



DND Photo BK2002-0155-25d by Cpl Grant Rivalin

A patrol from 'A' Company, 2nd Battalion of the Royal 22nd Régiment, monitoring the welfare of the residents in the southern portion of the Canadian area of responsibility in Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 2002.

CLAUSEWITZ, CANADIAN STYLE

By Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky

SHOULDER TO SHOULDER?¹

The Canadian military's response to the initiation of the American war on terrorism after 11 September 2001 was traditional. Ottawa quickly dispatched maritime forces, and the public discourse immediately turned into an orgy of national self-doubt and self-criticism. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien came in for some particular scorn when he stated that Canada would stand 'shoulder to shoulder' with its allies against terrorism. One editorial cartoon showed a diminutive, and obviously confused Chrétien sandwiched between and being held up by the broad determined shoulders of US President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Implicit in much of this early criticism of possible Canadian contributions, was the assumption that after a decade of defence cutbacks, Canada was in no position to stand shoulder to shoulder with its allies in this new global campaign.

Yet in April 2002, after four Canadians had been mistakenly killed by an American aircraft while training in the Afghan desert, US Senator Patrick Leahy observed that, "They stood shoulder to shoulder with our own troops and they lost their lives helping us defeat terrorism in Afghanistan." US Secretary of State Colin Powell, testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Foreign Operations, echoed these sentiments: "We have a lot to thank Canada for. They've always been with us."²

Were these just understandable albeit empty tributes, the kind to be expected in the face of what was a senseless trag-

ic mistake? Was America, in the 'plenitude of its power' — having no real material need for Canadian contributions and with little worry about how Canada is responding — simply being gracious? Have the critics in Canada been right? Is the present government's lackluster response to the American-led war on terrorism in its overseas dimensions not only the logical result of years of defence underfunding, but of a congenital inability to understand strategic realities, especially with regard to security relations with the United States?

The argument here is that the response by the Chrétien government to 11 September was fully consistent with the approach it has taken to defence policy and security relations with the United States since 1993. But contrary to much of the accepted current wisdom, this response, similar to policy conduct that preceded it throughout the 1990s, reflects a clear assessment of both strategic realities and how Canadian defence policy can serve the national interest in coping with those realities. Moreover, far from exposing the gap between Ottawa and Washington, the government's response has reaffirmed, in the most dramatic way possible, the trend in defence policy — evident for a number of years — towards closer collaboration with the United States in overseas operations. It is a trend which sees the defence of Canadian and North American security interests not only in terms of defending the continental perimeter, but, consistent

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with US national security policy, as one which places importance on forward defence. Thus in Afghanistan today, as in all the peacekeeping, peace enforcement, armed interventions and 'wars' of the 1990s, Canada has indeed been standing shoulder to shoulder with the United States. Canada's shoulders may not be as broad and as powerful as those of its unipolar neighbour (and whose are?), but in this present war, they are as close to those of the American giant as any Canadian government has been since the early days of the Cold War.

The purpose here is not to engage in a war-fueled exercise in flag waving (that would be too 'unCanadian'). Much less is it intended to praise the government. The government has much to answer for. The defence budget has been seriously reduced in the last decade, while the number of missions of the Canadian Forces (CF) and their operational intensity has increased. There is a long list of equipment that the CF needs if it is to continue in this manner, especially given the deployments in support of the war on terrorism. For this, the current government merits criticism. But at the same time, there is an underlying realism to the government's overall approach. It is hard to argue that vital Canadian interests have been placed seriously at risk, or that Ottawa's influence has markedly diminished as a result of these shortcomings. Following the long-standing approach

OVER THERE WITH UNCLE SAM: CANADIAN OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD³

It has been said repeatedly that everything has changed since 11 September. This is true in the sense that combating international terrorism has now become the central focus of American foreign policy after a post-Cold War decade in which no grand organizing principle similar to containment and deterrence emerged. During these years, many argued that the very definition of 'security' had changed and expanded. No longer could it be viewed in strictly military or national terms. The economy, the environment, culture and human security now dominated international strategic relations. However, combined with other trends in the 1990s, the impact of the attack on America has brought back aspects of the Cold War world and catapulted traditional concerns about national security to the top of the agenda in order to deal with a non-traditional challenge. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld cautioned the American people that this is to be a protracted struggle comparable to the Cold War. We hear another Presidential address to the American people asking like-minded nations in all parts of the world to join the United States in what we are told will be a "long twilight struggle." Once again, we have Washington asserting indispensable leadership against a threat, which because it is directed primarily against America, endangers the entire Western world. As well, the NATO alliance is called upon to lend its material support and, even more important, legitimacy and unity to American efforts. The United States is yet again supplying military assistance and advisors, as in the Philippines, to help third world governments deal with insurgencies. Indeed, Daniel Pipes has compared the campaign against Islamic terrorists with the Cold War efforts to confront and contain communism wherever it existed.⁴ And in this effort, there is to be more than just containment: 'rollback' of the 'axis of evil' is to be the order of the day.

