only respite is in the presence of other commanders, away from their charges. No cracking of the whip was needed with my command team; they only required a bit of reining-in. I had to monitor and protect them from themselves by ordering them to slow down and set a gentler pace. An abundance of keenness became apparent about the midway point of the tour before any of them had had their family reunion trip home. Upon return to theatre, my commanding officers had a better perspective

and, with mission success and the tour end in sight, were less demanding of themselves and their subordinates. I stress that this was not a big issue. It is mentioned because, like fun and a healthy command climate which need to come from the top down, so does command rhythm or tempo. Leaders and commanders need to set an example of self-moderation in this regard. Responsibility and six months of no life but operations breeds a culture of work that is very intense. I could not have asked for a finer command team — outstanding soldiers and gentlemen all.

Having discussed the command relationship with subordinates, a brief examination of the relationship between my headquarters and the staffs at various levels is appropriate. Staff procedures and principles are very simple; it is the application that is challenging. *A transformational leader understands the relationship of trust to engendering among subordinates an environment of self-realization that causes them to perform and exceed their own expectations.* Staff officers need leadership as well, so care must be devoted to fostering staff team cohesion. Issues must be handled at the appropriate level, with the big issues saved for the commander.

Gone are the days of the military message system when there was adequate time for consideration and deliberate responses. Today, with so many means of communicating instantly, especially e-mail where people expect an immediate response, I had to be strident about disciplining the flow of information to and from NDHQ. Early on, the pervasive 'tech net' started to usurp the 'command net', and we in Bosnia found ourselves being ambushed by well-meaning but unthinking NDHQ staff officers. Frequently they would skip our headquarters and go directly to units, and thus the headquarters staff could not provide 'top cover' for the units. This was never a bottom-up issue nor an issue with the J Staff. For example, one NDHQ civilian agency would include, as a default setting, the DCDS no less, as an info addressee on e-mails. This was a classic example of elevating staffing to the inappropriate level. We would then have to keep the DCDS informed on this mundane issue, an issue with which he did not need to be involved. The point here is that issues must be staffed at the appropriate level and elevated sparingly. The same applies to the use of your 'silver bullet'. This was never an issue during my experience.

The J Staff, without exception, were outstanding. They provided the continuity between each Rotation, as all have managed at least two or three Operation "Palladium" rotations and they know the background, especially the past decisions and direction given by the CDS and DCDS. This is a depth of knowledge that one could not possibly grasp in the short six-month window attached to the DCDS branch for operations,

and out of appreciation for their hard work my staff and I looked upon ourselves as extensions of the J Staff. Also, it was important for all of us to understand the differing staff battle rhythms between NDHQ and Bosnia, and the six-hour time difference. In Bosnia we worked around the clock, seven days a week, and we had one job — the relentless pursuit of the mission. The J Staff had to march to the morning briefing timings of the Daily Intelligence and Operations Briefing, as well as the Daily Executive Meeting. They had other missions to manage and operations to mount, so we were not the only mission on their 'radar screen'. The dispatch of the Task Force Harvest squadron group to Macedonia for the month of September and Operation "Apollo" are but two examples.

An essential element of the superior-subordinate relationship is establishing 'command rhythm' — that common understanding between both with respect to when, how and how frequently they interact. *From a leadership theory perspective, it*



Guns belonging to the 2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery firing on a range near Glamoc, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 2001.

is about finding a comfortable balance or point on the continuum that has directive, prescriptive, transactional leadership at one end of the continuum and descriptive transformational leadership at the opposite end of the continuum. Never having worked with the Chief of Staff J3 before, and having said that a six-month tour does not afford the luxury of time to get to know each other, he and I still established a good relationship very early in the tour.

We sought to mentor, protect and provide leadership to the subordinate staffs. We also worked to honour the principles of battle procedure, always appreciating two-down and giving simple and clear direction one-down. Of course, only they can judge the degree to which we were successful. Our dealings with all levels of international staffs were conducted knowing that we, as the national headquarters, represented Canada: we were friendly, approachable and diplomatic. We understood the cultural differences between the contributing nations, and the mindsets and differing standards of their armed forces.

THE STRATEGIC TASK FORCE

“Conflict is waged on three levels — the strategic, operational and tactical. Each level is defined according to the nature and purpose of the military operations being conducted and the outcomes they are intended to achieve. They are not dependent on the size of the forces engaged or the level of command involved. Although the levels of conflict form a hierarchy, there are no sharp boundaries, and they often overlap.”²² The units of the task force within the Canadian AOR, and divisional

Leadership is about communicating, defining reality, providing hope and inspiration, and communicating what your expectations are.

missions within the divisional AOR such as the Offensive Support Group, operated at the tactical level. Outside the divisional but within the SFOR AOR, it could be argued that our units conducted tasks at the operational or theatre level. The dispatch of the Task Force Harvest squadron group to Macedonia for the month of September was an example of a tactical level sub-unit crossing the operational level to act and have an influence at the national-strategic level and, in so doing, garner Canada international recognition.²³ Reinforcing this was the level at which I interfaced with the national chain of command, answerable to the CDS: I was interfacing at the military-strategic level.