It was the global character of America's Cold War policies which made a seat at the table so important for Canada. Sharing Washington's appreciation of the pervasive nature of the threat, as well as a continent, it was essential that Ottawa also concentrate on its own national security and how its policies would be co-ordinated and adjusted to accommodate and support its closest ally. This approach continued into the post-Cold War era as the US continued to be globally engaged.

After 11 September, Canada was once again drawn into a global effort; specifically, one with even greater and more complex ramifications for bilateral security relations. Its response was to do what it has always done in the past — join the campaign alongside America and its Western allies. Along with the NATO partners, Canada invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, declaring the attack on America to be an attack on all Alliance members. Following this declaration, Ottawa dispatched forces overseas.

But the deployment of Canadian forces to join the Americans in Afghanistan is just the latest, albeit most dramatic, of what has come to be a familiar response in the post-Cold War era. It began with Canadian participation in the Gulf War, and has continued unabated ever since.

of not asking "How much is enough?", but rather, "How much is *just* enough?", the present government seems to have correctly gauged the necessary level of the Canadian contribution needed to demonstrate its support for the American campaign. Just as important, the CF has, once again, come through with not just a sufficient capability, but with an effective one — one which compares favourably with those of our other allies. In doing so, it has allowed the government to follow the dictates of the great German theorist Clausewitz on ways to continue its policies toward the United States "by other means".



HMCS *St. John's* (left) and the aircraft carrier USS *John F. Kennedy* (right) being resupplied by USS *Seattle* while patrolling in the Gulf of Oman as part of Operation "Apollo," July 2002.

DND Photo HS2002-10188-061 by MCpl Michel Durand

In the wake of the Gulf War, the CF began to turn its attention to how it could improve its ability to operate with the US in the disorderly regions of the New World Order. As stated in the 1994 Liberal White Paper, Canada must be prepared to fight with the best against the best. On land, at sea, in the air and in space, the CF has been scrambling to find the funds for the equipment and training needed to meet this objective. Interoperability was becoming a Canadian strategy, a strategy made explicit in *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020*. The CF must strengthen its “military to military relationships with our principal allies, ensuring interoperable forces, doctrine and C⁴I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence).” In particular, it called for expansion of “the joint and combined exercise program to include all environments and exchanges with the US.”⁵ Interoperability is the direct military consequence of accepting inter-polarity, or, at least, American dominance.

In December 1997, the *Globe and Mail* published an article on Canada’s “shrinking peacekeeping role.” It noted that the 250 Canadian Forces soldiers on various United Nations operations was the lowest number since Lester Pearson won the Noble Peace Prize forty years earlier. It also mentioned, parenthetically, that there were 1,300 Canadian troops in Bosnia. According to the article, these forces did not count because they were “part of a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) rather than UN force.”⁶

In the following few years, the imbalance between Canada’s UN and NATO peacekeeping commitments has become even more pronounced. As of 1 June 2000, there were some 2,756 CF personnel on overseas operations. Of these, 1596 were with the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and another 522 with the Alliance’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). In support of NATO operations in the Balkans, Canada had 118 personnel with the allied air forces at Aviano, Italy. If the ship’s company of HMCS *Fredericton* (225), sailing with NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic, is added, it means that 93 percent of all CF personnel overseas were deployed in support of NATO and its new peacekeeping operations.⁷ In addition, Canada continued to maintain a naval presence in the Persian Gulf. Only about 220 personnel — 190 of these on the Golan Heights and the remainder in small contingents of less than ten — were assigned to various UN activities.⁸ Canada did send troops on a limited UN mission to Eritrea, but they only served for a limited time. Meanwhile, Canada also dispatched forces to serve with NATO in Macedonia in August 2001.

The imbalance between blue and green operations is even more telling when the fact that the CF has deployed its most advanced equipment to NATO operations is taken into consideration; equipment that includes the CF-18 aircraft, the Coyote reconnaissance vehicles, the Leopard main battle tank and the patrol frigates. In comparison to NATO’s other middle powers, such as Belgium and Spain, Canada has a higher percentage of its available forces outside its borders — 6 percent as opposed to an average of 2 percent.⁹ While the Prime Minister may have declared that, “generally speaking, we are very reluctant to join an intervention that is not under the umbrella of the UN,”¹⁰ the reality, well before 11 September, was certainly otherwise.

The discrepancy between the UN blue helmet commitments and the NATO green helmet commitments organized

and led by the United States, tells the whole story of international peacekeeping in the 1990s and what happened to this quintessentially Canadian (and supposedly un-American) role for the CF. It also describes what happened to Canada’s relationship with NATO, as well as the American role in the Alliance. In the 1990s, Canada has been over there in Europe — the classic definition of ‘over there’ — with Uncle Sam.

This is not how the future looked at the end of the Cold War. At the beginning of the 1990s, the ‘Canadianization’ of US defence policy seemed at hand since the UN, with considerable American support, had launched a series of peacekeeping operations which, in a few years, saw nearly 80,000 blue helmets deployed from Cambodia to the former Yugoslavia.¹¹ With American global security interests contracting, and with the Security Council now able to reach a consensus more easily, peacekeeping offered Washington the prospect that the UN would be able to respond to regional crises and civil strife without the need to deploy US forces. The UN also undertook to intervene, on humanitarian grounds, in those countries suffering from starvation or atrocities brought on by internal struggles. Despite some early successes, it soon became clear that UN peacekeeping forces were not able to deal with all situations. In contrast to Cold War peacekeeping operations, the blue helmets were now being sent to areas where the fighting had not stopped; where, in fact, there was “no peace to keep.”¹² Its forces soon became bogged down in Somalia and at serious risk in Yugoslavia.

The reality was that the government would not spend significantly more on defence because it did not believe it had to in order to secure vital Canadian interests...

This led to a new variation in UN peace efforts. Rather than sending in lightly armed multinational forces under UN command, the Security Council authorized a coalition of states, usually led by the United States, to intervene more forcefully into civil conflicts and impose a peace or, at the very least, a cease-fire. Such was the approach in Haiti and the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), and with the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) sent into Bosnia after the US-brokered Dayton accords. This new, more muscular style of peacekeeping very much reflected a shift in American policies. The earlier enthusiasm for peacekeeping, evident in the Bush administration and, initially, under President Clinton, was replaced by a growing opposition, especially in the Congress, to the UN and peacekeeping operations. Even though the American troops killed in Somalia had not been under UN command, many in Congress blamed the UN for the debacle. Peacekeeping became a lightning rod for opposition to the Clinton administration’s foreign policy, which seemed to place too much trust in the world body. In the spring of 1994, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) set out strict conditions for American participation in UN operations and for US support. More importantly, PDD-25 made it clear that if international action was required and American troops were to be involved, then Washington would lead the operation under a UN mandate, but not under UN command and administration. It was not so much that the United States was not paying its peacekeeping assessments,

although in actual fact it was not; it was that Washington was taking steps to make sure that peacekeeping would be done the American way or not at all.

As the decade wore on, the number of peacekeeping missions declined. By mid-1996, there were just 26,000 troops serving in blue helmet UN operations.¹³ At the same time, the US was also working through NATO. Other 'coalitions of the willing' took the lead in implementing those UN mandates which it had helped sponsor and which were con-

not even protect itself. Canadian troops were threatened and, in some cases, taken hostage. While concerned about the deteriorating situation, Ottawa also worried about American calls for attacks on Serb forces, lest they put UNPROFOR in greater danger. By the summer of 1995, the government was looking forward to withdrawing the CF. Then came the NATO air strikes and the Dayton Accords, followed by the decision to deploy IFOR. After some hesitation, Canada agreed to contribute forces to the NATO force, and these remained for over three years. In similar fashion, Ottawa, which had early on taken the diplomatic lead in pressing for UN action against the military government of Haiti, eventually endorsed and then participated in the American-sponsored intervention.

Canada made a major commitment to IFOR and the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR), supplying one of the largest national contingents, in excess of 1200 troops, in addition to the continued deployment of a ship to the NATO naval force in the Adriatic. Furthermore, to the extent that SFOR became focused on post-conflict resolution and a wide variety of non-military activities to assist the population, the commitment was fully consistent with Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy's human security agenda.