Earlier I mentioned the morale boost I received from the confidence expressed to me by the CDS, DCDS, and CLS. Remembering this, I made a point of contacting our Task Force Commander in Macedonia and offering him my support as a

fellow Task Force Commander. I contacted him every Sunday morning for the duration of his mission.

CONCLUSION

Having previously described my command experience and discussed the various theories and concepts of leadership, a retrospective analysis reveals that in most cases I applied transformational leadership — not only because it was appropriate to the mission, but also because it best suited my nature.

Canada continues in its long tradition of peace support operations in the Balkans through Operation “Palladium.” This worthy commitment has influenced past and present Canadian servicemen and women, and will likely influence future members of the Armed Forces. As the geopolitical and military situation changes, so too must the mission evolve to meet the requirement. Rotation 8 carried on this tradition while primarily acting at the tactical and operational levels. However, it also had the unique opportunity to impact at the strategic level. In the preceding, I have attempted to describe my style of leadership as applied on an operation in relation to leadership theory and, given the right level of properly resourced training and the participation of talented, committed, professional people, describe the ease in which operations can be conducted successfully.

Task Force Bosnia Herzegovina continues to make a military difference to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment in order to permit nation building. The Canadian Armed Forces continues to make a difference in Bosnia — a difference of which all Canadians can be justifiably proud.



NOTES

1. Crabbe, LGen R.R., “The Nature of Command,” *The Human in Command*, McCann, Carol and Pigeau, Ross, eds., (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2000), p. 11.
2. *Ibid*, pp. 11-12.
3. The author has discussed this concept on a number of occasions with its proponent, General (ret’d) Fred Franks, US Army, former Commander TRADOC and Commander VII (US) Corps in Operation “Desert Storm.”
4. Northouse, Peter G., “Introduction,” *Leadership Theory and Practice* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997), p. 2
5. *Ibid*, pp.1-12.
6. Okros, Captain(N) A., NSSC 4 Lecture - Executive Leadership, April 4, 2002.
7. Northouse, *Ibid*, pp. 4-5.
8. *Ibid*, pp. 130-147.
9. Bass, Bernard M., *Transformational Leadership: Industry, Military, and Educational Impact* (Mahwah, New Jersey: Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1998), p. 2.
10. *Ibid*, p. 4.
11. *Ibid*, pp. 130-140.
12. *Ibid*, p. 5.
13. *Ibid*, pp. 5-6.
14. Among the many books available, read Fitzroy Maclean, *Eastern Approaches* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1947), Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House Inc., 1999), and Michael Ignatieff’s *Blood and Belonging – Journeys into the New Nationalism* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1993) and *The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (New

- York: Metropolitan Books, 1997).
15. Ambassador Sam Hanson, Canadian Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 4 April 2001. Throughout my tour as commander, I was fortunate to be ‘coached’ by both Ambassador Hanson and our Ambassador to Croatia, Ambassador Dennis Snider.
16. Keegan John, *The Face of Battle* (New York: Viking, 1976). In this popular primer and classic, the author writes from the soldier’s perspective at the tactical level of the sights, sounds and smell of the battlefield.
17. Clancy, Tom, with General (ret’d) Fred Franks, *Into the Storm: A Study in Command* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1997), p. 47.
18. Most of the principles of leadership I learned during my first regimental tour. It was put succinctly to me by my first troop Warrant Officer: “All we need from you is that you don’t embarrass us, that you know the technical aspects of your job, that you be fair, firm, consistent, friendly, and, in the final analysis, show that you care and have our best interests at heart.” WO Herb Boehmer, 1st Troop, A Squadron, 8th Canadian Hussars.
19. Wintle, Justin (ed), *The Dictionary of War Quotations* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989), p. 128.
20. Make sure that the public address system works in order for all to hear your ‘bon mots’!
21. The Daily Executive Meeting includes all group principals: the Deputy Minister, the CDS, the Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS), the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) and the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), or their representatives, normally their Assistants – ACMS, ACLS, ACAS.

22. *Canada’s Army – B-GL-300-000/FP-000* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1998), pp. 78-79.
23. Krulak, General Charles. The former Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps has described the present and future reality of warfare in his concept of the “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” where “In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees – providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting peace-keeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the Three Block War.” In this article he posits that the success of future humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping or traditional warfighting missions will depend “on the decisions made by small unit leaders, and by actions taken at the lowest level. Most importantly, these missions will require them to confidently make well-reasoned decisions under extreme stress – decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court of public opinion. In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. His actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation; and he will become ... the Strategic Corporal.” *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 83, No. 1, January 1999, pp. 18-22.