Kosovo, however, represented the apogee of what became the 'Americanization of peacekeeping' in the 1990s. Although the operation could be justified on moral grounds and was consistent with a Human Security Agenda, the fact remained that this was a war being waged, without a UN mandate, against a sovereign country. Ottawa readily mounted up to join this latest American-led posse. Indeed, Canada mounted its largest overseas combat operation since the Korean War. In the Kosovo air campaign, "Canadian pilots flew 682 combat sorties, or nearly 10% of the missions against fixed targets — and they led half the strike packages they took part in, and were among only five countries delivering precision guided munitions."¹⁴ A total of 1,400 personnel were deployed to KFOR, including an infantry battle group, a reconnaissance squadron, a tactical helicopter squadron and an engineer contingent.

The Kosovo operations also showed that, given sufficient warning, the Army could move quickly overseas with vehicles and integrated helicopter units.

The Edmonton-based Lord Strathcona's Horse was the second NATO force to enter Kosovo and the Pristina area after the British; less than 72 hours after rolling hundreds of military vehicles and containers off a freighter in Greece, the Strathcona's were already spying on Russian peacekeepers and Serbian armoured units around Kosovo's only airport. Some 24 hours after that, a US Marine Corps Expeditionary Brigade specializing in quick deployments arrived in country.¹⁵

In the spring of 2000, Ottawa decided to consolidate its Balkan presence in Bosnia. A Canadian major general would assume command of the Multinational Division Southwest, a force responsible for 45 percent of the total SFOR area.¹⁶ With the continuing SFOR role, Canada has now maintained a military presence in the Balkans for nearly a decade, most of it under US/NATO leadership.



CF Combat Camera Photo IVD02-0227 by Sgt David Snaehall

Griffon helicopters providing support to security forces during the G8 summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, June 2002.

sistent with American policies and interests. It did appear that this approach was more effective in certain circumstances; for example, in Bosnia and Haiti. For Canada, it was this 'Americanization of peacekeeping', not opposition to it by the US, which had the most profound impact. Ottawa had supported Washington in the Gulf War, diplomatically and with forces. But it also eagerly embraced the renaissance of UN peacekeeping in the early 1990s. Within a few years, nearly 5,000 CF troops were abroad, most in the former Yugoslavia, with small numbers dispatched to Latin America and Cambodia. All of this reflected the long-standing Canadian desire to play an active and distinctively Canadian role in international security affairs. The 1994 Defence White Paper stressed the importance of contributing to international security efforts and responding to humanitarian disasters. It stated that the CF would also maintain a global combat capability. With cuts to the defence budget and personnel, it became increasingly difficult to maintain that Canada had anywhere near such a capability. Indeed, the heavy peacekeeping demands of the early 1990s had greatly strained the CF.

Even as Canada was increasing its contribution to UN efforts in the early 1990s, it was also taking part in NATO efforts in the former Yugoslavia. From the beginning, allied forces, including the Americans, supported the efforts of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Canada endorsed these allied efforts and the CF was involved in them. For example, the Navy participated in NATO's maritime enforcement of the UN arms embargo in the Adriatic Sea. On the ground it was becoming evident that, despite helping to avoid even more widespread fighting and atrocities, UNPROFOR was not working. Indeed, the force could

Had the CF been stretched too thin by the beginning of the new century? The answer was assuredly yes. But the problem cannot simply be attributed to the inability of the country's political leadership to understand the nature of the current international security environment. For as real as the operational problems are for members of the Armed Forces, the CF had been able to dispatch (albeit not without problems), army, navy and air units all over the world. From the perspective of the country's political leadership, Canada was doing more than its share, and the CF was effectively supporting the country's foreign policy. In fact, the leadership seemed to have a fairly firm and clear grasp of international and, especially, domestic realities. Nor was it a question of money. With its new budget surpluses, Ottawa had the money to spend. But the reality was that the government would not spend significantly more on defence because it did not believe it had to in order to secure vital Canadian interests — the security of the country and its prosperity. Nor, given the experiences of the 1990s, could Ottawa have expected that increases in defence spending in order to deploy more forces abroad in coalition operations would secure Canada enhanced influence in Washington or Brussels.

Here then was the root of the dilemma that advocates of an enhanced intervention capability for the CF faced when trying to convince an admittedly reluctant government to spend more on the military. The objectives of Canadian foreign policy are the promotion of prosperity and employment, the protection of our security within a stable global framework, and the advancement of Canadian values and culture.¹⁷ Simply put, the CF has, despite its well-documented deficiencies, generally supported the pursuit of these foreign policy objectives, to the extent that armed force is relevant to their achievement. Moreover, it has always been difficult, even during the world wars and the Cold War, to argue that a specific, particularly higher, level of contribution translates directly into the enhanced achievement of specific, vital national interests.

It is important to remember that Canada was not, in the first instance, dispatching forces to secure solely Canadian interests. The reality is that it is the protection and promotion of the interests of other states, mainly the United States, that has given rise to the requirement that Canada dispatch combat forces overseas. To be sure, as in the present case with regard to the war on terrorism, Canadian interests will be affected and participation in the operations is almost always consistent with broad foreign policy objectives and interests. But it does make a difference with regard to how much Ottawa believes it needs to send, and how those forces are to be organized. These are American-led coalition operations wherein Canada's military participation, however tactically and operationally useful, is undertaken primarily for politically symbolic reasons. As such, the government is aware that Canada can never make a militarily decisive contribution. But it is also well aware that Washington, for its own political reasons, will accept whatever contribution Canada can make. Nor has the political leadership been particularly concerned with the specifics of the CF command and control arrangements. However the CF wishes to organize itself for overseas operations, the forces will operate under American operational command as part of a combined force. And whatever those American-dictated combined operational arrangements are,

Ottawa will retain, as all allies do, the final say on how Canadian units will be employed.

It was not, as Joseph Jockel argued, a question of "soft-power and hard choices." The decisions facing the government were not that difficult. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet were aware that the public would not accept a major increase in defence spending, and that Canada's allies, including the US, would welcome and accept whatever contributions Ottawa could make. Despite mounting criticism at home, no Canadian contribution was ever turned away. Indeed, each time a new US-led coalition of the willing was formed, Ottawa was asked to contribute.

COMMITMENTS, CAPABILITIES AND COMPARISONS: CANADA AND THE CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN

In this context, the deployments to Afghanistan were fully consistent with previous trends in defence policy in the 1990s, both as to the nature of the deployments and the political calculations behind them. As of the end of April 2002, Canada had 4,079 personnel deployed on 13 overseas missions. Of these, over half, 2116, were with Operation "Apollo" (with 2052 in the AOR), and another 1,699 were still with SFOR in Bosnia, leaving 264 divided between the eleven other missions. The largest of the latter deployment, 190, was with the long-standing UN operation on the Golan Heights.

By the spring of 2002 the deployments in support of US Central Command were as follows:

- Canadian personnel arrived at US Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters on 1 October 2001. Organized under Commodore Jean-Pierre Thiffault, Joint Task Force South Asia (JTFSWA), and commanded by the Canadian National Command Element (NCE); headquarters located at MacDill Air Force Base near Tampa, Florida. By the end of March 2002 there were 61 Canadians at CENTCOM.
- By February 2002, DND estimates that a total of 2,650 Canadian Forces personnel had been deployed under Operation "Apollo."¹⁸ By March 2002, if all rotations were taken into account, a total of 3,400 CF personnel had taken part in the Afghan campaign.¹⁹

Army²⁰

Between 850-880 personnel deployed, operating with US Army 187th Brigade Combat Team Task Force (187 BCT):

- Immediate Reaction Force (Land) – IRF(L) – 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) Battle Group.
- Reconnaissance Squadron, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians), equipped with 12 Coyote armored reconnaissance vehicles.
- Combat service support from 1 Service Battalion – Strategic Line of Communications (SLOC).
- 130 soldiers from 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

Air Force²¹

- Strategic Airlift Detachment – one CC-150 Polaris long-range transport aircraft from 8 Wing Trenton, based in Germany with 43 CF personnel.
- Long-Range Patrol Detachment – two CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft from 14 Wing Greenwood and 19 Wing Comox, operating in the Arabian Gulf with 200 CF personnel.
- Tactical Airlift Detachment – three CC-130 Hercules transport aircraft from 8 Wing Trenton with 150 CF personnel. By March 2002, over 4.3 million pounds of freight had been moved.²²

Navy²³

- HMCS *Halifax* integrated into the USS *Carl Vinson* Carrier Battle Group.
- Canadian naval task group comprised of HMCS *Charlottetown*, HMCS *Preserver* and HMCS *Iroquois*. The task group included four Sea King helicopters. *Charlottetown* and *Iroquois* integrated into the USS *Bataan* Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) as an escort. *Preserver* performs replenishment at sea (RAS) operations (over 91 RAS operations since March 2002).²⁴
- HMCS *Vancouver*, replacing *Halifax*, integrated into the USS *John C. Stennis* Carrier Battle Group. Approx. 1500 personnel at its peak in February 2002. The duties of the Navy have been to conduct Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIOs) and Leadership Interdiction Operations (LIOs). Since March 2002, 6470 ships have been hailed. Canadian ships have executed 2963 of these hails and conducted 25 boarding missions.²⁵ Organic helicopters flew over 700 missions by March 2002.²⁶

Special Operation Forces²⁷

- Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) has performed a wide range of SOF tasks.

In the White House report, *Campaign Against Terrorism*, special mention is made of the fact that “Canada contributed the first coalition Task Group to arrive in CENTCOM AOR” (Area of Responsibility).²⁸

The Canadian contributions are in direct support, and integrated with, the America forces in Operation “Enduring Freedom.” Canada decided not to participate in the British-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/Operation “Fingal.” To date, seventeen nations have deployed forces to CENTCOM’s AOR with over 16,500 troops. The ISAF is a multinational force comprising 5000 personnel, created under a United Nations Security Council Chapter VII resolution. It is shaped around two infantry battlegroups, one led by the United Kingdom, the other by Germany. Fourteen other European nations also contribute.

According to a recent White House report, the European NATO allies have been contributing relatively significant numbers of forces to both the ISAF and “Enduring Freedom.” Excluding ISAF troops, there are about 3,600 British personnel in the region. France has deployed their only Carrier Battle Group to support combat operations in

the North Arabian Sea, and is also taking part in the build-up of the airfield in Kyrgyzstan. Germany has supplied 3,900 troops to “Enduring Freedom,” and another 1,200 with the ISAF. It has also supplied a naval task force and transport aircraft. Other European states, including Belgium, Spain, Denmark, Greece, Turkey and the Netherlands, have sent small numbers of transport and fighter aircraft, as well as individual naval vessels. Two of NATO’s newest members, Poland and the Czech Republic, have sent smaller forces, as has potential member Romania. Finland and Sweden have also sent forces. Traditional Pacific allies Australia, New Zealand and South Korea have forces taking part in both “Enduring Freedom” and the ISAF. The White House report also notes that countries as diverse as Jordan, Qatar, Uzbekistan and Cambodia are making contributions in various ways, such as allowing for overflights, basing and leasing of facilities.²⁹

While the world has rallied to President Bush’s call, this is not multilateralism but rather what Coral Bell called in 1999, the “pretense of concert.”³⁰ In other words, the allies need to appear that they are in fact being consulted and are exercising influence for the sake of appearance at home. In reality, this is all pretense, a thin veil for what is still essentially American unilateralism. Bell wrote before 11 September, yet the argument is even more appropriate today. This was not an attack upon civilization or democracy, it was, as Americans are well aware, an attack upon America by those who oppose American hegemony, especially in Middle Eastern affairs. It is not anti-Americanism, but realism to argue that if an attack of this scale had taken place in London or Paris, Washington would not now be rallying the world for a war on terrorism. Nor would Canada be making the commitment it is. It is precisely because this was an attack upon America, that US allies are concerned, and will, in the end, follow the US lead regardless of any misgivings they may voice beforehand about potential actions, such as possible operations against Iraq. And considering geographic proximity, the economic stake and public sentiment, the government’s decision was an easy one.

This is an American crusade, even more so than in the Gulf War. It is a classic ‘round up the posse’ undertaking in which it is impossible to imagine that Canada would not take part. Ottawa is committed to a forward defence approach to North American security in this war on terrorism. Given that it is as yet unclear what the role of the CF will be in the newly established US unified combatant command for North America, Northern Command (NORTHCOM), one can argue that the bulk of the Canadian military response since 11 September has been directed toward forward defence. And, as in a number of similar operations in the 1990s, relative to other allied contributions, the combined Canadian force compares quite favourably both in terms of numbers and in quality of the equipment dispatched. The naval forces and some of the elements of the land units, such as the Coyotes, have proven extremely effective. Moreover, given the wide range of operations, from cruise missile strikes to searching caves, not all forces need to be at the technological cutting-edge of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Comparisons are even more applicable when it is considered that this force has been engaged in a number of combat operations, one which found a Canadian officer in command of an American unit temporarily placed within larger Canadian forces.

Still, could Canada have done more? Could it have gotten its forces there sooner? Has the decision not to replace the ground forces finally exposed the weakness of the CF and thus, in the end, undermined American confidence in Ottawa's commitment?

Given numbers and the existing commitment in Bosnia, the Canadian contribution was about as large as could be hoped for (and somewhat more than critics had been predicting in the Fall of 2001). Had Canada had a greater strategic lift capacity, it might have been able to get its ground forces in place earlier. But it is not at all evident that this was necessary or that they somehow arrived too late to be of any use. As to whether this operation will place too much strain on an already stretched CF, here there are serious grounds for concern. It is evident that Canada could not maintain both the ground commitment in Afghanistan and rotate, for the tenth time, another force into Bosnia. It may therefore be necessary for Ottawa to reconsider yet another deployment to Bosnia. Given possible increased demands in North America and the importance to Canada of contributing at the forward edge of homeland defence, a case can be made for letting the Europeans 'backfill' in a region so close to their homelands. Moreover, the Canadian public remains both genuinely sympathetic to the tragedy that took place on American soil, and concerned about the vulnerability of their own nation. In this regard, the recent decision of the government to reduce by 500 the number of Canadian troops in the next rotation into Bosnia may well be an indication that this one will be the last. More importantly, with America now focusing more on homeland security, especially with the decision to establish a Northern Command, an argument can be made that Canada needs to reduce its overall commitment to overseas intervention and focus on North American defence.

MATCHING LIMITED MEANS TO LIMITED ENDS

The deployment to Afghanistan represented a strategically realistic use of limited military means to obtain what were limited political ends. After 11 September, Canada's prime interest was in assuring the United States that it took seriously America's response to this new threat. Behind this fundamental consideration was justifiable concern about the maintenance of the free flow of goods across the border upon which Canadian prosperity and employment depends. As Haglund and Fortmann have put it, "Ottawa was aware of the need to preserve the 'Kingston Dispensation'."³¹ After 11 September, the United States was in no mood to 'stand idly by' anywhere, and Canada's obligations as a good and friendly neighbour are now to be tested as they have not been since the early days of the Cold War.

The Liberal government recognized that part of that test included a willingness to send forces overseas to participate in the forward defence of the North American homeland. Fortunately, the Canadian military has been working toward enhancing its ability to operate with the Americans overseas for the past several years, despite earlier budget cutbacks. And while the government could be accused of being disinterested in defence policy, this did not prevent (and indeed may have facilitated) the issuing of *A Strategy for 2020*,

which placed interoperability with the US at the centre of CF force development and doctrine. Similarly, the government did not seem to interfere with the continuing arranging and rearranging of the command and control structure. Yet, while the military has yet to arrive at a militarily satisfactory command and control arrangement for overseas forces, the efforts to date seem to have worked reasonably well. Thus, when the call came and the government knew it had to send something, the CF was able to provide the government with an extremely useful military tool with which it could secure its overall political objective of assuring the US that Canada would and could contribute.

As in the recent past, Ottawa was aware that, for Washington, numbers and, to a certain extent, high technological capabilities did not count as much as simply being there. After all, as the champion of the RMA, and with a clear determination to run the campaign without even the pretense of mul-



Vehicles of Reconnaissance Squadron, Lord Strathcona's Horse patrolling an area north-east of Kandahar airfield in Afghanistan, July 2002.

DND Photo AP2002-5540 by Cpl Lou Penney

tilateralism, the United States has not been overly concerned with the character of individual national contributions. (Even though it is getting some markedly high quality assistance from its so-called 'high end' NATO allies such as France, Britain, Germany and Canada.)

Given the importance of this campaign to the security and way of life of Americans, Ottawa could be under no illusions about being able to leverage military contributions into influence over the overall strategic and political direction of the war on terrorism. In this campaign, there is not even the 'pretense' of concert. Even less could it expect that contributions to this effort would have any positive impact on major trade disputes, such as those over softwood lumber or farm subsidies. The government had a set of important, realistic, yet limited political objectives that it believed the deployment itself would fulfill. It seems to have worked, and as a bonus the CF has done much to enhance its image at home by its outstanding performance in the field. It is a performance that has also drawn a measure of praise south of the border.³²

It may well be the case that public opinion, when surveyed, will now be more favourably disposed towards the kind of increased defence spending that would give Canada a

greater overseas intervention capability. With its continued budgetary surpluses, Ottawa, as critics point out, now has the money to increase spending on social programs *and* defence. But the improved fiscal situation also, in an important way, works against those who believe that new-found public support will finally compel the Liberal government to spend more on defence. As a general rule in democracies, when the economy is doing well, governments are more or less secure. Thus, while beset with scandals, the current government, much like that of President Clinton in the late 1990s, enjoys a measure of public support. Whatever failings one may attribute to Jean Chrétien as a 'warlord,' and however much it may be just a matter of good luck, the current government has managed to improve the prosperity and employment prospects of Canadians — the first foreign policy priority. Given this political reality, the government is unlikely to feel pressured by transitory polls showing support for higher defence spending to pour billions into DND.

While Washington would surely have welcomed a Canadian decision to replace the ground troops in Afghanistan, this is unlikely to have a detrimental impact on Canada-US relations, any more than a decision to replace would have had a significantly positive impact. To be sure, if Canada had not sent any ground forces to Afghanistan, they would have been conspicuous by their absence. But, despite the well-earned praise, in the larger context of American foreign policy and this war in particular, the troops were inconspicuous despite their presence. Ottawa will maintain naval and air forces in the region. More importantly, it is evident

that overall coalition war-fighting operations are winding down. Other allies, such as Britain, are also reducing their presence as the peacekeeping force, now led by Turkey, takes over to support the long term effort of rebuilding the country and securing the newly installed democratic government. Once again, the so-called 'know nothings', the political masters who direct Canadian foreign and defence policy, may have made the right decision.

The current government may not know much about how to maintain or treat its military. For far too long it has ignored serious equipment and personnel shortages. A reckoning may not be far off if the current pace of operations continues. Yet the government evidently knows how to use military force to advance the national interest and, equally important, its own political agenda. This is Clausewitz, Canadian style, to be sure. War is the continuation of policy by other means, requiring the firm subordination of military actions to political objectives. If this is so, then at least in the present campaign, Jean Chrétien, that master of the 'art of the possible' in domestic politics, may well be a better student of the art of war than his legion of critics have given him credit for.

The author would like to thank Mr. Phil Lagasse for his assistance with this paper. All errors are mine alone.



NOTES

1. This paper was partially drawn from "Clausewitz, Canadian Style," a paper presented to the conference on "Toward a North American Perimeter? Canada, the United States and Homeland Security," co-sponsored by the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, Dartmouth College and the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, Hanover, New Hampshire, 23-24 May 2002. Parts of it have also been submitted as commentary on the papers in Session 3 of the "Seapower Conference 2002: Intervention and Engagement: A Maritime Perspective," Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S 7-9 June 2002.
2. Jan Cienski, "A Lot to Thank Canada For, Powell Says," *National Post Online*, www.nationalpost.com, 25 April 2002.
3. Parts of this section have been taken from Joel J. Sokolsky, "The Politics of Defence Decisions at Century's End," in Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership* (St. Catherines: Vanwell, 2001), and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Sailing in Concert: The Politics and Strategy of Canada-US Naval Interoperability," *Choice* 8 (2002).
4. See Daniel Pipes, "Who Is the Enemy?," *Commentary* 1 (2002).
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6. Paul Koring, "Haiti pullout reveals shrunken peace role," *The Globe and Mail*, 15 December 1997, sec. A, p. 1.
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8. "UN Needs Upgrade to Keep Peace: Panel," *The Kingston Whig Standard*, 24 August 2000, p. 13.
9. David Haglund and Alen Sens, "Smaller NATO Members: Belgium, Canada, Portugal and Spain," unpublished paper.
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11. United Nations Association of the United States, *Washington Weekly Report* (22), 14 June 1996, p. 4.
12. Major Brad Bergstrand, "What Do You Do When There's No Peace to Keep?" *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 23 (1994), pp. 25-30.
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19. Department of National Defence. Press Release; available from www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/2002/mar02/mar13_w_e.htm.
20. Department of National Defence. Press Release; available from www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/2002/mar02/7mar02_b_e.htm.
21. *Ibid.*
22. US White House, 2002, *Campaign Against Terrorism: A Coalition Update* (March 2002); available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/march11/coalition/coalitionupdate.html>.
23. Department of National Defence. Press Release; available from www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/2002/mar02/7mar02_b_e.htm.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*
26. US White House, 2002, *Campaign Against Terrorism: A Coalition Update* (March 2002).
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. Coral Bell, "American Ascendancy and the Pretense of Concert," *National Interest* 57 (Fall 1999).
31. David Haglund and Michel Fortmann, "Canada and the Issue of Homeland Security: Does the Kingston Dispensation Still Hold?," *Canadian Military Journal* 3 (2002).
32. Indeed, *Soldier of Fortune* magazine recently ran a feature on the skills of Canadian snipers in Afghanistan. It noted that they "killed more of the enemy than their American counterparts." David Pugliese, "US Magazine Honours Canadian Sharpshooters," *The Whig Standard* (Kingston, Ont) 9 July 2002, p. 9.